ASEAN @ 50, Southeast Asia @ Risk: What Should Be Done?

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The ASEAN @ 50, Southeast Asia @ Risk Workshop

From October 25 to 27, 2017, Stanford University’s Southeast Asia Program and the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative in the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, in partnership with Australian National University’s (ANU) Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) of Nanyang Technological University, and the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI APCSS), co-hosted a unique workshop entitled “ASEAN @ 50, Southeast Asia @Risk: What Should Be Done?” at DKI APCSS in Honolulu, Hawaii. Coinciding with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ 50th anniversary year, the workshop participants discussed and appraised a series of policy proposals on Southeast Asian issues for relevant actors to consider.

Twenty-two scholars from eight countries—Australia, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam—submitted 24 specific policy recommendations (SPRs) on regional security, regional economy, and regional institutions in Southeast Asia for discussion at the workshop. Over two-and-a-half days the group debated and evaluated each SPR along these dimensions: its effectiveness in addressing a regional issue; the significance of the issue addressed; the specificity of the recommended policies; the feasibility of those actions in the real world; and options for improving the recommendation. Given the participants’ interest in U.S. policy under the new administration in Washington, discussions were also held with Dr. Joseph Felter, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and Southeast Asia; U.S. Congresswoman Colleen Hanabusa; Rear Admiral Matthew Carter, Deputy Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet; and Rear Admiral Patrick A. Piercey, Director of Operations, U.S. Pacific Command. Participants also interacted via video with Dr. Munir Majid, Chair, CIMB ASEAN Research Institute, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

What follows in this report, without individual attribution, are summaries of the SPRs and, to add context, a condensed review of what was said about them at the workshop. The goal is to offer a set of fresh perspectives, innovative approaches, and specific proposals that address some of the main challenges and opportunities facing Southeast Asia as a region today. The intended recipients are those who make, influence, or analyze Southeast Asia-relevant foreign policy in the ASEAN states (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) and in Australia, Japan, the United States, and other regional powers. To maximize candor, the workshop was held under the Chatham House Rule. Accordingly, the report neither attributes the SPRs to their authors nor implies any consensus at the workshop regarding their contents. Participants were encouraged to publish their recommendations, however, and many did. A listing of those publications and their authors completes the report.

Regional Security: SPRs

SPR 1. States with coast guards and civilian law-enforcement agencies operating in the South China Sea (SCS) should establish a code of conduct for non-naval vessels similar to the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) that addresses encounters by navies. Such a mechanism should be adapted to fit the distinct operational cultures and divergent legal doctrines of law enforcement agencies that have jurisdiction in the area. Additionally, the ASEAN states that have made claims to the SCS—Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam—should adopt a legally binding
code of conduct among themselves. Such a code should address dispute settlement; maritime delimitation; crisis management; a freeze on illegal reclamation; ecological preservation of contested areas; and specified provisions for enforcement and arbitration, unequivocally based upon the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and in compliance with relevant provisions of the Philippines’ landmark South China Sea Arbitral Award against China.

SPR 2. In order to reduce overfishing in the South China Sea, the U.S. and Japanese governments, with buy-in from interested outside parties, should establish a publicly accessible database to track fishing activities in the SCS in real time using a combination of Automatic Identification System (AIS) tracking and radar imagery. Similar efforts are underway in the Pacific, with support from groups like the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and Microsoft, to help Pacific Island states monitor their vast Exclusive Economic zones (EEZs). The database would help Southeast Asian states monitor their waters and help name and shame bad actors, including illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing not only by China but also by Southeast Asian nations (e.g., Vietnam's "blue boats").

SPR 3. The U.S. government should publicly state that no single country, not the United States, not China, nor anyone else, should exercise exclusionary control over the South China Sea. The current policy of Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) under the U.S. promise to “fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows” is too abstract in its reliance on ambiguous international law, too unfocused in its global scope, too susceptible to criticism of America’s failure to ratify UNCLOS, too boastful of U.S. naval prowess, and ultimately less effective than specifically committing to cooperate with Southeast Asians in jointly ensuring that no one country exercises exclusionary control over the SCS.

