

Editor's Introduction

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This introductory chapter has five specific objectives. First, it summarizes an ongoing debate within the global security community over what constitutes security in the world today. The aim of this discussion is not to settle this debate, but rather to contextualize the views of security professionals from all over the globe with regard to the emergence and/or intensification of a wide variety of transnational security challenges. Secondly, this chapter addresses US policy toward the Asia-Pacific region. The emphasis is that regardless of where one places transnational security issues in terms of US national security priorities, US policy currently promotes active engagement with the Asia-Pacific region, and that to engage in a manner seen as beneficial to all parties will require careful scrutiny of the needs and perspectives of those who live in the region. The third objective is to discuss the unique position of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) as a conduit for regional security dialogue and a filter through which Asia-Pacific security priorities can be channeled. The goal of this volume, to provide insights from our assessment of the importance of transnational security challenges in the national security priorities of a wide range of Asia-Pacific nations, is explained in section three. In the fourth section of this chapter, the results of an electronic poll of APCSS alumni on the importance of a wide variety of transnational security challenges are presented, highlighting the significant differences that can be observed among the priorities of the various subregions of the Asia-Pacific. Finally the chapter concludes with a summary discussion of some of the crosscutting themes that emerged from the individual country level analyses.

I. The (not so) New Security Debate

The global security community is currently involved in a wide-ranging debate about the significance of emerging transnational security challenges. This debate has been ongoing for more than twenty years, receiving enhanced impetus with the end of the Cold War and more recently with the rise of international terrorism. The debate within security circles has pitted those who continue to view traditional state-to-state rivalry and conflict as the preeminent concern of national policymakers against a growing chorus of voices emphasizing the need to expand the

concept of national security to address a wide variety of transnational security challenges that require multilateral cooperation and coordination to resolve. Concerns about global climate change, environmental degradation, pandemics, resource scarcity, demographic shifts, terrorism and organized crime predate the end of the Cold War but have received increasing attention as the probability of a great power nuclear conflict has receded.

Another factor contributing to the rising importance of transnational security challenges is the increasing pace of globalization. In addition to bringing opportunities and benefits to many of the world's people, globalization also has brought new risks and associated costs. For example, modern advances in communications, transportation and commerce that have fostered economic growth, social exchange and political integration can also be conduits for transnational security threats.ⁱ Sometimes referred to as the “dark side” of globalization, advances in global integration have made it easier for those involved in illicit trafficking, money laundering and terrorism to evade the reach of national governments.ⁱⁱ Further, the global impacts of infectious disease, environmental degradation, resource scarcity and economic distress all have been magnified as the barriers between countries have been lowered.ⁱⁱⁱ

For those advocating an expanded view of security, the key is not to focus on any one particular transnational threat but rather to understand the overlapping and interactive effects that various challenges can pose at the individual, national and global levels. Jessica Matthews, in her much-debated 1989 *Foreign Affairs* article “Redefining Security,” argued that unresolved issues of resource scarcity and population growth that result in economic decline could spark domestic unrest or “make countries ripe for authoritarian government or external subversion.”^{iv} Five years later Robert Kaplan's controversial article, “The Coming Anarchy,” invoked West Africa as a symbol of “worldwide demographic, environmental and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real strategic danger.”^v Kaplan's message, while certainly not universally accepted, did help to garner additional attention for the UN Development Program's attempt to introduce the concept of “human security” in its 1994 Human Development Report. The notion that security should be conceived globally, with the focus on individual human beings, meant “both a horizontal extension of the parameters of security policy to include an even larger set of problems, such as poverty, epidemics, political injustice,

natural disasters, crime, social discrimination, and unemployment, as well as a vertical extension of the traditional referent object of security policy to above and below the nation-state.”^{vi} As Amitav Acharya has argued, the development of the human security concept has strong roots in the Asia-Pacific, though the emphasis in the East has tended toward “freedom from want” whereas the West has promoted “freedom from fear”.^{vii}

As more researchers took an interest in a wider view of security, assessments across the globe were carried out. Alan Dupont’s *East Asia Imperilled: Transnational Challenges to Security*, while clearly less apocalyptic in tone than Kaplan, argued that a failure to reverse the decline in energy, food and water sufficiency, as well as increases in HIV transmission, drug addiction and people-smuggling, “will have overwhelmingly negative outcomes for peace and stability in the region.”^{vii}

