Japan’s 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines: Coping with the “Grey Zones”

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KEY FINDINGS

• Based upon a strategic assessment that portrays the US in relative decline and international public goods (the high seas, including exclusive economic zones, airspace, outer space and cyberspace) deteriorating, Japan has placed new emphasis on developing its own capability to deter China in the “gray zones” of disputed territories and waters near its southern island chain.

• Consensus across the Japanese security community on this new strategic outlook has lead to the abandonment of the Basic Defense Force concept and the adoption of a “Dynamic Defense Force” concept as the underlying logic driving Japan’s defense policy.

• Japan’s new policy of dynamic deterrence emphasizes increasing its visibility in the southern islands through improved intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR) capabilities as well as enhancing its capability to deal with contingencies arising in that area by developing a more mobile and flexible force structure that is better coordinated for a timely response.

• Japan will establish a new body within the Prime Minister’s Office to coordinate security matters among relevant ministers and provide recommendations to the Prime Minister.

• Ideological differences that continue to be played out largely within the media and political parties have prevented some of the more controversial changes desired by Japan’s defense planners from being adopted, such as limited collective self-defense rights, revision of the Three Principles on Arms Exports and revision of the Five Principles that govern Japan’s participation in peace cooperation activities.

• China has unsurprisingly taken a very negative view of Japan portraying its military expansion and lack of transparency as a “concern for the region and the international community”. Japan’s new defense program, which also emphasizes the development of bilateral relationships with countries such as Australia, South Korea, and India, as well as multilateral security cooperation with ASEAN, is seen by China as an attempt at joint containment.

• Regardless of whether Washington agrees with Tokyo’s new strategic assessment of the security environment, the United States will appreciate Japan’s willingness to play a larger role in monitoring Chinese maritime expansion in the East China Sea as Japan’s increasing ISR capabilities are integrated with US capabilities in this area. The US will at the same time need to reassure its ally that the United States will continue to play its role in extended deterrence of all territories under Japanese administration.
Introduction

The new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) announced by Japan on 17 December, 2010 have ushered in a number of significant, if incremental, changes in Japanese defense policy, force structure and decision-making processes, as policymakers in Tokyo grow increasingly wary of Chinese military development and maritime expansion in the disputed waters of the East China Sea. Beyond China’s general military buildup, the new NDPG indicates that “China is stepping up and expanding maritime activities in the region’s surrounding waters, and these activities, coupled with the lack of transparency shrouding China’s military and security aims are of concern to the regional and global community.” While the new NDPG addresses a wide range of security challenges facing Japan, including the continuing destabilizing influence of North Korea and new concerns about cyber attacks, the core of this document focuses upon increasing Japan’s ability to cope with what are described as “gray zone” conflicts that arise from disputes over “territory, sovereignty and economic interests”. The 2010 defense guidelines continue a trend begun in the previous NDPG, shifting the focus of Japan’s Self Defense Forces (JSDF) from northern defense in Hokkaido toward the island chains that extend far to the south and closer to Taiwan and the Chinese mainland. The emphasis in the new NDPG is on developing Japan’s intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in the southern islands, as well as developing a more mobile, well coordinated and flexible defense force capable of responding in a timely manner to any contingency that might arise there.

The realignment of Japan’s force structure articulated in the new NDPG is accompanied by a conceptual shift in Japan’s defense strategy. The Basic Defense Force (kibanteki boei ryoko) concept that had governed Japan’s defense strategy since 1976 has been replaced by a “Dynamic Defense Force” (doeki boei ryoko) construct that will allow Japan to focus its defense efforts according to perceived security needs, rather than by merely maintaining the “minimum defense capacity” necessary to avoid the creation of a power vacuum in the region. The static Basic Defense Force (BDF) concept, under which Japan continued to deploy a large number of heavy weapons and infantry uniformly across the main islands in order to deter an outright invasion, is now viewed as antiquated and will be replaced with a strategy which seeks to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of Japan’s defense force by concentrating resources on what are deemed “truly necessary functions”. Accordingly, the new NDPG and Mid-Term Defense Plan (MTDP) call for substantial reductions in the number of tanks and heavy artillery while increasing the number of submarines, Aegis destroyers and upgrading Japan’s fighter aircraft and airlift capability.

