

Perceptions of Transnational Security Threats in Malaysia and Singapore: Windows of Cooperative Opportunities for the United States

Yoichiro Sato, Professor,
Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University (Former APCSS Professor)

Key Lessons

- Malaysia and Singapore face a similar set of transnational security challenges, but their perceptions differ considerably due to the differences in their economic status, ethnic and religious composition, and law-enforcement capacity.
- Concerns regarding the rise of China are shared by Malaysia and Singapore. Both have an interest in the increased maritime power of China.
- Concerns about transnational criminal activities by Chinese nationals are strong in Malaysia, whereas Singapore is confident of its own ability to control such activities.
- While Singapore is confident of its ability to control transnational labor flows, Malaysia lacks law-enforcement capabilities to deal with illegal aliens and transnational crimes such as drug and human smuggling.
- Malaysia would benefit from increased security cooperation on drug trafficking and broad maritime security capacity-building in the tri-border area, but not in the Malacca Strait. Piracy, terrorism, human trafficking, and money laundering are not among the country's priorities.
- Singapore considers terrorism, global economic slumps, and maritime piracy as important transnational security threats. The country is confident of its ability to deal with drug issues and illegal migrant workers. The Singapore government does not officially acknowledge money laundering to be a serious issue, in view of the country's claims to have a highly effective regulatory framework. However, international experts have noted

shortcomings in Singapore's measures and have stopped short of giving a full mark to the country's performance.

- Cooperative opportunities for the United States are limited. Singapore sees itself capable of dealing with most transnational challenges—except for terrorism and maritime security, where the only limits to cooperation with the United States are perceptions of its neighbors, Malaysia and Indonesia. Malaysia's perceived transnational threats are deeply embedded in the country's domestic political economy, thereby making the government efforts to address these issues half-hearted at best. Cooperation with the United States on terrorism faces political sensitivity within Malaysia's Muslim population, leaving a narrow window of cooperation on the drug problem.

Introduction

The transnational security issues faced by Malaysia and Singapore are nearly identical, but the two countries' perceptions of transnational threats differ considerably. Being former British colonies—which by twists of history became two separate states—Malaysia and Singapore have grown into two distinct political systems with differing degrees of economic performance. These domestic factors inevitably affect each country's perceptions of transnational threats in the region. US efforts to extend a cooperative hand must take into account the similarities and differences of these two countries.

Malaysia and Singapore—Commonalities and Differences

Both Malaysia and Singapore are highly open economies and societies. Their geographical locations along a major trade path have historically exposed them to heavy international traffic and associated transnational issues. Government policies in both countries in recent years clearly aim at taking advantage of the global economic linkage, encouraging trade, labor, tourist, and international student flows. Both Malaysia and Singapore are highly dependent on international trade. Malaysia's trade per gross domestic product (GDP) ratio stands at 159.1 percent, whereas Singapore's ratio is 309.1 percent.¹ Previously Singapore monopolized the profitable transit trade, but Malaysia is cutting into Singapore's share.

Compared with other countries in the region, both Malaysia and Singapore enjoy a relatively high standard of living, although the latter is much richer than the former.ⁱⁱ As a result, both countries receive a large influx of foreign workers from the rest of Southeast Asia and beyond.

The two countries differ, however, in some important aspects. In Malaysia, ethnic Chinese are the minority, along with the Indians. The issue of ethnic relations with the dominant plurality (officially the majority) of the Malays is a controversial topic in Malaysia. The “Malay first” policy of favoring ethnic Malays over other ethnicities in economic and educational opportunities has provided the politically connected Malay businesspeople with many benefits and protection against competition. This measure was justified in the name of narrowing the socioeconomic gap with the richer Chinese. Malay skepticism of the Chinese also has a root in the communist insurgencies of the 1960s backed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Meanwhile, in Singapore, ethnic Chinese are the majority. Malay dominance in Malaysia has a religious dimension as well. Ethnic Malays are considered Muslims by the virtue of their birth, and Islam is the state religion. Malaysia is active in the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) and maintains special relationships with Islamic countries of Middle East, North Africa, and South and West Asia. Singapore, on the other hand, is a secular state that closely identifies itself with the developed Western world, except for the latter’s emphasis on human rights and democracy.