Dupont is among those who have criticized the dominant realist school in international relations theory for focusing too narrowly on issues related to interstate warfare. Critics such as Dupont argue that because realism puts too much emphasis on territory and national boundaries, new threats caused by the cross-border flow of money, information, infectious diseases and environmental degradation do not receive enough attention. Critics argue that both classical realists and contemporary neorealists view economic vulnerabilities and strengths primarily in terms of strategic control and war-fighting potential rather than as fundamental security issues. Dupont, and others like him, see the need for an “extended realism” that gives sufficient weight to the combined threat of these challenges, not only because of the cost to individuals, but also in terms of weakening states and increasing the tensions of interstate relations.^{ix}

Realists and others who have a skeptical view of broadening the concept of security often have pointed to the problems of making security in this sense operational, emphasizing the need for governments to prioritize among a diverse array of possible threats.^x Some would argue that the end of the Cold War has been overrated; great power confrontations are not obsolete but rather in the “down phase” of a cyclical pattern that will eventually return. Such viewpoints posit that emerging powers and rogue states continue to challenge the international order, and that policymakers turn attention away from these threats at their own peril.^{xi}

The debate between realists and “the transnational challenges school” is a significant aspect of current US strategic thinking and US policy

toward the Asia-Pacific region, with most American strategists differing in terms of degree of emphasis, rather than the outright denial of the importance of issues on either side.^{xii}

This volume does not attempt to settle this debate but rather to identify areas of particular concern for the Asia-Pacific region and, where possible, to offer suggestions on how the United States might engage these countries to our mutual benefit.

II. Transnational Security Challenges and US Asia Policy

The US government’s interest in transnational security challenges was evident well before the tragic events of September 11, 2001. Soon after taking office in 1992, the Clinton administration signaled its interest in “new” security issues by creating several new offices in traditional areas of the government. These included a national intelligence officer for global and multilateral issues, a deputy undersecretary of defense for environmental issues and an undersecretary for global affairs at the State Department. The National Security Council also added a new Directorate for Global and Environmental Issues, which attempted to integrate environmental considerations throughout the NSC’s decision-making process.^{xiii}

The Clinton administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS) of 1997 moved the issue of transnational challenges closer to the forefront of US policy. The 1997 NSS named transnational threats, including terrorism, the illegal drug trade, illegal arms trafficking, international organized crime, uncontrolled refugee migrations and environmental damage as “threats to US interests” on par with regional or state-centered threats and threats from weapons of mass destruction.^{xiv} However, there was often disparity between these policy pronouncements and comparable levels of funding and policy initiatives during a period of declining public and congressional support for foreign engagement.^{xv}

Clearly, the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001 helped to galvanize US strategic thought and resources to combat transnational security challenges. These events moved the threat of terrorism—and the danger of weak states that can become vulnerable to terrorist networks—to the highest level of priority in US security policy.^{xvi} The corollaries of this shift in US security priorities for US Asia policy during the Bush administration led to mixed reviews. The new emphasis on nonstate actors as primary security concerns provided the United States

and major powers such as China and Russia (both having their own reasons to be concerned with the terrorist threat) with a stabilizing framework from which to engage each other despite deep differences over many other strategic concerns.^{xvii} At the same time, some US allies in the region grew concerned that US preoccupation with counterterrorism was resulting in inadequate attention to regional security dynamics, including the pace of Chinese military modernization.^{xviii}

The designation of Southeast Asia as a “second front” in what was then described as the “war on terror,” in conjunction with a new awareness of China’s growing influence in the region, led to what Catherine Dalpino has described as “a modest renaissance in US bilateral relations with Southeast Asia.”^{xix} The focus on increased intelligence cooperation, new economic and military assistance, and expanded military-to-military ties between the United States and certain Southeast Asian countries, while significant, was not enough to overcome the view in some quarters that Southeast Asian concerns and regional developments were being overshadowed by US preoccupation with the Middle East.^{xx} Additionally, major initiatives developed by the Bush administration to enhance economic and trade relations with Southeast Asia, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Cooperation Plan, the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative, the ASEAN-US Enhanced Partnership, and the US-ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, were sometimes viewed as reactions to improvements in China-ASEAN relations.^{xxi} The sense of marginalization felt by some in Southeast Asia was fostered when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice decided not to attend the 2005 and 2007 annual meetings of the ASEAN Regional Forum and when a US-ASEAN summit was canceled in 2007.^{xxii}