While abandoning the BDF concept, Japan’s new NDPG indicates that it will retain the notion of exclusively defensive defense (senshu boei), signaling that it will not begin to deploy weaponry it has deemed offensive in nature, such as ballistic missiles, long range bombers and aircraft carriers. In that sense, Japan hopes to reassure its neighbors that the basic principles that have guided its defense program throughout the postwar period remain intact.
The 2010 NDPG is the fourth of its kind in the postwar era. Previous NDPG’s were released in 1976, 1995 and 2004. The Japanese NDPG is similar to the US Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in that it is a review of strategy and priorities for Japanese defense policy, including an annex with target numbers for personnel and major weapons systems over a 10 year horizon. Each revision of the 1976 defense program has been preceded by recommendations from an expert panel selected by the administration in power at the time. On 27 August, 2010 the Prime Minister’s advisory panel released its recommendations for the new NDPG. Despite the committee being instituted under the leadership of the center-left Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and the perception that several members of the committee were more liberal than members of previous advisory committees, the report included a number of controversial recommendations, including abandoning the Basic Defense Force concept which has characterized Japanese defense policy since the mid-1970s, permitting limited use of collective self-defense (missile defense of the US and protecting US ships in Japanese waters), and revising Japan’s policy on the export of weapons. Dr. Yoshihide Soeya of Keio University, a member of the advisory committee, indicated during an interview that the committee had chosen to consider necessary revisions without consideration of the political context in Japan, realizing that some of the recommendations might not be adopted when the 2010 NDPG was announced. Soeya also stated that the Japanese security community was for the most part united in its strategic outlook and that ideological conflict related to defense was a matter that would play out primarily in the media and political parties.

The government panel, led by Keihan Electric Railway chief executive Shigetaka Sato, produced a report that was in many ways similar to an advisory report issued a year earlier by another expert panel selected by the then governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). That report, issued under the leadership of Tsunehisa Katsumata of the Tokyo Electric Power Company, underscored Japan’s lack of preparation for responding to situations in the “gray area between peace time and war time”. The Katsumata report developed the case for “dynamic deterrence” as a means of dealing with possible contingencies that can develop out of normal operations in peacetime, arguing that Japan must be better prepared to both monitor its air and sea space and quickly repel an intrusion if the presence of monitoring forces alone proved ineffective in securing deterrence. The emphasis on improving Japan’s ISR capabilities, enhancing mobility, and posting new ground, sea and air units in its offshore islands is common to both reports and demonstrates a coalescence of strategic thought among the security community in Japan. Both reports also emphasized the need for better coordination at the cabinet level in order to integrate the influx of information from various ministries related to security. Further similarities between the Sato and Katsumata reports can be seen in the willingness to suggest revisions to not only Japan’s current positions on collective self-defense and the Three Principles on Arms Exports, but also to revise the “Five Principles” under which Japanese peace cooperation activities
are currently conducted. vi

In discussing the new security environment, both the Katsumata and Sato reports describe a world wherein globalization and increasing interdependence has reduced the probability of large-scale war between major powers. This leads both reports to mention the importance of new transnational threats such as terrorism, transnational crime and cyberterrorism. Yet both reports also portray an ongoing shift in the relative balance of power, with the US said to be declining both militarily and economically, which has in turn lead to a deterioration of international public goods. The Sato report refers to the high seas, including EEZ [exclusive economic zones], airspace, outer space and cyberspace as international public goods that have come under threat by emerging powers. It is this situation that spawns new Japanese concerns, where “disputes over sovereignty, territory, resources, and energy” can lead to conflict. According to the Sato report, “We need to be aware of risks that may arise from disputes in these ‘gray zones’ and their potential to provoke confrontation between major powers beyond the intentions of the countries concerned.” vii These arguments are adopted in section three of the new NDPG, which deals with the security environment surrounding Japan.