Although both Malaysia and Singapore attract a large number of foreign workers, the gap in economic standings between Malaysia and Singapore and the former’s lax regulations make Malaysia a transit country for illegal workers as well. Singapore’s much stricter regulations mean that those who want to transit through Singapore to other countries, like Australia, tend to go through legal permanent residency status and therefore are clearly visible to the government authority.

The other difference between Malaysia and Singapore is in their law-enforcement capacities. Malaysian government suffers to a greater extent from corruption, and its ability to effectively deal with transnational security threats is hampered by widespread corruption from the lowest to the highest levels of government. In Singapore, the authoritarian government sees corruption as a potential means of self-destruction of its otherwise successful governance. However, its lax regulations in the financial sector to attract foreign money have offered a high degree of secrecy to potential abusers of the island’s financial system.

Malaysia

Within the Southeast Asia region, Malaysia is a highly open economy due to its maritime location, historically porous borders, geographic proximity to major trade and traffic routes, small population combined with relative affluence, shared ethnic heritages with the neighboring countries inside and outside Southeast Asia, government policy to encourage ties with the Islamic world, and globally oriented economic outlook.

Benefits of international trade are clearly visible in the country’s rising trade volume and trade-per-GDP ratio. In addition to attracting foreign investments and signing free trade agreements (FTAs) with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members and other countries in Asia and beyond, the Malaysian government has decided to compete for the regional transshipment market against the previously dominant Singapore. While Singapore has an advantage in advanced facilities and cumulative management expertise, Malaysia offers lower costs in labor and land.

Migrant workers are attracted to Malaysia because of the country’s relative affluence compared with its Southeast Asian neighbors (excluding Singapore and Brunei) and other countries in Asia. Malaysia’s small population and higher local labor costs disadvantage its labor-intensive sectors and domestically focused industries. Foreign migrant workers are introduced both legally and illegally in such sectors as farming, food processing, mining, construction, and housekeeping. Promotion of the tourism industry also requires a large pool of low-skilled labor. The largest source of migrant workers is Indonesia, but many workers from the Philippines, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Cambodia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan are also present. On record, migrant workers represent 12 percent of the country’s population of 25.7 million,ⁱⁱⁱ but the number of overstayers (those who enter the country legally but overstay the term of their visas) is estimated to be three to four million, adding to the “official” foreign population. Undocumented entries of an estimated two million people further augment this number. Because transit use of the Malaysian territory is also common in this category, Malaysia’s official population figure is somewhat unreliable.

Opportunities for transnational crimes coincide with Malaysia’s growing migrant population and increased trade. At the same time, Malaysian observers are cautious not to blame everything on the recent globalization. In fact, Malaysia’s geographic location has exposed the country to long-distance commerce and migration since its precolonial

history, and many of the transnational issues Malaysia faces today have been present for a long time but have only recently been recognized as “problems.” Among these transnational issues, drug smuggling and illegal workers are given the most attention by Malaysian experts. Human trafficking is subsumed under the illegal workers category, leading the government to focus on visa violations of the trafficked victims. Terrorism and maritime piracy—to which the United States pays close attention—are not considered major problems; however, US reactions to these issues are.

Drug Issues

Drug issues have existed in Malaysia for a long time. The increased opiate trafficking out of the Golden Triangle in the 1970s entered Malaysia through the transshipment point in Penang. By 1983 the problem had worsened to the point that the Malaysian government declared drug trafficking the number one threat to the country. In more recent years, drug production in Thailand and Myanmar shifted to synthetic drugs, and drug usage in Malaysia followed suit. Today, drug users in Malaysia are overcrowding the prisons. Increases in the number of arrests of Malaysian “mules” (lowest-level traffickers, including many females) in both Malaysia and neighboring countries and drug usage among the Malay middle class are perceived as problematic by the security experts there. Arrest data indicate that the trafficking routes have considerably diversified. Drug money is also laundered throughout Southeast Asia (including Malaysia) by Chinese criminal networks.

Illegal Migrant Workers and Human Trafficking

Malaysia sees itself on the receiving end of human trafficking. Foreign victims of human trafficking in Malaysia have received little government attention because they are not seen as doing much harm and are perceived as being needed by the domestic economy. The country has signed the international antihuman trafficking convention but has not ratified it. The lack of government interest partly stems from the fact that the sectors in which trafficked victims are forced to work also attract willing workers who volunteer to be smuggled into Malaysia. Local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have clarified the distinction between “trafficked” (involuntarily brought in through coercion or deceit)

and “smuggled” (willingly and knowingly brought in) people, but government policy lags behind because the illegal status of these workers provides the labor market flexibility and conveniently denies them certain state benefits that are only available to legal migrant workers. Both trafficked and smuggled workers are bonded by the recruiters, and treating the trafficked people as victims in need of protection would place additional financial burdens on the Malaysian government.