In her recent “Remarks on Regional Architecture in Asia: Principles and Priorities,” Secretary of State Clinton indicated that the failure of the United States to participate in these annual meetings demonstrated “a lack of respect and a willingness to engage.”^{xxiii} The Obama administration has indicated that it intends to actively engage the region over a wider variety of issues, dealing both with traditional interstate rivalries and a “range of diverse, unconventional threats that transcend national borders.”^{xxiv} Secretary of Defense Robert Gates articulated the US position at the May 2009 Shangri-la Dialogue, stating: “It has become clear in just the last two decades that “security” encompasses more than just military considerations. An economic crisis can become a security crisis. A lack of good governance can undermine order and stability. Under pressure from

criminals or disease, weak states can become failed states.”^{xxv}

Secretary Gates’s characterization of the United States as a “resident power” in the Asia-Pacific region during his May 2008 remarks to the Shangri-la Dialogue has been adopted by the Obama administration in symbolizing a reinvigorated US engagement strategy for the region. US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Kurt Campbell, articulated this theme in his recent statement, “Principles of US Engagement in the Asia-Pacific” during testimony before the US Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs:

The Asia-Pacific region is of vital and permanent importance to the United States and it is clear that countries in the region want the United States to maintain a strong and active presence. We need to ensure that the United States is a resident power and not just a visitor, because what happens in the region has a direct effect on our security and well-being. Over the course of the next few decades climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and widespread poverty will pose the most significant challenges to the United States and the rest of the region. These challenges are and will continue to be the most acute in East Asia. This situation not only suggests a need for the United States to play a leading role in addressing these challenges, but it also indicates a need to strengthen and broaden alliances, build new partnerships, and enhance capacity of multilateral organizations in the region. Fundamental to this approach will be continued encouragement of China’s peaceful rise and integration into the international system. A forward-looking strategy that builds on these relationships and US strengths as a democracy and a Pacific power is essential to manage both regional and increasingly global challenges.^{xxvi}

The Obama administration’s first year has seen a number of high-level diplomatic visits to the region, including President Obama’s visit to Singapore in November 2009 to convene the first US-ASEAN Summit meeting. Secretary of State Clinton’s first diplomatic trip was to Asia, and she attended the 14th ASEAN summit in Thailand from 28 February to 1 March 2009. Very early in his administration President Obama appointed a special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, emphasizing the need for diplomatic solutions to the complex problems plaguing this region. The administration’s decision to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in July 2009 has been well received in Southeast Asia and should allow

the United States to attend meetings of the East Asia Summit.

As for concrete initiatives for engaging the region, the Obama administration hosted the first US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in July 2009 with follow-up discussions planned for 2010. Also in July 2009 the United States launched an initiative that creates a formal partnership between the Mississippi River Commission and the Mekong River Commission, a cooperative management organization involving Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.^{xxvii}

One of the central aims of this volume is to point in the direction of further possibilities “for America to enhance, deepen, and sustain our engagement to seize opportunities and minimize risk.”^{xxviii}

III. Goals and Methods

The Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies maintains a constant and continuing dialogue with government officials, security practitioners and subject matter experts of the Asia-Pacific region over a wide range of security issues through its in-house educational programs, outreach activities and research. Through our research and publications program we seek to ensure that the insights derived from this dialogue are conveyed to policymakers in the United States and in the Asia-Pacific region.

This volume attempts to bolster our efforts in this regard by identifying the major transnational security challenges facing ten Asia-Pacific countries, Oceania and Afghanistan, a country that has had a large effect on the region. Authors in this volume were asked to answer a number of questions, including: What are the most significant transnational security challenges facing this country? How do transnational security challenges stack up against traditional security threats for the country’s security planners? What steps has the country taken unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally to cope with these challenges? What are the most important “next steps” for this country to take? Are the transnational security challenges this country faces of any consequence for the United States? Is the country in question interested in engaging with the United States to deal with these issues?

Each author was asked to discuss the governmental priorities in the country under study with respect to transnational security challenges and to assess whether these priorities and the resources applied sufficiently address the threats posed by these issues today. In this context APCSS faculty authors explored how emerging transnational security challenges

may influence the changing security environment of the region and US relationships (including alliances and strategic partnerships) in the Asia-Pacific region during coming years, providing US policymakers with up-to-date insights for engaging countries on issues of significant concern across the region.

The first step in the research for this project was carried out in June–July of 2009. During this period APCSS conducted an online survey of its alumni regarding their views on the most pressing transnational challenges in their own countries as well as the best means for addressing these issues. The results of this survey (discussed below) were then distributed to APCSS faculty authors as background for writing the individual country analyses. Over the summer of 2009 most of the faculty authors then traveled to the region to conduct face-to-face interviews with government officials and subject matter experts in countries covered in this volume, supplementing the information they have gained through their day-to-day contact with Asia-Pacific security practitioners and analysts here at the Center. The chapters that follow represent the culmination of this process.

