REPORT FROM THE BIENNIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC CENTER
AUGUST 30 - SEPTEMBER 2, 1999 HONOLULU, HAWAII
Asia-Pacific Security in a Time of Economic Recovery
The Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
(APCSS) held its biennial conference from August 30 to September 2, 1999.
The conference brought together senior policymakers, defense
officials, and scholars from the Asia-Pacific region to discuss regional
security issues under the broad theme of “Asia-Pacific Security in a
Time of Economic Recovery.” The
conference covered the broad theme with regional security panels (that
focused on the particular security concerns of the various subregions) and
subject-matter workshops (that focused on security from a variety of
perspectives: economic, social, demographic, and military).
Asia: Virtually all panelists pointed to
developments on the Korean peninsula as the region’s primary flash point.
Although concerns about North Korea’s true intentions are
heightened by the possibility of a second launch of a longer range Taepodong
missile sometime this year, the Republic of Korea is firmly committed to its
almost two-year-old policy of engagement, otherwise known as the “sunshine
policy.” China’s emergence
as a major power was also a central concern for several members of the
panel. Japan tackled the
issue most directly, calling on Beijing to increase the transparency of its
defense budget. The Japanese
representative further described the Taiwan Strait as a possible regional
flash point. China attempted to
address these concerns, describing fears over Beijing’s military
modernization efforts as “mind-boggling.”
Efforts to bolster China’s military capabilities, according to the
Chinese representative, are a natural product of the country’s rapid
economic growth. China went on
to insist that it was committed to peaceful resolutions of outstanding
territorial disputes; Beijing further pledged to use force to resolve
Taiwan’s status only as a “last resort.”
Southeast Asia: Southeast Asia is experiencing relative peace and stability, despite the recent outbreak of violence in East Timor following its vote for independence from Indonesia. However, there remain potential threats that could hamper regional stability. For example, continued financial belt-tightening has forced many Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) members to cut defense budgets, and this threatens to impair the capability of the regional armed forces to carry out effective surveillance of their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as well as to combat illegal immigration. The region is also concerned about unresolved territorial disputes, such as the Spratly Archipelago. Its promise of economic abundance and control of strategic sea lines of communication has prompted several countries to build and man permanent structures on various reefs and atolls. Indonesia, meanwhile, remains torn by simmering ethnic and religious tensions as provinces and territories clamor for greater autonomy or secession. The Indonesian military’s “redefinition, reposition and re-actualization” may have to be postponed as tensions between pro- and anti-independence groups erupted in East Timor’s UN-sponsored vote for independence.
Asia: The panel on South Asian security issues
focused on both traditional and non-traditional threats to security.
The clearest and most dangerous flash point in the region is the
sustained conflict between India and Pakistan, primarily over Kashmir.
This conflict has become much more volatile with the introduction of
nuclear weapons on both sides. Alongside
such threats of traditional military conflict lies the emerging problem of
transnational security challenges. Narcotics
trafficking (and the attendant problem of organized crime) continues to be a
major problem for the region, as is arms smuggling.
Human smuggling is yet another problem that is common throughout the
region, often perpetrated by the same gangs that trade in drugs or other
illegal commodities. Environmental
threats were also listed as a concern for some nations in the region.
Maldives, for instance, is concerned about sea-level rise, resulting
from global warming. Other
countries are worried about the possibility of natural disasters, possibly
resulting from climate change.
Pacific/Oceania: Security issues in the South Pacific range
from traditional worries about flash points in the wider region—such as
Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula—as well as more non-traditional concerns,
such as environmental degradation and global warming, transnational threats
(including narcotics smuggling and human trafficking), and natural
disasters. Like other parts of
the Asia-Pacific region, the South Pacific region has its own share of flash
points, including Bougainville in Papua New Guinea.
Concern was also expressed about instability in the Solomon Islands,
sparked when Guadalcanal militants drove thousands of Malaitans back to
their own island due to conflicts over land, jobs, and political control.
The conflict has had a very negative impact on the Solomons’
economy and has resulted in widespread unemployment.
Island states are concerned about fisheries and sea-level rise
resulting from global warming. Moreover, many Pacific Island states are worried about being
neglected by the major powers of the region.
Proliferation in the Asia-Pacific Region: This working group focused on the growing
threat of arms proliferation in the Asia-Pacific region.
Among other things, the panel noted that the current financial crisis
has created a lull in defense spending and thus reduced purchases of arms.
However, current indications suggest a new wave of defense
expenditures will accompany the economic recovery that is currently
underway. By the year 2015, the
region is likely to reach pre-crisis growth.
Additionally, the panel noted that globalization requires regional
solutions to such problems as arms proliferation.
The recent reductions in multilateral solutions must be reversed, and
regional accords increased. The
United States should play a role in addressing arms proliferation concerns,
but should not necessarily be the leader in the region’s efforts to deal
with this huge issue.
Governance in an Era of Diminished Expectations: This working group challenged the assumptions inherent in the working group title itself; the political transitions experienced in Southeast Asia, the panel noted, is a consequence not of “diminished expectations,” but rather increased expectations among the people of the region. Much of this rise in expectation has been driven by the growth and strength of the middle class in countries such as Thailand, South Korea, and Singapore. The post–Cold War era increased the “peace dividend” in East Asia, and there was a rising expectation by the people to demand more from the state to provide basic protection against human vulnerabilities. When the financial crisis occurred, it reduced the state’s capacity to deliver these basic rights to the people, which led to the overwhelming demands for change that we have seen occurring across the region. The financial crisis has also provided greater “open space” for civil societies to expand and strengthen themselves in countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines.
Capitalism into the Early 21st Century: The
discussions suggested that India’s past slow economic growth was the
result of retaining policies that had outlived their relevance and
usefulness. However, economic reform is slowly and fitfully taking place in
India, leading to higher growth rates. Still, India has managed to avoid the
impact of the financial crisis partly because its links to the global
economy are weak. Asia’s remarkable turnaround from the economic crisis
has an unfinished agenda (corporate restructuring, debt reduction, and
management of political tensions).
Participants also agreed that despite institutional weakness, the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) has significant potential to
make a great impact on the future shape of the international political
economy if it can bridge the gap between North and South.