During the economic boom of the 1990s and the recovery from the Asian financial crisis, job categories such as waiters, housemaids, and construction and plantation workers attracted few local workers and were subsequently filled by foreign workers. The ongoing economic recession has turned local Chinese and Indian workers against foreign workers to compete for their jobs. The downturn has also turned the trade unions with Malay workers against foreign workers, resulting in massive deportations and cancellations of visas for non-Malay foreign workers. However, political sensitivity about the treatment of Indonesian workers grants them slightly better treatment than that of other migrant workers. Ethnic Malays in Malaysia see Indonesian workers as brothers and sisters, and resent domestic Chinese and Indian allegations that Indonesian workers commit many crimes. Deported Indonesian workers are normally allowed to apply for legal entry.

Land routes of entries include illegal crossing from the Indonesian side on the island of Borneo and from the southern provinces of Thailand. The porous nature of both borders and the corruption at official crossing points are both identified as causes of Malaysia’s ineffective immigration management. Sea routes include the Malacca Strait, South China Sea, and the tri-border area from the Southern Philippines to the Celebes Sea. Between southern Mindanao and Sabah in particular, the presence of traditional seafarers who have their relatives living on both sides and their stateless nature are abused by smugglers and traffickers.

Further compounding the problem of illegal entries, overstayers and those with other visa violations can potentially be exploited by more serious criminals, including terrorists. “China dolls” is the term used by Malaysians to describe Chinese female students working in prostitution. Faked marriages are said to be used to bring in Vietnamese plantation workers. Malaysia accepts a large number of foreign students and tourists from Islamic countries. In order to promote Arab tourism, Malaysia has offered visa-free entries to tourists from Islamic countries. Overstaying Nigerians are settling in parts of the country and are said to be developing

criminal ties with Chinese crime syndicates. Malaysia took advantage of the post-9/11 visa tightening in North America and Europe against students from Islamic countries to attract fee-paying foreign students. Some Malaysians fear that with these entries comes the influence of conservative Wahhabism, which challenges the Malaysian government's emphasis on progressive Islam, and that radicalized Islam may lead to terrorism.^{iv}

Terrorism

Malaysia's perception of terrorism is not based on a strong and genuine concern that the country may be targeted by terrorists. Rather, it is more concerned about what the United States does in the region in response to terrorism concerns. Accordingly, Malaysia's responses to terrorism are partly for precluding US actions. Malaysia's half-hearted counterterrorism posture is also driven by domestic political considerations. The ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO) has viewed Islam as an important source of popular support for the government. However, its emphasis on "progressive Islam" (as opposed to more conservative/radical interpretations) has not developed strong roots in Malaysia, and emotional ties with the Middle East have persisted. The government approach is also viewed as aiming to discredit the opposition Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS).

While the country maintains an ambivalent stance on terrorism, Malaysia's corrupt political system has revealed governance weakness with regard to combating transnational crimes. The implication of high-ranking Malaysian government officials and their family connections in such scandals as the corrupt UN Oil-for-Food program for Iraq and Dr. Khan's nuclear proliferation network have illustrated that Malaysian ties to the Middle East and South Asia could be more than emotional.

Maritime Piracy

Malaysia does not see piracy as a serious problem. In fact, most incidents in the Malacca Strait occur in Indonesian waters. Malaysia jealously guards its sovereign claims over the Malacca Strait, resisting the user states' effort to multilateralize policing of this strait. Malaysia and Indonesia strongly and negatively reacted to reports that Admiral Thomas Fargo had suggested the United States might deploy "marines or special

forces on high-speed boats" to the strait. Malaysia is more open to maritime security cooperation (broadly defined) in the tri-border area (from Sulu Sea to Celebes Sea), where improved maritime domain awareness would help the Malaysian authorities deal with various transnational criminal activities. The Malaysian perception that the Chinese navy is tacitly aiding its nationals in certain criminal activities (such as illegal fishing) is also a motivating factor for Malaysia to seek cooperation from the United States.