SPR 4. In order to understand whether and to what degree the South China Sea Arbitral Award of July 2016 is being observed, the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy) and the U.S. State Department should outline the current state of compliance by all affected parties so that actual practice can be accurately judged based on existing international law, and regional states’ policy responses tailored accordingly. Clarity on compliance will allow for more definite and nuanced policy pronouncements and facilitate strategies of deterrence, compellence, countermeasure, or sanction if warranted, based upon the legal strictures of necessity and proportionality.

SPR 5. In order to promote the South China Sea Arbitral Award, strengthen the Law of the Sea regime, and help ensure that a “rules-based order” is commonly understood by the region and eventually achieved in the maritime Asia-Pacific, the U.S. Defense and State Departments, as well as selected ASEAN foreign ministries (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam in particular) should strategically frame, in policy venues, regional institutional settings, and strategic documents, specific tenets of the Arbitral Award consistent with their legally valid maritime interests (including domestic jurisdictional areas that the Award significantly impacts, namely EEZs and high seas rights).
SPR 6. ASEAN member states, with technical assistance from dialogue partners if desired, should produce an updated map of the South China Sea that shows disputed areas and clarifies which legal questions have been answered and which remain open. ASEAN claimants would benefit in two ways: (1) They could use the map to help them initially resolve their own bilateral and multilateral disputes in the South China Sea, and then agree on a coordinated negotiating position vis-à-vis China’s “nine-dashed line.” (2) They (and other states) would better understand the extent, nature, and legal status of China’s claim.

SPR 7. All stakeholders in the South China Sea with the capability to deploy to the region should provide operational support for international law by exercising all applicable rights in the high seas, even where this entails risk. Such exercise should support not only freedom of navigation, but other rights as well, including two established by UNCLOS and pertinent to the SCS: coordinated activities authorized by a Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO) to counter overfishing of migratory stocks in the high seas; and, deep-seabed mining exploration in consultation with the International Seabed Authority (ISA).
SPR 8. The ASEAN-Australian Summit, (March 17-18, 2018 in Sydney) should call for the resolution of Asian maritime disputes in peaceful ways consistent with international law, and should call upon the United States to ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Singapore, as ASEAN’s chair in 2018, should play the leading role within ASEAN on behalf of this outcome. Such an effort will encourage the United States to ratify and thereby strengthen both UNCLOS and the legal and moral standing of the U.S. regarding maritime issues in the South China Sea. This will also help signal to the U.S., China, and the region that ASEAN and Australia welcome U.S. involvement in matters related to access to and control of the SCS under international law.

SPR 9. In order to reduce tensions in the South China Sea, the ADMM-Plus should leverage its record of military-to-military cooperation by planning and conducting a multilateral exercise in an appropriate part of the SCS to test and illustrate the application of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) in that body of water. The ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) brings together the ASEAN’s ten members plus Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, and the United States.

SPR 10. The Philippines and Singapore, respectively the 2017 and 2018 chairs of ASEAN, should jointly promote Southeast Asian compliance with the UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions that sanction the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The resolve of ASEAN, or of a willing subset of its members, to support the UN and a rules-based international order in East Asia, would be warmly received in Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington, and perhaps also in Beijing, which formally supports UNSC sanctions against the DPRK.

Regional Security: Discussion

Discussion of these SPRs began with the South China Sea. Participants focused on the difficulty of initiating and coordinating remedial efforts despite the urgency of action to address a deteriorating situation. The feasibility of SPRs 1 and 2, it was felt, depended signally on whom the endeavors would or would not involve. More progress might be made through smaller, minilateral efforts, including two-tiered negotiations toward one set of minimal goals likely to garner broad agreement and another set of maximal goals shared by a smaller group of interested countries. Speakers cautioned against overemphasizing, in the early stage of negotiation, the need to enlist participation by China or by other parties resistant to action, lest negotiating leverage be ceded to recalcitrants enabled to veto future agreements from within.

Involving China in SPR 2’s database on overfishing in the SCS or in a fisheries management regime could be framed as “win-win” for food sustainability. But Beijing would likely block multilateral limitations on fishing in light of its own food security needs and its preference for unilateral fishing bans. SPR 1’s call for a CUES for coast guards may also be challenged by China’s unwillingness to comply with commonly accepted principles regarding the aims and operations of coast guards. In contrast, if outside actors provide publicly available information, as in SPR 2’s database or SPR 4’s and 6’s compliance report and claim maps, the debate on these issues could be constructively shaped without needing initial consensus.
SPR 3 would change the rationale for U.S. FONOPs from an abstract principle into a concrete policy statement, but would ASEAN states support it? As one participant stated, Southeast Asian opposition to Chinese expansion seems not to have overcome fear of Chinese retribution should such opposition be expressed. The dilemma is that while fear of expansion triggers escalation, fear of escalation permits expansion.