Asian Capitalism into the Early 21st Century: The discussions suggested that India’s past slow economic growth was the result of retaining policies that had outlived their relevance and usefulness. However, economic reform is slowly and fitfully taking place in India, leading to higher growth rates. Still, India has managed to avoid the impact of the financial crisis partly because its links to the global economy are weak. Asia’s remarkable turnaround from the economic crisis has an unfinished agenda (corporate restructuring, debt reduction, and management of political tensions). Participants also agreed that despite institutional weakness, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) has significant potential to make a great impact on the future shape of the international political economy if it can bridge the gap between North and South.
on the Chinese Defense White Paper: This working
group focused on the implications of China’s most recent—and
first—Defense White Paper. Among
other things, panel members noted that the notion of security has been
expanded by China to include such things as internal stability and
prosperity, regional stability, and Asia-Pacific dialogue.
The panel agreed that events since the publication of this paper
have not changed these objectives. Moreover,
future steps to build confidence in the region would include having more
transparency on defense doctrines and budgets as well as elaborating
positions on maritime disputes and the U.S. forward presence.
Roles in Transnational Security: This working
group considered a variety of topics related to the evolving role of
military forces in the region.
First, the panel examined the impact of the financial crisis on
military modernization in the region.
It was noted that the crisis has indeed had a remarkable impact on
stalling military modernization among many countries, although there are
notable exceptions (i.e., China and Taiwan).
The panel also looked at the emerging role of the military in
addressing transnational security problems.
It was noted that the future role of military forces is likely to
continue to expand from traditional “defense of the nation” into more
non-traditional roles aimed primarily at transnational threats.
Moreover, it is increasingly clear that military action in response
to transnational threats is bounded on one hand by national imperatives
and ever-broader definitions of security, and on the other, by respect for
Future of the Asia-Pacific Community: This working
group looked at the general trend of community-building in the region.
It was noted that although a broader sense of common identity is
beginning to emerge in the region, an Asia-Pacific community is still far
in the future. Nationalism
and wide-ranging concepts of national identity still remain significant
impediments to the creation of a more formal Pacific community.
Although several regional institutions have been formed in an
effort to forge a common purpose on political, economic, and security
issues in Asia—such as APEC, ARF, and ASEAN—these organizations were
seriously weakened by the financial crisis.
“Enriched bilateralism”, in the words of a senior American
military official, may provide the best vehicle for attaining
comprehensive security over the next decade.
Change in Asia: This working group focused on the
security implications associated with the general trend towards an aging
and mobile population, which increasingly resides in urban areas.
Presentations and subsequent discussions highlighted the
fact that an aging population in Asia will create great strains on the
existing family-based care for the elderly. The inability of governments to provide basic services to
populations in rapidly expanding Asian megacities was discussed as a
potential source of social unrest for governments in the region.
Finally, migration was viewed as both a source of potential
internal instability as well as an effective balancing mechanism in the
Perspectives on the U.S.-East Asia Strategy Report: Three U.S. panelists and a discussant from China provided perspectives of the 1998 United States Strategy for East Asia Pacific Region (EASR) published by the U.S. Department of Defense. The main theme of the discussion highlighted the enduring nature of U.S. security interests in East Asia. As a result, the sense of continuity in U.S. policy and strategy is reflected in the EASR. Principal observations were: the United States continues to be a dominant force in the region; Japan remains crucial to U.S. strategy in the region; and bilateral alliances are critical and underpin any movement towards multilateral arrangements. Key changes to the EASR were also noted to include a broader interpretation of security by including transnational security concerns and the first mention of continued U.S. presence following Korean reunification/reconciliation. A criticism that the EASR was “anodyne” was viewed as praise because it emphasizes the continuity of American policy. As intended, it reassures and emphasizes common ground.
an effort to stay at the forefront of debate on regional security issues, the
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies held a four-day conference featuring
presentations and discussions among the region’s top government
officials and analysts of international affairs. The biennial event was divided
into two broad sessions: a day of subregional panels centered on presentations
from officials representing the major countries of Asia; and a day of concurrent
working group sessions that addressed themes and issues relevant to all
countries in the region. Representatives from more than 30 countries in the
Asia-Pacific and beyond were in attendance. With the exception of formal
presentations, discussions were conducted on a non-attribution
basis to encourage frank discussion.
While all panelists agreed that the
Northeast Asia subregion is relatively stable at present, there are concerns
that this stability could be shattered by a number of prominent security issues.
In general, traditional security issues (e.g., strategic miscalculation by the
recalcitrant North Korea, arms proliferation, escalating territorial disputes,
changing bilateral relations and military alliances, etc.) continue to dominate
the concerns of this subregion. A number of areas where conflict could
potentially erupt in the region were identified: tensions on the Korean
Peninsula, the issue of Taiwan, and increasing competition for resources in the
South China Sea. Panelists also expressed a growing recognition that
globalization, recent technological advances, and “new threats” to security
(e.g., environmental degradation, organized crime, maritime piracy, illegal
migration, etc.) have and will continue to fundamentally reshape the strategic
balance in Northeast Asia. As such, these ascending security threats will
warrant more attention in the near future.
all panelists pointed to developments on the Korean Peninsula as the region’s
primary “hot spot.” Worries over North Korea’s intentions have been
renewed by indications that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)
is preparing another test launch of its Taepodong missile. Although tensions
have abated somewhat in recent weeks, panelists noted that a missile launch
would be especially troubling considering the lingering suspicion of a North
Korean nuclear program. Concern was also expressed about North Korea’s
possible implosion and the strategic implications of such an event. Although
they differed on policy specifics, members of the panel were unanimous in their
assertion that tensions on the peninsula should be resolved through dialogue and
participants cited the possible deployment of a Theatre Missile Defense (TMD)
system in the region as cause for concern. These panelists drew attention to the
potentially destabilizing effects that a TMD program could have on Northeast
Asia. Detractors of the program were unified in their fear that a TMD system
would create tension and shift the existing balance of power by eroding China
and Russia’s strategic deterrent, and thus spark a new round of arms
proliferation and military build-up in the region.
of the panel also cited escalating territorial disputes as a common concern.
Some panelists highlighted the recent armed conflict on the South Asian
subcontinent as particularly unsettling given the confirmed nuclear capabilities
of the combatants. Other panelists underscored the potential for conflict
between the major powers in the Taiwan Strait as more alarming for the region.