Singapore

Singapore has a long history of viewing security from a broad, comprehensive perspective. Its "total defense" doctrine since the mid-1980s has encompassed military, economic, psychosocial, and environmental dimensions of security. Being a small city-state, Singapore sees that all threats are transnational and interlinked. Major security issues Singapore faced during the last decade—including the Asian economic crisis, the sudden acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic, avian flu, the 2002 Bali bombing, and the regional haze problems—only enhanced Singapore's comprehensive security perspective. Unlike Malaysia, Singapore does not suffer from weak governance in facing transnational threats. Its meritocratic bureaucracy and the ruling Peoples' Action Party (PAP) maintain a well-coordinated and stable working relationship that is atypical of Southeast Asia.

Singapore considers terrorism and global economic slumps as its most serious transnational security threats, perhaps closely followed by maritime piracy. Drug issues, illegal migrant workers, and money laundering are not considered major problems. Singapore's transnational security perceptions are directly linked to what the country is able and willing to control. With exceptionally strong governance capacities, the Singapore government is confident that most transnational threats it wishes to control are controllable. Drug syndicates, migrant workers, and Chinese criminals all fall in this category. The government is still working on improving the state's antiterrorism capacities. The perception of piracy threats due to problems on Indonesian waters is partly beyond Singapore's control. As for economic security, the country is at the mercy of global economic conditions.

Singapore most openly welcomes US involvement in the region's transnational security issues, including terrorism. In its domestic

population, Muslims are the minority, and this frees Singapore from having to pay closer attention to domestic reactions to the government's close cooperation with the United States. Singapore's working relationship with the United States is also driven by its ambivalence about China's growing status and maritime military buildup. Transnational issues associated with the inflow of Chinese migrants are considered to be within Singapore's controlling abilities. Yet, as a state, China poses a potential threat to Singapore due to its strategic maritime location, which has lured major powers for control (such as the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century and Japan during World War II). The Multilateral Maritime Information Fusion Center in Singapore is a manifestation of Singapore's overlapping concerns about transnational threats and a rising China. The center also demonstrates Singapore's willingness to keep the United States engaged.

Migrant population

Singapore's higher income level and economic openness attract a large number of migrant workers. Out of its population of roughly 4.7 million,^v one million are estimated to be foreign workers. While many foreign workers enter Singapore with fixed-term visas and go through periodic renewals, the presence of a significant number of unregistered foreign workers is suspected. Singapore is listed on the Tier 2 Watch List for human trafficking by the US State Department for the presence of many trafficked workers there. Old criminal syndicates are suspected of bringing in foreign sex workers into the country. Unlike in Malaysia, the large inflow of mainland Chinese into Singapore as permanent residents is not perceived as a security threat, perhaps partly for ethnic affinity, but more importantly because of the country's highly selective and controlled recruitment of foreign workers. Singapore's highly taxed items, such as cigarette and liquor, are often smuggled in. Indonesian workers are known for their frequent smuggling in of cigarettes.

Drugs

Singaporeans are fairly confident that no major local drug syndicate operates in the city-state. However, drugs from Thailand find their way into Singapore, and some Singaporeans are working as "mules" to carry illicit drugs across state borders. Overall, the drug problem in Singapore is

not perceived to be as bad as that of Malaysia. One major difference is Singapore's comprehensive approach to the drug issue, which provides treatment and rehabilitation for drug users. Singaporeans view drug businesses in Thailand as being partly run by political groups, including former communists and secessionists in the South. While this perception was accurate in the past, more recent analyses see neither of these two groups as significant actors in drug smuggling through Thailand.^{vi}

Maritime Piracy

Singapore's strategic maritime location, connecting the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, has made the country a world-class transshipping point. Its economy depends on uninterrupted maritime traffic, and piracy poses a major threat to its industry. As pirates are no longer based in the tightly governed Singapore, Singaporeans see themselves as victims of poor governance in the neighboring countries. Most notably, economic conditions on the island of Sumatra (Indonesia) are perceived as a key determinant of piracy activities in the Malacca Strait. For Singapore, piracy poses a threat to the physical danger of Singaporeans and the potential loss of ships and cargos. However, the threats are perceived more in terms of lost business, as high insurance rates drive shipping companies away from the Malacca Strait.