On the topic of territorial disputes and international law, SPRs 4, 5, 6, and 7 were considered feasible to varying degrees. Most practicable was SPR 4, which asks for unilateral action by the United States to clarify and support compliance with international law. SPRs 5 and 7, however, require coordination with or by claimant states with sufficient political will to defend international law including the Arbitral Award. Speakers agreed that the updated mapping proposed in SPR 6 could be very effective, but would depend on Southeast Asian support, at least by claimant states, to gain full legitimacy. Some participants cautioned that ASEAN would be unable to reach a consensus on this proposal, and that even the maritime nations would find it hard to support. Several, however, argued that a non-Southeast Asian government or think tank might have enough diplomatic distance and credibility to produce and socialize the map in ASEAN’s stead.

SPR 9’s ADMM Plus proposal for a CUES exercise was well received, as was the idea of using Singapore’s experience with HA/DR as a model. There is no consensus in ASEAN on how to use CUES. But an exercise on the water, or a practical discussion by a regional think tank, might help move ASEAN forward. SPR 8’s suggestion that ASEAN urge the United States to ratify UNCLOS met with some concern that, given opposition to such a move in Washington, the request would only further isolate the United States, undermining U.S. leadership on maritime law and security while failing to admonish China for its failure to abide by UNCLOS. Individual ASEAN governments could privately advise the Trump administration to ratify the treaty, or perhaps Australia should press the United States. Participants agreed with SPR 10 that ASEAN has an opportunity to act globally, as a bloc, against nuclear proliferation and Pyongyang’s provocations by improving Southeast Asia’s compliance with Security Council sanctions against the DPRK. But some were concerned that in doing so ASEAN’s leaders could sacrifice their future ability to mediate the matter.

Regional Economy: SPRs

SPR 11. In order to reinvigorate American economic engagement in Southeast Asia, the Trump administration should: (1) promote public-private investments in U.S.-ASEAN Connect, the U.S.-ASEAN Expanded Economic Engagement initiative, and infrastructure development projects in Southeast Asia; and (2) encourage increased Southeast Asian investment in the United States and more economic and diplomatic engagement with Southeast Asia by U.S. partners, especially Australia, India, Japan, and New Zealand.

SPR 12. Users and defenders of Southeast Asian sea lanes should directly support maritime infrastructure in Southeast Asia through targeted development assistance and increased incentives for investment and trade. Recent studies argue that improved maritime infrastructure will support stronger growth in sea-based trade than can be achieved by negotiating lower tariffs. Strengthening the linkages from land-locked or overland-trading states to neighboring maritime trading hubs will help to align the former
states’ interest in open sea lanes more closely with that of their already sea-focused neighbors.

SPR 13. In order to defend American interests in the Asia-Pacific region while holding China accountable for how it pursues its regional aspirations, the United States should proactively seek American participation in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). In this context, the United States should urge the creation of an AIIB board of resident directors who could be of any member-state nationality. That would bring the AIIB in line with the best practices of other major development banks. Inside the AIIB, the United States can negotiate on weighted voting rules; express its voice in day-to-day decision-making; gather like-minded stakeholders around desired policies and programs; build coalitions; and vote on projects according to American interests.

SPR 14. A common standard for high-quality infrastructure investment should be established, along with a regional/global framework in which to implement it. Infrastructure investments in one country by another should be efficient, open, transparent, fiscally sound, and respectful of the debt-paying ability of the recipient state.

SPR 15. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is the best arrangement through which to further a pattern of Asian economic integration supported by credible and ambitious liberalization commitments and domestic reforms that buttress both regional and global economic systems. RCEP should be pursued in a manner that promotes an open regionalism that does not divert economic activity away from the United States or other countries. RCEP should also be open to full American participation and leadership whenever the United States is again ready to assume that role.