Participants differed in their suggestions for solving the situations—some
emphasized “deterrent” policies while others favored a “dialogue”
approach. Despite the divergences, however, members of the panel agreed that
long-term management of these disputes and preservation of peace in the
Asia-Pacific depended on maintaining constructive bilateral relations between
countries of the region, formulating an effective partnership framework among
regional powers, and continuing development of multilateral fora.
members conveyed their opinions on many regional concerns, focusing on the
following specific issues: 1) the
lingering effects of the 1997 economic crisis, 2) violence in East Timor, 3) the
continuing territorial disputes and claims of sovereignty in the South China
Sea, 4) ongoing differences between China and Taiwan, and 5) the potential for
nuclear escalation in the region.
currency crisis that began in 1997 produced the two worst years for the regional
economy in recent memory. Countries
accustomed to seeing a steady 6- to- 8- percent annual growth are now unevenly
recovering from two years of little or no growth.
The subsequent decline in the standard of living has similarly impacted
both national defense and regional security.
Most ASEAN states were forced to cut defense budgets, suspend arms
procurement programs, and reduce allocation for defense research and
development. Unchecked, this trend
could undermine overall defense capabilities and disrupt military programs
designed to carry out surveillance of exclusive economic zones and the ability
to combat piracy, illegal immigration, and drug trafficking.
Panel members were firm in their belief that ASEAN should maintain its
economic leadership in the region to facilitate full economic recovery, thereby
allowing much needed improvements in regional security.
the past two years, Southeast Asia has experienced a time of relative peace and
However, recent sovereignty disputes in Indonesia and between China and
Taiwan sound the clarion call of concern over potential flash points that could
jeopardize regional stability.
remains torn by simmering ethnic and religious tensions as provinces and
territories clamor for greater autonomy or independence.
Violence in East Timor erupted between pro- and anti-independence groups
after the August 30 referendum produced a clear call for secession.
The United Nation's sponsored vote was seen as a success for
self-determination, but procedures to contain post-election violence, if in
place, had no effect.
The Indonesian military, which is currently attempting to reinvent its
place in Indonesian society, may hold the key to the successful resolution of
this and subsequent issues of national sovereignty.
has been done to resolve the worsening territorial disputes concerning
overlapping claims in the Spratly Archipelago.
Its economic promise in fishing, petroleum, gas, and mineral resources,
in addition to the islands’ proximity to strategic sea lines of communication,
have prompted several countries to build and man permanent structures on various
reefs and atolls claimed by other nations.
In addition to unresolved questions of sovereignty, panel members feared
the increased military presence in the area could lead to militarization of the
islands, and in turn, further escalation of regional tensions.
members expressed some concern over the rhetoric exchanged between Taiwan and
the People's Republic of China. Taiwan's
decision to abandon the one-China doctrine and declare it would regard ties with
Beijing as "one Nation, two States" infuriated China and diminished
the prospects of a peaceful reunification in the near future.
Panel members view with dismay China's refusal to discount the
possibility of using armed force to achieve its goal of recovering full control
of Taiwan. This position has been a
catalyst for both sides to pursue a destabilizing arms build-up, with Taiwan
buying 150 F-16 fighters, and China's construction of an aircraft carrier.
Asian nations are concerned about the nuclear build-up in Asia.
Recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, combined with North Korea's
nuclear research and long-range missile development are unsettling.
These events may have the effect of encouraging other regional members to
pursue nuclear technology as a security safeguard.
potential flash points alluded to by panel members included the danger of
increased international terrorism, environmental degradation, drug trafficking,
and piracy on the high seas.
South Asia grapples with evolving external security concerns, internal security
has become a major dilemma.
Nearly all the countries in the region have serious internal security
threats that have forced the commitment of major economic resources to control.
Sri Lanka, internal security problems threaten the stability of the country.
Sri Lanka is still struggling economically as it slowly progresses
towards solution of the Tamil insurgency.
The economy has been crippled, as the country has had to deploy forces
throughout the island to battle terrorism.
The economic cost alone of combating terrorism threatens internal
has had to commit significant resources to containing the terrorist activities
of Kashmiri dissidents.
This deployment to control terrorism has serious economic impacts on the
rest of the country.
Nepal also is struggling to cope with increased internal terrorist
activity that forces the government to commit scant economic resources to
and Pakistan's nuclear testing in May of 1998 has resulted in increased
uncertainty between the two powers. In
their recent border escalation in Kashmir, both countries limited their military
activity to the Kashmir border area alone.
While tension escalated, neither side used or threatened to use their
newly tested nuclear capabilities. In
fact, deployment of troops was contained in the affected region.
India and Pakistan will continue to struggle with border differences and
have continued to remain at odds in the matter of an overall solution to
Kashmir. Pakistan still feels that
a bilateral approach with India will not produce viable results.
This distrust will continue to be a major impediment to future bilateral
countries in the region feel uneasy about the possibility of a hegemonic India.
With little U.S. presence and Chinese influence dwindling as India works
to resolve differences with her northern neighbor, border disputes and economic
differences loom as even more important.
India's quest for superpower status has also led to some mistrust by
other countries in the region.
Smaller countries rely on multilateralism for survival.
throughout the region remains an extremely significant security concern.
All the countries in South Asia have difficulty providing for basic human
Nutrition, education, health care, and employment trends have not shown
significant improvement. South Asia's concentration of population intensifies
One-fifth of the world's population is concentrated on 2 percent of the
Another acute and interrelated problem facing the region is the environment. As these nations confront internal and external security threats, environmental degradation has emerged as an essential concern. Due to the concentration of population, poor education, and necessary use of resources to sustain those living on the land, the environment suffers greatly.
Asia's security challenges for the future center around peaceful coexistence and
handling internal strife.
Economic development, resources and population management, and protection
of the environment are critical, interrelated concerns.
issues in the South Pacific include traditional worries about flash points in
the wider region—such as Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula—as well as less
traditional security concerns such as environmental degradation and global
warming, transnational crime (including illegal drug and human smuggling) and
a regional perspective, several country presenters from the South Pacific
expressed concern about the continued effects of the Asian economic crisis and
its impact on regional organizations and institutions.
Among other things, there is concern that the economic crisis has
resulted in reduced military spending that potentially could cause military
imbalances between countries that could be destabilizing.