Money Laundering

Singapore's openness as a regional financial center attracts a large sum of transnational money. Like many other offshore financial centers, Singapore has become a place for laundering money of illegitimate and dubious origins. The opening of a major casino on the Sentosa Island in February 2010 further enhanced this perception. In competition with other offshore financial centers, Singapore has kept lax financial regulations in place. Based on its March 2007 evaluation of Singapore, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which works with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), noted "[o]verall, the regime for investigating ML [money laundering] has not been effectively implemented, as is illustrated by the low number of ML investigations."^{vii} In fact, the absence of comprehensive rules was less problematic in Singapore than was the lack of will to enforce them. The evaluation further stated:

MAS [the Monetary Authority Singapore] reports that administrative sanctions such as letter of reprimand or letter requiring remedial action have been very effective in getting financial institutions to rectify their breaches and deficiencies. No criminal sanctions have been issued; fines have only been issued against money remitters and bureau de change.^{viii}

Singapore avoided being listed by the OECD in 2000 as one of the thirty-five offshore tax havens. However, Singapore's law protected financial information of the clients of banks and other financial services to such an extent that sharing of their tax-related information with treaty partners was practically impossible. According to Jeffrey Owens, director of the OECD Center for Tax Policy and Administration, Singapore has "used the fact that it is not on the OECD list of tax havens and the restrictive exchange of information provisions in its tax treaties to market itself as the ultimate secrecy jurisdiction."^{ix}

While the FATF acknowledged some improvements, lack of sufficient progress earned the country a "gray" designation by the OECD in early 2009—which indicated less-than-substantial implementation of the OECD standard on transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes. Since then, Singapore has passed new laws to empower the domestic tax authority to "exchange information, including bank and fiduciary information, with tax authorities in other countries" and signed a protocol with France to bring their bilateral tax treaty up to the OECD standard—a move that qualified Singapore as a "white list" (substantial implementation) country.^x It is too soon to evaluate efficacy and implementation of these new measures.

Economic Slumps

Singaporeans see economic slumps as the trigger and multiplier of transnational security problems. For instance, at times of economic crisis and high unemployment inside Indonesia, the influx of illegal workers from Indonesia is feared. Similarly, Singapore views piracy as closely associated with Sumatra's economic conditions. Furthermore, at times of economic slump, political instability may ensue in the neighboring countries and spill over into Singapore. Most notably, the governing elite of Singapore is concerned that during economic crises transitional democracies in the region may face open criticism and disfranchisement of the populace, and the same pressure may reach the Singaporean government.

Conclusion

Although Malaysia and Singapore share borders and face similar transnational security challenges, their perceptions of such challenges differ considerably due to differences in domestic, political, economic, and societal factors. The two countries are similar in their dismissive perceptions about the seriousness of the human trafficking problem, for these countries are recipient and transit (Malaysia) countries rather than source countries (like the Philippines and Indonesia). Malaysia and Singapore, however, differ in their ability to assess the extent of their illegal worker problems and to deal with the issues. Malaysians view the issue as a bigger problem than do Singaporeans, due to the former's lack of confidence in its own monitoring and enforcement capabilities and historically held negative perceptions about the Chinese. Singapore, with a Muslim-Malay minority, does not overtly demonstrate such ethno-religious bias, partly due to its emphasis on meritocratic society, and also because of its confidence in monitoring of and enforcement capabilities for dealing with the imported workers and transnational criminals. For issues related to illegal workers, Singapore does not need external help, and Malaysia does not want external help, for illegal workers are heavily entrenched in the country's economic interests.

On drug problems, both Singapore and Malaysia face common challenges that mainly stem from Thailand. Both countries impose tough penalties against traffickers, but the two countries differ in their ways of dealing with drug users. Malaysia's straightforward criminalization of drug use without rehabilitation of the users is less effective than Singapore's comprehensive approach. The drug issue is a potential venue of closer cooperation between the United States and Malaysia. For example, the Joint Interagency Taskforce-West (JIATF-West) of the US Pacific Command has been active in counternarcotics efforts in Thailand. Extending this cooperation to Malaysian ground and maritime law-enforcement agencies with minimal footprints, mainly focusing on information sharing, may open up further venues of cooperation in the future. As Singapore's success indicates, a rehabilitation program for drug users in Malaysia would complement the countertrafficking approach. Quiet US assistance in this venue would also be welcomed by Malaysia.