SPR 16. Japan, Singapore, and Australia should lead the drive to conclude an eleven-party Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP-11) agreement that embodies a high-standard approach to Asia-Pacific integration and enters into force by January 2019. They should strive to comply with that time frame, but should continue to move forward even if that deadline is not met. A path to eventual U.S. participation should be left open. To that end, discussions with the United States should continue, including with congressional leaders and key trade committee members. TPP countries should explore with members of Congress the revisions that the United States would require in order to consider rejoining the agreement, including the specific market-access provisions that it would seek and how those might differ from the existing text. The TPP states would understand that the United States could want to incorporate changes in the text in the light possible renegotiations of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement. TPP members should discuss with South Korea among other countries the possibility of their joining, in due course, as well.

Regional Economy: Discussion

The review of economic proposals began with SPRs 11 and 12 on trade and infrastructure investment. Some participants found U.S. economic engagement with ASEAN to be overly concerned with China. The engagement, they noted, lacks a multilateral basis of the
kind that an ASEAN-U.S. free trade agreement (FTA) could provide, and they saw the U.S.-ASEAN Connect initiative as falling short of filling that gap. The group also felt, however, that American investment in maritime infrastructure could support multilateral trade even in the absence of a formal trade arrangement. By enhancing the usage of free and open sea lanes, U.S. maritime investment could foster benefits for all of ASEAN. Maritime infrastructure also demands a lighter geopolitical commitment than overland, cross-border trade routes and pipelines would entail. Sea-linked investments do nevertheless imply a long-term strategy, and in the short term, some felt, the Trump administration may prioritize security investment over economic cooperation. Some participants warned that the enormous need for investment in Southeast Asia has led regional leaders to agree to low-quality infrastructure projects and to accrue vast debts in pursuit of short-term domestic political gains.

To meet such massive infrastructural demand sustainably, a high priority should be given to building local capacity to set and meet high-quality standards of inward investment that can prevent project mismanagement and corruption, as argued in SPR 14. As proposed in SPR 13, U.S. participation in China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), could help meet this need. The risks of American membership were seen as relatively low due to several checks on possible Chinese dominance or mismanagement. These include the bank’s multilateral character; China’s relative self-restraint within the AIIB so far; the careful standards applied to date in co-financed operations with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank; and the relatively small size of the AIIB’s investment portfolio compared to the many and large commitments acquired by China’s state-run investment banks. A U.S. role on the AIIB’s board of directors may be contingent upon a simultaneous reform of the allocation of voting rights in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. It was also said, however, that even if the Trump administration were to join the AIIB without seeking a seat on the directors’ board, the United States could still enjoy representation and exercise influence on behalf of good economic governance, especially in co-financed AIIB/ADB/World Bank projects.

Negotiations toward a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) were also discussed in light of president Trump’s withdrawal from the latter process. RCEP did not appear to be China-centric in the eyes of several participants. They tended to agree with SPR 15 that as of October 2017, compared with the TPP, RCEP represented the more feasible path forward toward regional trade integration. It was felt that in any case, RCEP and the smaller and barely nascent TPP-11 (without its formerly 12th member, the United States) should be viewed as complementary projects rather than opposed models for regional economic engagement. Steps toward concluding a TPP-11 in 2018, as advised in SPR 16, could operate in parallel with progress toward RCEP. Both agreements promise greater trade and economic openness in the region. Perhaps TPP’s higher standards could be incorporated into RCEP in future negotiations. It was also suggested that the low bar RCEP sets could encourage India and Japan to improve their respective bilateral trade relations with China.
Regional Institutions: SPRs

SPR 17. In order to sustain the positive momentum toward better security relations between the United States and Vietnam, Washington should address Hanoi’s concerns by: (1) articulating an American priority on peaceful resolution of claims to the South China Sea and on freedom of navigation and overflight there; (2) exploring a U.S.-Vietnam free trade agreement or other arrangement whose geo-economic importance could, for Vietnam, replace that of the Trans-Pacific Partnership; (3) recognizing the strategic importance of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) by further committing to the Lower Mekong Initiative, keeping in mind the needs of the Southeast Asian states in the GMS and the asymmetry between these countries and China; and (4) renewing the 2013-18 ASEAN-U.S Partnership for Good Governance, Equitable, and Sustainable Development and Security and extending its record of support for institutional capacity building to realize the blueprints of ASEAN’s Political-Security and Socio-Cultural Communities.