Also of concern is the usual litany of flash points that dominate
the region, including tension in the Taiwan Strait, instability in North Korea,
potential conflict in the South China Sea, etc. One participant stressed that the stability of the
China–Japan–United States relationship was key to regional stability.
other parts of the Asia-Pacific region, the South Pacific region has its own
share of flashpoints. Instability
in Papua New Guinea—especially Bougainville—was listed by several presenters
as a major concern. Concern
was also expressed about instability in the Solomon Islands, sparked when
Guadalcanal militants drove thousands of Malaitans back to their own island
because of conflict over land and
jobs. This conflict has had a very
negative impact on the Solomon Islands’ economy and has resulted in severe
Alongside traditional security concerns,
many presenters noted the importance of rising nontraditional security issues.
Transnational crime—including drug trafficking and people
smuggling—was cited as a major worry by many presenters.
In the South Pacific, concern about global warming-and its potential
impact on sea-level rise-was described as being a major security issue for
Pacific Island states. Moreover, one presenter from an island state noted that
illegal fishing constitutes a major security concern.
specter of arms proliferation looms in the Asia-Pacific region. But just how serious a problem is it? This issue served as the backdrop for discussion in this
working group. In embarking upon a
thematic tour of the region, the participants addressed the issue of weapons of
mass destruction, the ability of various nations to deliver such weapons, and
the industry and technology that are connected with these issues.
The panel’s remarks encouraged many probing questions and insightful
comments from the floor.
first of the working group’s three presenters was a senior defense analyst
from Japan, who focused on weapons of mass destruction and their delivery
systems— particularly ballistic and cruise missiles.
He made a comparative assessment of the capabilities of the region’s
most powerful countries—noting, with particular interest, developments in
North Korea, China, Russia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan.
argued that a three-way combination of export control, deterrence, and missile
defense systems may be helpful in stopping proliferation and the use of
ballistic and cruise missiles.
He was guarded in his optimism about the potential for success owing to
the need, arguably not yet realized, of the international community to
strengthen various nonproliferation efforts in a coordinated manner.
Australian scholar addressed the issue of conventional arms control.
He noted that, in the 1980s and into the 1990s, Asia doubled its share of
world military expenditure. He went on to argue that these acquisitions were
strategically justified. While the Asian economic crisis has led to a lull in
this growth, he did not foresee a long-term slowdown.
to respond to weapons proliferation seem far more symbolic than real, and there
is little prospect over the next decade for effective arms control or
multilateral security dialogue.
The commitment of the region to self-reliance and modernization remains
strong. He did think it is nevertheless useful to consider several sorts of arms
transparency (Regional Arms Register); avoidance of inadvertent
escalation through reciprocal acquisition and modernization; prevention of
long-range, land-attack cruise missile proliferation; and tightened control of
information warfare technology.
American space technology expert explored the increasingly complex area of
technology transfers and export controls.
She noted that Americans (particularly those in Washington, D.C.) have
been enthralled recently with Chinese space activities, primarily in connection
with the Cox Report, which came out last spring.
The report alleged that the Chinese had been spying at laboratories in
the United States, and their advancements in missile technology were
attributable to Chinese scientists’ work with American companies launching
Both of these findings are sources of significant controversy: They are
also extremely important developments in their own right.
important is the manner in which the United States responded. She concluded that
the American response may ultimately be counterproductive in several areas
critical to national security.
key themes emerged from the session: prospects
for conventional arms control in Asia are not good; the impact of the Asian
economic crisis on arms control is only temporary; and partisanship and
regulation are having an impact on the aerospace and related industries.
for conventional arms control in Asia are not good.
North Korea’s development of nuclear warheads is stalled, it is acquiring
missile capability—particularly missiles able to deliver chemical
weapons—and this capability is being exported.
China’s willingness only to curb surface-to-surface missiles is
representative of its lukewarm commitment to promoting arms control—due in
part to its view that the United States is leaking missile technology into East
Russia’s economic difficulties continue to undercut efforts to limit
the exportation of this technology.
Korea and Taiwan have been effectively pressured into accepting limits pressed
by the United States but still enjoy significant short-range capabilities.
Japan— not possessing such weaponry—cautiously monitors the
situation. Export controls, mutual
deterrence, and deployment of defense systems have been viewed by some as
possible means of limiting the threats of missile technology proliferation.
Nevertheless, more and more countries are acquiring WMDs; thus, there is
an ever-increasing invitation to war, not peace.
Control, to a large extent, depends on political stability.
economic crisis’ significant but temporary impact on arms purchases will not
prevent another cycle of increased procurement, which can be expected around
date, arms control efforts in the region have been virtually nonexistent.
While significant disparity among nations has contributed to acquisition
programs, self-reliance has taken on a new dimension—but not necessarily a bad
In the meantime, there are possibilities for progress.
These include the development of transparency measures, fewer examples of
action-reaction dynamics, limitations on cruise missiles and related technology,
and serious attention to control of information warfare.
the impact of the financial crisis in the region, the long-term prospects for
conventional arms control are not good. Emphasis is likely to be on offensive
versus defensive weapons—while the advantage of ballistic missiles is
Still, it is difficult to say whether current trends are actually fueling
a true arms race in the region.
of partisanship and regulation on the aerospace and related industries is
of the potential monetary bonanza from commercial satellites are becoming
The Asian financial crisis, a string of rocket failures, the prospects of
rising insurance costs, and increasingly restrictive U.S. export policies are
combining to threaten the vitality of the industry.
This will lead to funding problems for satellite programs.
Export policy and technology issues due, in large part, to reactionary
legislation and regulations arising out of a knee-jerk response to the Cox
Report are at the heart of the problem.
If the United States wishes to continue to walk the line between
management of proliferation and encouragement of capitalism in the aerospace
industry, it must move quickly to update both the rules and processes for doing
working group looked at recent military trends in the Asia-Pacific region in
light of three major developments: the growing importance of transnational
security threats to security planners, the impact of the recent financial
crisis, and the implications for the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).
German scholar focused on the impact of the Asian economic crisis on military
modernization efforts in the East Asian region. Up until 1997, many Asian
countries were actively engaged in modernizing their military forces. Although
global defense expenditures declined in the 1990s, the share of major
conventional weapons deliveries in Asia increased from 31 to 41 percent during
the period from 1988 to1997. This modernization has been especially pronounced
in Northeast Asia, where five states—China, Japan, Taiwan, North Korea, and
South Korea—accounted for 70 percent of all military expenditures in East
economic crisis that began in 1997 reversed that trend in most cases.