**Force Structure, Realignment and Coordination:**
**Protecting the Southern Island Chain**

Japan has demonstrated growing concern regarding Chinese maritime expansion in the East China Sea for over a decade. Beginning with the 1997 Defense White Paper, Japan has noted an increasing number of Chinese oceanographic research vessels operating in or around Japanese territorial waters. In November of 2004 a Chinese nuclear powered submarine drew protests from the Japanese government as it was tracked inside Japanese territorial waters. In 2005, Chinese naval vessels were seen circling disputed gas fields in the East China Sea which the Chinese had begun developing despite vehement Japanese protests. Since 2008, Japan has reported new developments in Chinese naval activity, as flotillas of Chinese naval warships have been observed passing through the Tsugaru and Miyako channels on their way to the Pacific Ocean. The largest of these passages occurred in April 2010, when a Chinese flotilla of ten vessels, including Kilo-class submarines and Sovremenny-class destroyers, passed through the Miyako channel between Okinawa and Miyako island and on toward waters west of Okinotorishima island before conducting exercises. viii This expansion of Chinese naval activity has lead many inside the Japanese security community to question whether Japan is doing enough to protect its national interests in the southwest, an area with overlapping Sino-Japanese claims to exclusive economic zones, a dispute over sovereignty of the Senkaku (“Diaoyu” in Chinese) Islands, and through which pass major Japanese shipping lanes. Japanese fears in this respect were reinforced less than a month after the release of the Sato report. Sino-Japanese relations deteriorated sharply after September, when Japan detained a Chinese skipper whose trawler collided with Japanese patrol boats.
near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, sparking a major diplomatic row between Tokyo and Beijing. The incident over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and their disputed maritime boundaries exemplifies possible “gray zone” scenarios with tensions over access to territory and natural resources. Proven oil and natural gas fields are present in this area, and the collision of Chinese and Japanese vessels symbolizes the increasing competition to secure natural resources and protect vital sea-lanes.

At a press conference introducing the new NDPG, Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa described the southwest region as a “vacuum” that is addressed strategically in the NDPG, with specific steps to be taken outlined in the accompanying Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) for FY2011-FY2015. In order to strengthen the SDF’s general ISR capabilities as called for by the new NDPG, the MTDP states that new helicopter destroyers (DDH), destroyers (DD), submarines, and fixed-wing surveillance aircraft (P-1) will be provided, while the service of existing submarines, destroyers and P-3C fixed-wing surveillance aircraft will be extended. In the southwestern islands, infrastructure to support early warning aircraft (E-2C) will be provided along with mobile early warning radar. In addition, a Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) coastal monitoring force will be deployed in the southwestern islands, while “preparations will be started for the formation of units responsible for first responses”. Press reports have indicated that the defense ministry intends to deploy 100 noncombat GSDF personnel to Yonaguni Island (about 110 km from Taiwan) and is considering deploying personnel to Miyako and Ishigaki islands as well. The GSDF 15th Brigade in Naha will be upgraded to division strength. In order to improve response capability for rapid deployment in the case of a contingency the GSDF will procure more CH-47 JA transport helicopters and the Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) will introduce a replacement for its current C-1 transport aircraft. The ASDF’s air defense capability will be enhanced by deploying an additional fighter squadron to Naha Air Base. The ASDF plans a number of upgrades to its aircraft within the period covered by the next MTDP, including replacing its aging F-4 fighter aircraft with a fifth generation fighter and further upgrades to its existing F-15 and F-2 fighters. The MDTP also indicates that intermediate surface to air missiles will deployed along with surface to air Patriot missiles that Japan is currently working with the US to improve.