The expressed concerns about terrorism in the region are more genuine in Singapore, which welcomes closer cooperation with the United States in every conceivable way, provided that such cooperation is not aimed at Singapore's two most immediate neighbors—Malaysia and Indonesia. In

Malaysia, the primary concern with terrorism has to do with US actions in the region and the repercussions of these actions on domestic politics. Malaysians recognize that the country is more prone to the influence of radicalized Islam from West Asia, South Asia, and North Africa and that its territory may harbor terrorists and their sympathizers. However, Malaysians seem to take some comfort in their belief that the terrorists' targets are elsewhere. Terrorism and its perceived association with Islam are sensitive topics in Malaysia's domestic party politics. The country's ethnoreligious divide on these topics largely precludes publicly visible antiterrorism cooperation with the United States. Singapore's concerns about maritime piracy are not closely shared by Malaysia. Malaysia's strong sovereign claims over its territorial waters in the Malacca Strait preclude formalized multilateral cooperation that includes nonlittoral partners.^{xi} The two countries, however, share concerns about the expansion of Chinese naval activities in Southeast Asia. To counter the increasing Chinese naval activities, Singapore openly welcomes a US naval presence in the country. However, Malaysia cannot do the same for domestic considerations. With Malaysia, broader maritime security cooperation outside the Malacca Strait—which only implicitly embeds improvement of the antipiracy capabilities—is more likely to be fruitful. Such cooperation could go a long way toward improving Malaysia's Maritime Enforcement Agency's capabilities in maritime border patrol and interceptions, information-sharing with other agencies (such as immigration, police, customs, the navy, and other regional governments), legal prosecuting capabilities, and anticorruption measures at the enforcement level.

Finally, both Malaysia and Singapore are hotbeds of money laundering. The presence of traditional transnational criminal networks in the region, combined with the recent “race to the bottom” (financial liberalization and deregulation) among the regional financial centers in terms of liberalization of cross-border financial transactions, has made criminal money an important part of Southeast Asian economies. White-collar crimes and unethical but legal (due to lax regulations) business practices have the potential to severely destabilize the security of the region, as Singaporeans clearly see economic conditions in the region as a critical variable affecting all other transnational security issues. The money laundering issue, however, involves enhancement of the global financial rules and standardization of the national rules, which are far beyond the scope of security cooperation

measures by a regional military command or the US Department of Defense. Instead, windows of opportunities for the United States are found in anti-drug and maritime law enforcement efforts, where developing the capacity of the partner country's authority in a quiet manner is welcomed.

ⁱEstimated as of 2008. Computed from data in the CIA, *World Factbook*, 2009.

ⁱⁱSingapore's estimated GDP per capita (purchase power parity) for 2008 was US\$51,500, whereas Malaysia's figure for the same year was US\$15,200. They both compare favorably against most other countries in the region, like Burma (US\$1,200), Bangladesh (US\$1,500), Cambodia (US\$2,000), Vietnam (US\$2,800), the Philippines (US\$3,300), Indonesia (US\$3,900), China (US\$6,000), and Thailand (US\$8,400). Data source: CIA, *World Factbook*, 2009.

ⁱⁱⁱEstimated as of July 2009. CIA, *World Factbook*, 2009.

^{iv}For a history of Wahhabism's influence in Malaysia and its link to Jemaah Islamiya, see Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), pp. 125–38.

^vEstimated as of July 2009. CIA, *World Factbook* 2009.

^{vi}“Thailand Islamic Insurgency,” GlobalSecurity.org. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/thailand2.htm>. Accessed on 9 December 2009.

^{vii}Financial Action Task Force, “Third Mutual Evaluation on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, Singapore, Executive Summary,” Paris: Financial Action Task Force, 29 February 2008, p. 5. <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/52/40211135.pdf>. Downloaded on 9 December 2009.

^{viii}Financial Action Task Force, p. 7.

^{ix}US Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, “Written Testimony of Jeffrey Owens, Director, OECD Center for Tax Policy and Administration before Senate Finance Committee on Offshore Tax Evasion,” 3 May 2007, pp. 7–8, 15. <http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2007test/050307testjo.pdf>. Downloaded on 9 December 2009.

^xFrancis Chin, “S'pore in the white,” *Strait Times*, 14 November 2009, reproduced on the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs website at: http://app.mfa.gov.sg/pr/read_content.asp?View.14045. Accessed on 9 December 2009.

^{xi}Yoichiro Sato, “Southeast Asian Receptiveness to Japan's Maritime Security Cooperation,” Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, September 2007. <http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Maritime%20security%20cooperation%20Japan-SE%20Asia%20Sato.pdf>. Accessed on 9 December 2009.