First, the economic crisis led to a dramatic currency depreciation that
has resulted in reduced arms imports.
Simultaneously, many governments in the region have had fewer funds for
military training and exercises.
This has had a major impact on long-term modernization efforts.
defense spending in the Asian region has had a number of short and long-term
Most immediately, the crisis has resulted in fewer arms imports to the
Moreover, funding limits have, in many cases, reduced operational
readiness. For the longer term, reduced defense spending in the region has
thwarted American efforts to get Asia to carry a greater defense load.
It has also challenged U.S. efforts to forge—or maintain—strategic
alliances in the region, as regional partners are unable to carry their weight
in military matters.
senior Thai military officer focused on the increasing role of military forces
in addressing transnational security issues. In the post–Cold War world,
transnational threats have emerged as major security concerns for many nations.
Unlike traditional security threats (such as a military invasion or
missile attack), transnational threats thrive despite the existence of national
They are often protracted threats that are driven by non-state actors.
Examples include narcotics trafficking, illegal migration, terrorism,
arms trafficking, and transboundary pollution.
forces are often ideally suited to deal with these challenges because of their
training, equipment, and expertise. Some governments are more eager to deploy
military forces against transnational threats than others.
However, in other countries, political or legal barriers make such
deployments impracticable. As countries increasingly deploy military forces
against transnational issues, they must also consider the impact that such
deployments might have on readiness against more traditional security threats.
American military officer focused on the impact of the Revolution in Military
Essentially the RMA uses technology to enhance war- fighting
capabilities. Although many military planners are placing much expectation and
faith in the RMA, the reality is that it may not be a cure-all. Among other
things, the RMA may result in a reduced size for military forces, may cause
pressure for reduced deployment, and may prompt other countries to pursue
RMA may also have negative consequences for America’s allies in Asia.
Because RMA advances are costly to implement, allies may not be able to
make the investments necessary for smooth interoperability.
Moreover, as military budgets are forced to fund RMA advancements, less
money will be available for preventive defense mechanisms.
working group explored the extent of Asia’s recovery from the financial
crisis, and the impact of the economic turmoil on regional security. Discussions
also considered the possibility of the Asian economy going into remission, as
well as the institutions that are posed to shape the future of the region’s
political economy. Impetus for the decisions and dialogue came from the three
presentations: the first addressed India’s approach to globalization and
economic liberalization; the second examined Asia’s economies after the
crisis; and the third explored Asia’s economic institutions and the
international economic order.
In his presentation, an American
authority on South Asia argued, “the fundamental problem with India’s low
rate of economic growth is the policy choices adopted by its political leaders
and managed by its bureaucrats had become counterproductive.
This is not to say that every aspect of India’s economic policies has
been completely flawed. In fact,
they produced greater growth rates than before independence”.
He went on to assert: “while
India’s economic policies persisted beyond their usefulness, they may yet
prove to have laid the basis for more rapid growth in the future.”
The problem today is that although India is moving beyond the policies of
the past, it is doing so very slowly. He noted that due to the lack of intricate
ties to the global economy, India’s economy has been surprisingly resilient,
despite the Asian financial crisis and post-nuclear sanctions.
He concluded, “There are real signs that a slow, but inexorable shift
toward greater GDP growth, integration with the global economy and
liberalization has begun.”
the second presentation, an American economist illustrated the remarkable GDP
growth turnaround in Asia, and noted that the cause of the recovery during the
first half of 1999 was Keynesian fiscal stimulus, lower interest rates, and
capital inflows. He
also pointed out a new volatility in the second half of 1999, and asserted
regional reform efforts may be losing momentum, as evidenced by declines in
stock and currency markets.
The “unfinished agenda”—corporate restructuring and debt reduction,
for example—confronting many Asian economies threatens to return the region to
final paper, presented by a Japanese political scientist, examined the past and
future prospects of APEC. He first examined the development of APEC over the
last decade, and analyzed the “implementation of conflicting views over the
shape of the APEC and its role in the region as well as at the global level.”
He then explored the role of APEC in interregional relationships and the
next round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations. He concluded,
“Given its combined huge economic power of the member economies, APEC will be
the most important economic institution in Asia [and has the] potential to make
a significant impact on the future shape of the international political
conclusion, globalization was a central theme that emerged from the
presentations and discussions. Globalization was viewed as being at Asia’s
doorstep and as the catalyst that would fuel more rapid economic development in
the region. “Going global” was seen as having negative aspects as well, such
as, the potential for rapid capital outflow.
But overall globalization was viewed as essential for economic
development, along with other factors such as a level playing field, open
markets to investors, and fair competitive practices.
This working group explored the status
of institution-building efforts in the region after the financial crisis.
Participants agreed that although a broader sense of common identity has begun
to emerge in the region, an Asia-Pacific “community”—however defined—is
still far in the future. Indeed, Asia’s economic crisis has dealt a serious
blow to efforts to form a common purpose in the region.
noted that the ASEAN states have been the foundation of Asia’s nascent
regionalism. Southeast Asian governments together have been the driving force
behind APEC, formed in 1989 to promote trade and investment liberalization in
the region, and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which was created in 1994 as a
mechanism to address regional security concerns. Both organizations have come to
adopt the principles that guide ASEAN itself: consensus-based decision-making
that emphasizes voluntary, rather than negotiated and enforced, commitments;
inclusive membership and equality among all participants, as evidenced by the
rapid expansion in membership in both APEC and ARF; and respect for sovereignty,
particularly the principle of noninterference in domestic affairs.
the “ASEAN way” was often criticized in the West before the crisis as too
slow and cumbersome, the region’s approach to institution-building,
nevertheless, maintained a certain credibility. Southeast Asia’s striking
economic dynamism strengthened the region’s collective voice on the world
stage, particularly on development matters. ASEAN’s ability to forge and
maintain a generally unified face to the world—despite the diversity of its
members—similarly increased its credibility. Finally, although many of its
achievements were small in scale, the region had developed a solid track record
of problem solving among its members—most prominently in addressing
Cambodia’s emergence from civil war during the early 1990s. Indeed, the
relative peace in a region once fraught with conflict is testament to the
success of the “ASEAN way.”