The MSDF will receive the largest increase in major armaments as the number of submarines allotted will grow from 16 to 22 and Aegis destroyers will increase from 4 to 6 under the next MTDP. In order to pay for these new armaments and other upgrades to SDF forces without increasing the overall defense budget the Ministry of Defense (MoD) has agreed to a number of cutbacks in other areas. The 2011-2015 MTDP budget will be cut to about 23.49 trillion yen (US$283 billion), down by 750 billion yen (US $8.93 billion) from the previous five-year budget. The GSDF will be the biggest loser as the number of tanks and artillery will both decline from 600 to 400 over the next five years. The GSDF will also lose 1,000 regular personnel, going from 155,000 to 154,000. Whether these cuts, along with a number of reforms planned for the SDF personnel system will be enough to adequately fund
the new armaments and technology upgrades is open to question. Japan’s recent catastrophic earthquake disaster will put an additional drain on the government’s coffers and increase pressure on the military budget. The hope at Japan’s MoD is that with better integration and coordination, Japan will actually be able to do more with less. The new NDPG intends to improve command and control by strengthening the functions of the Joint Staff Office, improving information-gathering capabilities through the use of satellites and unmanned aircraft, and employing advanced communications systems “to ensure that commands and information sharing are carried out accurately and promptly.” The new NDPG also indicates that after evaluating the structure and functions of the current security organizations in the Cabinet, Japan will establish a new body within the Prime Minister’s Office to coordinate security matters among relevant ministers and provide recommendations to the Prime Minister.

**Political Hot Button Issues:**

**the Three Principles on Arms Export**

When the Sato report was released in August of 2010, a great deal of media attention focused on the report’s recommendation that Japan consider revising the so-called “Three Principles on Arms Exports”.x The stage for this debate had already been set when Nippon Keidanren (The Japanese Business Federation) issued its own proposals for the new NDPG in July. Keidanren emphasized the fragile state of Japan’s domestic defense industry, an industry that it argues has been weakened by continuous reductions in the defense budget and the lack of a clear defense industry policy that might allow related businesses to carry out long-term planning. Keidanren suggested that Japan follow the model provided by countries like the UK and France, which “have clarified the areas on which to focus investment as a nation and to promote international joint development, and have successfully established an environment that enables the business community to set up a long-term vision.”xii In order for Japan to break out of its national isolation with regard to defense technologies, it would have to revise the Three Principles for Arms Export and allow the government to “comprehensively examine each case from the viewpoints of contents, final destination, and application.”xiii

During interviews conducted in September of 2010, I found widespread support for revising the *de facto* arms export ban among security experts at Japanese think tanks, as well as officials interviewed at both MoD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). Most interlocutors mentioned Japan’s inability to participate in the international development of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter as an example of Japan being left out in the cold with regard to trends in military technology, though Professor Soeya stressed that the Sato report also emphasized Japan’s ability to contribute to the capacity building of countries involved in anti-piracy and counterterrorism efforts, as in the case of Japan supplying Indonesia with patrol boats. Within the ruling DPJ, Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa, Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara and Minister of
Economy, Trade and Industry Akihiro Ohata all actively advocated an easing of the de facto ban on arms exports. There was, however, no consensus on the change within the ruling party. Some liberal members lead by Hideo Hiraoka, senior vice minister of the Internal Affairs and Communications Ministry, strongly opposed the change, which they said would violate the DPJ’s election pledge to uphold the Three Principles. In the end, internal opposition, along with that of New Komeito and the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the latter a coalition partner of the DPJ, made a full review of the Three Principles too costly for a politically weak Prime Minister Naoto Kan. SDP chief Mizuho Fukushima declared that Japan would become a “merchant of death” if the Three Principles were revised and threatened to oppose upcoming budget bills should the administration go ahead with revisions. Fukushima’s opposition is widely credited for having kept the review out of the new NDPG, although the guidelines do mention that Japan will “study measures to respond to international trends in defense equipment”.

The major investment of political capital utilized in attempting to overcome the arms export ban did not leave much room for debate on other controversial issues such as revising the government’s policy on limited collective self-defense rights, which many Japanese security experts recognize as important to the future of the US-Japan alliance. Officials at the Cabinet Secretariat’s Office informed me in September that the collective self-defense issue would not be raised when the new NDPG was announced in December as there was insufficient time to reach consensus prior to the scheduled release.

Revision of the Five Principles governing the dispatch of the SDF overseas for peace cooperation activities is another issue widely supported within the security community that did not receive much attention when the National Security Council met to finalize the drafting of the new defense guidelines.