SPR 18. To restore the sense of good will and mutual interest between the United States and Thailand since the Thai coup in 2014 while ensuring continued American access to Utapao Air Base, the United States should: (1) assure the Thai military of America’s constructive relations with China; (2) reinforce friendly relations with
Thailand through ceremonies, memorials, scholarships, and research on the shared legacy of Thais and Americans during the Cold War; (3) strengthen engagement on democracy and human rights through a program of interaction between relevant institutions in both countries including their legislatures; (4) continue to support scientific research on water-resource management in the Mekong River system; (5) expand use of the Thai language in diplomatic settings and engage culturally through jazz, a favorite of the late King Rama XI; and (6) demonstrate American support for ASEAN including reference to its birth in Bangkok half a century ago.

SPR 19. The United States should establish a Comprehensive Partnership with Brunei, and subsequently with Cambodia and Myanmar, in order to strengthen bilateral strategic relations with these and prospectively all ASEAN states. Less formal than mutual defense treaties, these partnerships could offer the United States opportunities to enhance strategic and economic cooperation with key partners in Southeast Asia based on shared interest and mutual benefit.

SPR 20. ASEAN should improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its secretariat. Nearly 1,000 ASEAN meetings were scheduled in 2016, and the figure is likely to rise to 1,600 by 2020. ASEAN should streamline and decentralize its functions away from its headquarters in Jakarta to the national ASEAN secretariats in, for example, Singapore and Malaysia. ASEAN should encourage other member countries, particularly in mainland Southeast Asia, to host ASEAN organs and events. Currently inadequate funding for the ASEAN Secretariat should be reconsidered. Each member could continue to submit the same absolute amount, but it should be increased. Alternatively, the required payment could represent an equal share of each government’s spending, or reflect a weighted proportional formula taking into account the country’s GDP, GDP per capita, and balance of intra-ASEAN trade.

SPR 21. To reduce the likelihood and the suspicion of currency manipulation in East Asia and the possible damage therefrom in Southeast Asia, the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) governments should: (1) allow the APT Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) to more independently carry out its surveillance tasks, including gathering necessary data and publishing reports on currency manipulation in the region; and (2) incorporate AMRO Consultations into the 2004 ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism. ASEAN Plus Three (APT) is a largely economic arrangement to which China, Japan, and South Korea in addition to ASEAN’s ten members belong.

SPR 22. In order to enhance ASEAN’s ability to respond to challenges involving regional security while preserving the practice of consensus, the secretary-general or the chair of ASEAN should propose that the “ASEAN minus X” formula, already agreed to and used on economic topics, be extended to include some security matters as well, notably terrorism and preventive diplomacy.

SPR 23. ASEAN’s more institutionally and economically robust states—Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, and perhaps Malaysia—should look toward formalizing long-term partnerships with relatively near and advanced industrial states like Australia, Japan, and South Korea, as well as Taiwan, that are significant stakeholders in the security, stability, and prosperity of Southeast Asia. Such relations should be based
on principles of transparency, due process, and the rule of law. This new approach—call it “Southeast Asia Plus”—could usefully and creatively complement ASEAN’s mission by experimenting with the design of new security and economic institutions and best practices that address issues of common regional concern, issues that ASEAN alone may be unable to pursue.

**SPR 24. Southeast Asian nations should establish a “Multinational Standing Task Force” in the Asia-Pacific region.** Its membership should include the ASEAN states along with Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Together they could engage in peace-time operations including: protecting sea lanes of communication, providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), and countering cross-border crime and terrorism. Their work could draw upon the success of the Standing NATO Maritime Group in the Atlantic and the Combined Maritime Forces in the Middle East.

**Regional Institutions: Discussion**

These SPRs address U.S. relations with ASEAN and particular ASEAN states, as well as ways of helping ASEAN improve decision-making mechanisms including its secretariat. SPRs 17, 18, and 19 argue for closer economic and security ties between the United States and Vietnam, Thailand, and Brunei respectively, while understanding that these ASEAN states desire positive and balanced relationships with both the United States and China. Enhanced interaction between the American and Vietnamese economies, while not as impactful as a TPP-12 would have been, would help reassure both Hanoi and Washington of each other’s commitment to closer political and security ties and to specific steps toward that end. Speakers were not unwilling to support a gradual, whole-of-society effort to warm U.S.-Thai relations chilled since the 2014 coup, including accepting constructively warmer relations between Bangkok and Beijing. But some questioned the relative practical importance of the U.S.–Thai alliance. It was argued that Brunei, for instance, has not received enough U.S. attention and should be a new focus for outreach, and that it is not time for the United States to write off its relations with Cambodia, present tensions notwithstanding. A theme in these remarks was that the United States may find it easier to engage new partners than win back old ones.