onset of the financial crisis, however, has undermined each of these elements of
ASEAN’s strength. Most obviously, the crisis has damaged the credibility the
region cultivated by virtue of its economic prosperity; in short, the Asian
“miracle” has lost much of its luster. Similarly, where once ASEAN was
united and cohesive, the organization is now beset by internal division. The
onset of the financial crisis brought out tensions among member states;
relations between Malaysia and Indonesia in particular were shaken by a sudden
outflow of illegal Indonesian migrants landing on neighboring shores. The crisis
also has shaken ASEAN’s core principle of non-interference in domestic
affairs, as some members have argued for a mechanism in which members’
economic policies can be monitored—and perhaps even criticized. When combined
with the expansion of ASEAN membership to include Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar,
the organization’s capacity to make swift decisions is even more open to
question. And with Indonesia, ASEAN’s core member, troubled with political
unrest and still teetering on the brink of economic collapse, the
organization’s ability to stay at the forefront of Asian regionalism is in
Unfortunately, other actors in the Asia-Pacific region appear to be no better placed to lead the community-building effort. The United States is seen by many in the region as an arrogant hegemon. The American response to the financial crisis, regardless of its merits, won few friends in Asia: after first downplaying the significance of the crisis, Washington chose not to provide assistance to Thailand, and then aligned itself closely with the unpopular policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Many Asian participants also argued that the NATO intervention in Kosovo raises questions in the region about American respect for national sovereignty—a subject that remains deeply sensitive in Asia. Although the American role in the region remains central, Washington’s ability to lead is constrained.
position is similarly weak. Tokyo was harshly criticized as indecisive and slow
to respond during the crisis. Although Japan did provide some $80 billion in
assistance to the region, many observers saw the aid as only a reluctant
response to outside pressure. The long-term struggles of the Japanese economy
have also eroded Tokyo’s stature as a regional leader; much of Japan’s
influence in the region has been predicated on its economic strength. Finally,
one participant noted that the nature of Japanese identity and
nationalism—centering on a view of the nation as unique and separate from both
the West and Asia—limits Japan’s ability to lead in Asia.
role in the region is more complex. On the surface, Beijing appears to have
capitalized on the financial crisis to strengthen its leadership profile. China
has steadfastly maintained the value of the renminbi,
for example, despite immense pressure to devalue the currency; it also
contributed aid under the IMF packages for Thailand and Indonesia, and offered
important political support to ASEAN at a time when the organization’s
leadership of ARF was facing criticism. Indeed, in the words of one panelist,
China was ASEAN’s “Man of the Hour” during the crisis. At the same time,
however, lingering doubts about Beijing’s long-term intentions in the
region—and in particular doubts about its commitment to multilateralism in
Asia—undercut its ability to exert effective leadership.
light of Asia’s lingering economic difficulties, and the diminished stature of
several key powers in the region, participants agreed that the effort to
strengthen institutions and build a regional community has been damaged
considerably. Nevertheless, one panelist suggested that the way forward lay in
adopting “new principles” to guide policy and diplomacy in the region. In
particular, Asian countries should embrace a cooperative approach to security,
not founded on traditional “zero-sum” approaches to state interaction. The
“enlightened” use of power, and restraint in the development and use of
military force, are at the core of this approach. With the emergence of strong,
viable multilateral institutions in Asia still in the future, the practice of
“enriched bilateralism” recommended by a senior American military
official—which emphasizes greater sensitivity to local views and needs—may
be the best way forward.
in this working group centered on a number of key questions including.
For example, 1) What is meant by governance? (e.g., By whom? For what
purpose?) and 2) What is meant by diminished expectations? (e.g., Whose
expectations? About what? Why have expectations diminished? What baselines
should we use for comparison?)
From the outset, participants felt it important to address the conceptual
ambiguities related to this issue.
More specifically, the distinctions between governance and government,
and the links between governance and order need to be clearly defined. In
addition, because some languages do not have a word that equates to governance,
great sensitivity needs to be given to its usage.
Thai scholar examined the impact of the 1997 Asian economic crisis on civil
society and democratization in Southeast Asia. The presentation focused on the
effects wrought by the crisis on the middle class, civil organizations, and the
development of civil society in Southeast Asian countries.
concluded that the crisis has brought with it more political open space for
civil society to expand and strengthen. This, he argued, is because people in
countries touched by the crisis are convinced that political openness,
transparent and accountable government administration, good corporate
governance, and the presence of a strong and vibrant civil society are
conditions for preventing a recurrence of the crisis. Finally, he argued that
although every country in Southeast Asia has embarked on the process of
strengthening civil society, the pace has not been uniform.
On one end of the spectrum is Vietnam and Myanmar, while Thailand and the
Philippines are at the other, with Singapore and Malaysia situated in between
and Indonesia as uncertain.
European expert on India turned to the issue of conflict engendered by ethnic
and religious pluralism.
During his presentation, he explored 1) the reasons why ethno-nationalist
movements vary, and 2) the appropriate policies for their management.
He also argued that although his case studies were drawn mainly from
South Asia, the model he was advancing is applicable to other cultural and
temporal contexts as well.
In general, the presentation found that order is paramount to managing
conflict stemming from ethnic and religious pluralism. That is, the state must
be powerful, governance is essential, and both national and municipal policies,
practices, and procedures must reflect the aims of the people.
senior Indonesian government official presented a paper that dealt with the
impact of the Asian financial crisis on selected aspects of democratization and
political transition in Asia. In her presentation, she looked at the interplay
between the rising expectations of the governed—i.e., for greater freedom and
prosperity—and a state’s varying capacity to meet these demands, with an
emphasis on the consequences that can occur from reduced provision of public
sum, she asserted that the financial crisis was positive in some respects for
the countries of the region. Namely, the fallout from the crisis accelerated the
transition to democracy in many countries. This is especially true for
Indonesia, where reform of the political system, which was estimated by some
observers to require 15 years to complete, took place within less than a year.
However, she was quick to add that the crisis posed political and social
problems that have made more difficult the struggle to consolidate the
democratic process—i.e., to resolve ethnic conflict, crimes, and
regional rebellions, and to dissolve despair and jealously.
working groups discussed recent developments in Sino-American relations. The
first group focused discussion on the U.S.
Security Strategy for the East Asia Pacific Region (EASR) document published
by the U.S. Department of Defense on November 23, 1998.
This was the fourth such report since the first one published in 1990.
A panel of three representatives from the United States used different
approaches in discussing the report.