Domestic and External Responses following the Release of the NDPG

Editorial responses to the new NDPG from Japan’s major newspapers divided primarily along ideological lines, with the center-left papers Asahi Shimbun and Mainichi Shimbun emphasizing the need to develop political and diplomatic relations with China in addition to taking military precautions. Yet neither of the center-left dailies was willing to argue that the revisions included in the new NDPG were unnecessary. An Asahi editorial stated that “the security situation in East Asia is becoming increasingly unstable” and, “the document [NDPG] stresses that Japan can contribute to regional stability by increasing activity of its defense hardware and clearly demonstrating its advanced capabilities. We don’t deny that the new policy could have such positive effects. However, the new defense policy could be seen by Japan’s neighbors as a sign that it is relaxing its longstanding policy of self-restraint.” More straightforwardly, the Mainichi editorial stated, “Revisions to the defense program based on the current security environment in East Asia will be effective and necessary. Still, it is obvious that measures to counter
China’s military buildup cannot be the core of Japan’s policy toward China, considering China’s role in the international community and future Japan-China relations”. xvii The center-right Yomiuri gave a positive review of the new guidelines, arguing that “the adoption of such a dynamic defense capability as the concept of the new defense guidelines would be an appropriate switch in the dramatically changing security landscape we face today.” The Yomiuri was critical only so far as asking for further change, stating that, “If the balance of the SDF had been considered in a comprehensive manner, more GSDF personnel would have been cut in addition to the reduction in tanks and artillery that has been decided upon in the guidelines. At the same time, the fixed strength of personnel in the air and Maritime Self Defense Forces and the number of vessels and aircraft should have been increased.” xviii The Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei), a moderate business daily, echoed the Yomuri’s call for further improvements to the efficiency of the GSDF and, along with the center-right Sankei Shimbun, was disappointed by the failure to review the Three Principles on Arms Exports. xix

Unsurprisingly the loudest foreign reaction to Japan’s new NDPG came from China, where Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu criticized the new policy as “irresponsible” and added that “China poses no threat to anybody”. One editorial in the state-run China Daily argued that “Japanese hawks were now flexing their muscles” and another described Japan’s new NDPG as, “a paranoid defense strategy, featuring a Cold War mentality that has raised alarm both at home and abroad.” xx Dismissing Japanese appeals in the new NDPG for enhancing relations of trust with China and Russia through security dialogue and exchanges, Chinese commentators argue that Japan’s call for strengthening security cooperation, not only with the US, but also with South Korea, Australia, ASEAN and India as indicative of its clear intention to contain China. The Russian government, which made no formal response to the Japanese NDPG, declared on 15 February, 2011, that it would ratchet up its own defense capabilities on the disputed Northern Territories (Russia refers to them as the South Kuril Islands).xxi Thus far, there has been no sign that Japan will reconsider its defense realignment due to Russian assertiveness in the north.

Governments in Canberra, Seoul and New Delhi also made no formal response to Japan’s new NDPG, though Japan has in fact been working for some time to develop security cooperation with US allies Australia and South Korea, as well as India. These efforts have thus far not focused on China, but rather on areas such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), peacekeeping, counter-terrorism and counter-piracy. Japan signed a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation with Australia in March 2007 that was restricted to these issues and in May 2010, the two countries signed an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement in order to facilitate operations in these areas. After several years of dialogue, Japan and India adopted an Action Plan to Security Cooperation in 2009 that included maritime security, HA/DR, nonproliferation, counter-terrorism and counter-piracy. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Japan in October of 2010 and reaffirmed
this security cooperation with Japan through a Joint Declaration of Security Cooperation. Following the North Korean artillery barrage of Yeonpyeong Island, Japan and South Korea also took a historic step toward strengthening security cooperation by announcing a plan to research their own Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement along with the possibility of sharing military information. In announcing even these limited agreements, South Korean military officials made it clear that they would “involve ordinary exchanges and are completely unrelated to any move to keep China in check.”xxii An ongoing territorial dispute over Tokdo (Korean)/Takeshima (Japanese) Island along with continuing animosity regarding Japan’s colonization of the peninsula suggests that the South Korean public will likely remain cautious regarding any strengthening of ROK-Japan security relations. That progress in this area will remain slow was brought home when cautions were raised in South Korean editorials regarding Japan’s new NDPG, with one major daily raising the fear that Tokyo might seek to strengthen military power beyond the restrictions of its pacifist Constitution.xxiii