The final discussion dealt with the efficacy of ASEAN institutions. While outsiders could explore reforms or other means of improvement, the policy choices were of course Southeast Asia’s to make. Notably in that regard, all of the SPRs on this topic had Southeast Asian authors. SPRs 20 and 21 were praised for proposing novel means of strengthening ASEAN’s efficiency and authority. Speakers agreed with SPR 20 that a departure from ASEAN’s rule on dues—that each member country pay the same amount—need not imbalance ASEAN decision-making, provided the criterion of consensus is retained. Fewer meetings could help focus the ASEAN Secretariat less on planning periodic events and more on preparing substantive decisions. Speakers also suggested more attention to training staff in financial planning, data analytics, and effective management techniques.

Currency manipulation is a controversial topic, but implementing SPR 21 would support regional financial stability and augment the regulatory public service that ASEAN provides. Participants wrestled with ASEAN’s oft-cited dilemma between required consensus and desired action, especially as it was posed by the “ASEAN minus X” method of handling some security
matters proposed in SPR 22. Speakers agreed that such a model has already been used for some decisions, enabling beneficially phased participation in economic agreements, though not without some risk in diminished internal cohesion. “ASEAN minus X” on security choices would still require an initial consensus that it be adopted, lest the sovereignty of excluded members be jeopardized. Minilateral action thereby achieved would also need to avoid impinging on the interests of those left out. Participants agreed with the idea that the security goals chosen as suitable for the procedure should already enjoy member-state support.

As for SPR 23’s notion of “Southeast Asia Plus,” that inclusive format was credited as being potentially helpful in implementing SPRs 9, 11, and 16 as well, but as a supplement to ASEAN not a replacement of it. Finally, regarding SPR 24, lack of time constrained examination of its idea of a “multinational standing task force” that would enlist an array of Asian-Pacific states including those in ASEAN. It is likely, however, that although the boldness of SPR 24 would have appealed to some, others would have questioned its practicality in the near term.

The full workshop group convenes in DKI APCSS’ Maluhia Hall for discussion of each participant’s specific policy proposals.
Related Publications

A number of the scholars participating in the workshop have published articles and essays that touch upon or further develop their policy proposals. Virtually all of these publications appeared after the workshop, but a few were published versions of first drafts of specific policy recommendations (SPRs) circulated for comment prior to presentation in Honolulu. A list of these work, valid as of December 1, 2017, is included below for additional reading.

Shiro Armstrong


Niruban Balachandran

John Blaxland and Greg Raymond

Daniel Wei Boon Chua

Ralf Emmers

Donald K. Emmerson

Bates Gill
“Strategic opportunity lost?: Where is the White House on Southeast Asia?” PacNet #69 (September 25, 2017), Pacific Forum CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-69-strategic-opportunity-lost-where-white-house-southeast-asia

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ASEAN @ 50, Southeast Asia @ Risk:
What Should Be Done? A Prescriptive Workshop
HONOLULU, HAWAII | OCTOBER 25-27, 2017

Front Row, left to right: Dr. Justin Nankivell; Dr. Bates Gill; DKI APCSS Director James Hartsell; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Felter; Representative Colleen Hanabusa; Ambassador Karl Eikenberry; Dr. Don Emmerson; DKI APCSS Deputy Director James Hirai. 2nd Row: Mr. Evan Laksmana; Dr. Shiro Armstrong; Dr. Daniel Chua; Dr. Greg Raymond; Dr. Belinda Yeomans. 3rd Row: Dr. Huong Le Thu; Mr. Niruban Balachandran; Ms. Barbara Weisel; Dr. Lori Forman; Ms. Ariel Stenek; Ms. Katie Pham; Ms. Linda Juan; Mr. Jonathan Cham. 4th Row: Mr. James Potenza; Dr. Karen Pitakdumrongkit; Dr. Yoichi Kato; Mr. Richard Heydarian; Dr. Ralf Emmers; Dr. See Seng Tan; Ms. Roxane Turner; Ms. Kerry Nankivell.
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