A member of the Chinese delegation present at the conference offered
former senior American naval officer examined the report in an historical
context, highlighting enduring U.S. security interests and the continuity of
policy reflected in the report.
He identified six elements of the U.S. security policy embedded in the
and invigorating bilateral alliances in the region.
China and having China recognize that the United States has a legitimate
security role in the region.
Preventing war on the Korean Peninsula, and preventing nuclear
U.S. security policy with respect to Taiwan.
multilateral dialogue in Asia
Southeast Asia, replacing basing with a network of military access arrangements.
American officer with extensive experience in China compared the 1998 EASR to
the last report published in 1995.
He noted no fundamental differences in U.S. strategy between the two
One change, however, has been the broader definition of security with the
inclusion of transnational security issues in the 1998 report.
It was also noted that the 1998 report contains the first official
mention of continued U.S. presence after a Korean reunification or
senior American observer of China described the report as a
"political" document -- "political" in that the report
responds to interest groups within the U.S. government as well as responding to
concerns of friends and neighbors in the region.
He asserted that as a consequence, inconsistencies and tensions arise in
responding to the various and sometimes opposing concerns.
He highlighted four basic inconsistencies:
power is growing in an absolute and relative sense within the region.
However, downplaying this growth causes a myriad of contradictions.
United States attempts to engage China on the one hand and hedge on the
arrangements are the foundation of the U.S. strategy in the region in contrast
to the emphasis on multilateralism in the region.
Taiwan Relations Act strains the one-China policy.
Chinese delegate acknowledged that the report does seek common ground in its
effort to reassure the nations of East Asia and the Pacific.
He observed the "layering" of U.S. bilateral relationships in
the region, with the United States giving its relationship with Japan greater
importance, followed by its other alliance relationships in the region.
He observed that with the importance placed by the United States on these
bilateral relationships, they are not going to be transformed anytime soon into
regional or multilateral arrangements.
He also stated this allays earlier fears that the United States was
trying to formulate another NATO.
He noted that the United States has roles to play not only as a balancing
force in the region, but also as the dominant force in the region.
panel presentations and the discussions that followed yielded three broad areas
First, the report reflects a continuity of U.S. policy in the region with
key elements of that policy being: the criticality of Japan; the need for
continued U.S. presence in Korea after reunification or reconciliation; and the
continuing role of the United States as a balancing force as well as the
dominant force in the region.
Second, the EASR intends to reassure by emphasizing common ground.
The report does serve to allay fears.
An earlier criticism of the report as “anodyne” was also viewed as
its greatest strength.
One observer did point out, however, the report missed an opportunity to
correct perceptions regarding the controversial figure of "100,000" --
the prescription for the level of forward-deployed U.S. troops in the region.
Finally, there was agreement that bilateral alliances continue to be
important since they underpin the move to any multilateral effort in the region.
of Chinese experts similarly presented views of China’s first Defense White
Paper, issued in 1998. The group noted that the document describes three key
objectives of Chinese security policy:
stability and prosperity.
and stability in surrounding regions.
with all countries in the Asia-Pacific region.
to the panel, Chinese defense policy centers on several tenets. First is
the so-called New Security Concept. This approach to regional security insists
that formal military alliances represent “Cold War thinking.” Instead,
countries in the region should stress the concepts of mutual security and
peaceful coexistence, developing relationships that are not threatening to third
parties. Also embedded in this framework is the concept of “comprehensive
security,” which emphasizes the nonmilitary factors—such as social and
economic variables—that influence a nation’s well-being.
key tenet of Chinese defense policy as laid out in the white paper is the
government’s focus on “economic construction.” According to the Chinese
delegation, this focus implies that China will adopt an essentially defensive
posture with a limited defense budget. In addition, the white paper states that
a civilian government, under the leadership of the Communist Party, will
maintain strict control of the military.
Chinese participants pointed out that a series of recent events have challenged
the premises embodied in the white paper. In particular, the panel noted the
adoption of the new U.S.–Japan defense guidelines; the bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade; Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui’s comments about
“state to state” relations; and the recent successes in the testing of
America’s land-based theater missile defense system.
these developments, however, the delegation insisted that the basic elements of
Chinese defense policy remain unchanged. At the same time, however, Beijing will
work hard to prevent the involvement of outside powers in cross-straits
relations. The panel also suggested that Beijing will continue current levels of
growth in the defense budget, while working to improve military technology. At
the same time, China will maintain opposition to the deployment of a theater
missile defense system in Asia.
Chinese criticism of Washington’s military alliances in Asia—and Beijing’s
general wariness about American influence in the region—the panel also
stressed that China recognizes the United States as a legitimate Asia-Pacific
power. Indeed, one panelist insisted that China would follow a policy of
“three no intentions”: no intention to dominate the Asia-Pacific; no
intention to push the United States out of the region; and no intention to
replace the U.S. presence in Asia.
in the discussion generally agreed that the Chinese Defense White Paper
represented a welcome first step in improving the transparency of Beijing’s
defense policy. Further steps are needed, however, to address regional concerns
about Chinese intentions.
In particular, participants and panelists agreed that future steps to build confidence might include improved transparency in Chinese force structure, doctrine, and equipment acquisition; more complete information on defense budgets; greater elaboration of Beijing’s approach to resolving maritime territorial disputes; clarification of China’s stance on the forward deployment of U.S. forces in the region; and further elaboration of China’s “new security concept.” American participants stressed this final issue in particular, noting that there was some debate about the significance of the apparently new Chinese approach to regional order.
working group focused on the security implications associated with the general
trend towards an aging and mobile population, which increasingly resides in
urban areas. Issues
addressed included the prevailing demographic trends within Asia, the dynamics
of migration patterns in the context of globalization and the post–Cold War
security environment, and the impact of rapid urbanization.
Filipino scholar presented a comprehensive situation report on demographic
trends, while focusing on the security implications associated with changes
occurring within Asian population growth patterns.
Pointing out that changes in population growth rates are primarily a
function of the relationship between fertility and mortality rates, she
highlighted in both categories the demographic transition to generally lower
some countries have transitioned to the point where they have reached zero or
negative population growth (e.g., Japan and Western European countries), others
are still early in the transition and are experiencing rapid population growth
as a result of the mortality rate decreasing at a much faster rate than the
fertility rate. In these cases, it
is important to avoid solutions to the short-term problems that can exacerbate
the long-term problem, as in the case of China's one-child policy, where the
solution may well be the source of an even larger problem 50 to 70 years later.
the population pyramid grows increasingly top heavy as a result of decreasing
fertility and mortality rates, it will become more difficult for Asian families
to sustain family-based care for the elderly.