Implications for the Alliance

Japan’s portrayal of US relative decline vis-à-vis emerging powers such as China, Russia and India will not be received favorably in Washington, nor should it be. Japan’s newfound determination to do more to protect its southwest is a clear signal that confidence in US commitment and capability to deter China in this region is lacking. Meetings between US and Japanese officials immediately following the Sino-Japanese fishing boat flare up in September 2010 clearly aimed at shoring up Japan’s confidence in the United States. Secretary of Defense Gates met with his counterpart Toshimi Kitazawa in October, agreeing that both countries would closely cooperate to deal with China’s maritime activities in the East China Sea. US Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg also met with Vice Foreign Minister Kenichiro Sasae in October, with the two reportedly agreeing on a set of basic principles to direct key strategies on China.xxiv These issues will also be addressed when new common objectives are discussed at the next US-Japan Security Consultative Committee meeting.xxv

In the meantime, the US has welcomed Japan’s new NDPG and its calls for deepening and expanding the US-Japan alliance through strategic dialogue and concrete policy coordination. The new NDPG continues to stress that “the US-Japan alliance will be indispensable for ensuring Japan’s peace and security” and pledges greater cooperation in a number of areas including the sharing and protection of information, ballistic missile defense, and raising the credibility of the alliance’s extended deterrent capability. In December of 2010 Wallace Gregson, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, commended Japan’s attempt to “move away from a posture that was really inherited from the Cold War days to one that is different than that.”xxvi Japan’s planned improvements to its ISR capabilities in the southwest could complement the US’s new Air-Sea Battle doctrine discussed
in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. The new NDPG also promises steady implementation of the bilateral agreement to realign the US forces in Japan, while at the same time promising to ease the burden on local communities in Okinawa Prefecture. How these issues are resolved may, in the long-term, impact the ability of the two countries to carry out closer cooperation in the future.

i The English translation for Boei Taiko was changed from National Defense Program Outline to National Defense Program Guideline in 2004.

ii The advisory panel is formally titled The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era and the report title is “Japan’s Visions for Future Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era: Toward a Peace Creating Nation”.

iii Interview with Dr. Yoshihide Soeya, 21 September, 2010.


vi The Five Principles are: (1) a cease-fire must be in place; (2) the parties to the conflict must have given their consent to the operation; (3) the activities must be conducted in a strictly impartial manner; (4) participation may be suspended or terminated if any of the above conditions ceases to be satisfied; and (5) use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect life or person of the personnel.


xi The Three Principles on Arms Exports were first declared by the cabinet of Eisaku Sato in 1967 in response to the Japan Socialist Party’s objections to logistical support for US forces in Vietnam. The principles dictated that Japan would not exports arms to communist bloc countries, countries to which arms export had been prohibited by UN resolutions; and countries which are involved in or likely to become involved in international conflicts. In 1976 the Miki Cabinet extended this prohibition by indicating that Japan would “refrain” from exporting arms to all other countries and included the export of arms related technology. This resulted in a de facto prohibition on arms exports. Certain exceptions to these prohibitions have been made, such as the export of weapons and related technologies to the United States.


xiv “Arms export ban to stand; budget bills Kan’s priority” The Japan Times online Wed.,
Author interviews with officials in the Japanese defense ministry and subject matter experts in September 2010 confirm support for these revisions within the broader Japanese security community.

Personnel interviews with Koji Kurauchi, Counselor (in charge of governmental coordination for the upcoming NDPG) and Naoto Kawakami, Deputy Counselor of the Japanese Cabinet Secretariat’s Office, 17 September, 2010.


Mainichi Shimbun editorial 防衛計画の大綱「対中」軍事だけでなく (National Defense Program Guidelines should not deal with China in only military terms) 18 December 2010, accessed online at: http://mainichi.jp/select/opinion/editorial/news/20101218k0000m070140000c.html.


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