These changes will certainly impact the basic values within Asian
societies and require careful planning to avoid age-based conflict and
unsupportable social security policies in the region.
representative from a nongovernmental organization presented a paper on the
relationship between migration and security.
Political barriers to migration were lowered in many parts of the world
with the end of the Cold War while globalization has played an important role in
making migration much easier.
As a result, migration has become a more independent variable and
politicians now find themselves reacting to the phenomenon, rather than
controlling it through administrative measures.
that migration is often cast in negative terms largely due to the potential for
conflict associated with large migrant populations, the presentation focused
some attention on the positive economic aspects of a migratory labor force.
Specifically, he demonstrated how migrant workers have come to serve as a
reserve labor pool for the receiving countries and as outlet for excess labor in
security dilemma occurs when that reserve labor pool refuses to be repatriated
when the demand for their services diminishes. Using examples of both a
"melting pot" and a mosaic approach, he then suggested there was a
general trend toward a mosaic model of absorption and integration.
As a result, the cultural underpinnings that helped define national
security values in the past are no longer rooted as deeply in the state. In this
respect, international migration might actually serve to reform the very notion
of national security by accelerating the movement away from a state-articulated
concept of what constitutes security.
senior American scholar presented a paper on the impact of rapid urbanization on
security in Asia.
While noting the social benefits associated with industrialization and
urbanization, he suggested that the Asian financial crisis highlighted the
fragility in Asian cities that have grown so rapidly that governments have great
difficulty providing basic services to large portions of the population.
human costs include overcrowded slums, traffic gridlock, water shortages,
environmental degradation, and informal economic sectors that barely offer
subsistence level existence to inhabitants.
These costs are likely to increase unless strategies for sustainable
development are developed now.
Areas that require further study to ensure effective strategies are
developed include improvement of air and water quality within urban areas,
regional exchanges for optimal use of shared water resources, regional
strategies for energy conservation, and ways to improve mass transit within
the presentations and subsequent discussions, working group participants agreed
that demographic change was a major security concern for all Asian countries.
Although the most immediate short- term problem is providing basic
services and minimal quality of life for rapidly urbanizing populations in many
of the large South and Southeast Asian cities, the long-term problem of an aging
population will create future strains unless careful measures are taken to
provide care for the elderly. Finally, migration was viewed as both a source of
potential internal instability as well as an effective balancing mechanism in
the global economy.
conference represented a rare opportunity for government officials, scholars,
analysts, and private citizens to exchange views on Asian security matters. The
inclusion of a cross section of Asia’s increasingly complex security community
is a central theme in the work of the Asia-Pacific Center. Although the
discussions during the three days demonstrated that the region confronts a
strikingly diverse range of security threats, the opportunity for frank dialogue
served to enhance mutual understanding and supported the Pacific Command’s
broader goal of engagement with the Asia-Pacific region.
This report was written by Christopher B. Johnstone, a Research Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Center. For more information on this program, or other events and research sponsored by the Asia-Pacific Center, please contact the Research Division at (808) 971-8900.
Dewi Fortuna Anwar State
of Indonesia Indone sia
Assistant to the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs
Dr. Desmond Ball Professor Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Australia National University Australia
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
Australia National University
Adm Dennis Blair
Commander in Chief
United States Pacific Command
Dr. Suchit Bunbongkarn
Institute of Strategic and International Studies
Mr. Ronnie Chan
Hang Lung Development Co., Ltd.
Hong Kong, China
Mr. Jan de Wilde
Department of Programming and Fundraising Support
International Organization for Migration
BG Thomas Fleming, Jr. (Ret.)
National Security Consultant
Leadership Concepts, Inc.
Capt Sutter Fox
U.S. Coast Guard Liaison Officer
United States Pacific Command
Mr. Jeremy Harris
Mayor of Honolulu
Dr. Arthur Holcombe
Dr. Nay Htun
United Nations Development Program
Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese Honolulu, HI
Asia- Pacific Center for Security Studies
Mr. Dato Mohamed Jawhar bin Hassan
Institute of Strategic and International Studies
Mr. Mohammed Touhid Hossain
Director (Acting Principle)
Foreign Service Academy
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Jim Kelly
Dr. Tsutomu Kikuchi
Aoyama Gakuin University
Dr. Robert Kiste
Center for Pacific Island Studies
University of Hawaii
Col Michael Lepper
Northeast Asia Policy Division
United States Pacific Command
Dr. Satu P. Limaye
Director of Research
Asia -Pacific Center for Security Studies
Dr. Ian MacFarling
Royal Australian Air Force
Dr. Subrata Mitra
University of Heidelberg
Dr. Josefina N. Natividad
University of the Philippines
Dr. Shinichi Ogawa
Second Research Department
National Institute for Defense Studies
Ms. Maria Ortuoste
Foreign Service Institute
Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies
Col Paul Peyton
Department of Regional Studies
Asia- Pacific Center for Security Studies
Dr. Leif Rosenberger
United States Pacific Command
LG Charupat Ruangsuwan
Institute of Advanced Military Studies
Amb. Charles B. Salmon, Jr. Honolulu, HI
State Department Advisor
Asia- Pacific Center for Security Studies
Mr. H.C. Stackpole Honolulu, HI
Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies
Dr. Carlyle Thayer
Asia- Pacific Center for Security Studies
Dr. Frank Umbach
Senior Research Fellow
Research Institute of the German Society of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Xie Wenquing
Senior Research Fellow
China Institute for International Strategic Studies
Dr. Kosaku Yoshino
University of Tokyo
ABOUT THE ASIA-PACIFIC CENTER
The Asia-Pacific Center (APC) is a research, conference, and study center funded by the U.S. Department of Defense. The Centers mission is to foster understanding, cooperation, and study of security-related issues among civilian and military representatives of the United States and other Asia-Pacific nations. The Center provides a focal point where national officials, decision makers, and policy experts can gather to exchange ideas, explore pressing issues and achieve a greater understanding of the challenges that that shape the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region. APC occasionally publishes articles on Asia policy issues written by APC research, staff, and fellows. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Asia-Pacific Center, the Department of Defense, or the United States government.