IV. Alumni Survey Results

The APCSS electronic survey of its alumni base on “Transnational Security Challenges” was carried out from June–July 2009. Some two hundred of our alumni, composed primarily of mid-level government officials, law enforcement and military officers from forty-six nations in the Asia-Pacific region, responded to the survey.^{xxix} The tables below provide a look at the survey results across the various subregions, highlighting the differences and commonalities in the perceived security priorities of the Asia-Pacific.

Table 1 Framing Questions

As Table 1 indicates, Northeast Asia is the only subregion where interstate security is the top concern. As discussed in chapters by Azizian on Russia, Fouse on Japan and Kim on South Korea, Northeast Asian security priorities still lie in the area of traditional state rivalries, although transnational challenges have been integrated into security strategy at varying levels. Table one also indicates that internal security is the highest priority in both South and Southeast Asia, followed by concerns over transnational security challenges. Chapters by Vuving on Vietnam and

Table 1: Framing Questions

		Southeast Asia (%)	South Asia (%)	Northeast Asia (%)	Oceania (%)
Country's most important security challenge?	State to State	5.1	6.2	55.6	15.0
	Internal Security	57.7	63.1	11.1	40.0
	Transnational Security	37.2	30.8	33.3	45.0
Most effective approach to dealing w/ Transnational Challenges?	Global	27.3	28.1	15.4	20.0
	Regional (Asia-Pacific)	36.4	29.7	57.7	50.0
	Subregional	36.4	42.2	26.9	30.0
Country interested in working w/ U.S.?	no interest			3.8	
	a little interest	5.3	4.6	7.7	
	fairly interested	34.2	44.6	19.2	10.0
	very interested	60.5	50.8	69.2	90.0

Byrd on Thailand discuss this tendency among Southeast Asian countries to focus on the maintenance of domestic stability, which can sometimes undermine the ability of these governments to confront other emerging challenges. Our alumni in Oceania rated transnational security challenges as their number one security priority, followed closely by internal security.

Table one also indicates that our alumni have diverse views regarding how to most effectively deal with transnational security challenges, whether global, regional or subregional. Northeast Asian alumni do appear to favor a regional (Asia-Pacific) approach, while there is slightly more emphasis on finding a subregional approach among the South Asian alumni respondents. Each of the subregions indicates a strong interest in working with the United States to deal with transnational security challenges. Oceania, the subregion with the fewest resources of its own, demonstrates the greatest interest.

Table 2 High-Profile Transnational Issues

Alumni rankings of three transnational security challenges that have received significant media attention in recent years are listed in table two. This table indicates that there is a great deal of variation across the subregions in terms of the gravity of concern regarding terrorism, climate change, and infectious diseases. While strong majorities of our alumni respondents in South Asia, Southeast Asia and Oceania view terrorism as “very important,” only 17 percent of our Northeast Asia alumni felt the same about this issue. Tekwani’s chapter on Sri Lanka demonstrates that despite the government’s recent victory over the Tamil Tigers, the threat of

Table 2: High Profile Transnational Challenges

		Southeast Asia (%)	South Asia (%)	Northeast Asia (%)	Oceania (%)
Terrorism	not important	1.3		13.0	
	of little importance	10.4	6.2	39.1	5.0
	fairly important	18.2	24.6	30.4	35.0
	very important	70.1	69.2	17.4	60.0
Climate Change	not important	2.7	1.6		5.0
	of little importance	13.3	12.7	21.7	10.0
	fairly important	44.0	42.9	34.8	25.0
	very important	40.0	42.9	43.5	60.0
Infectious Disease	not important	2.6	1.6	4.5	5.0
	of little importance	9.2	38.7	27.3	10.0
	fairly important	34.2	46.8	40.9	35.0
	very important	53.9	12.9	27.3	50.0

terrorism remains a significant concern in southern Asia.

Oceania, not surprisingly, was the subregion most concerned with the issue of climate change, given that the very existence of some island states has been called into question by the rise of ocean levels. Nevertheless, strong majorities of the alumni respondents in each subregion view climate change as at least fairly important.

Sharp differences in opinion can be found with regard to the threat posed by infectious diseases such as acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), the avian flu and malaria. Although majorities in each subregion view this issue as fairly important, we see that the intensity of this concern is much stronger in both Southeast Asia and Oceania, where 53.9 and 50 percent, respectively, saw the issue as very important.

Table 3 Transnational Crime

Table 3 demonstrates that the illegal trafficking of drugs, weapons and human beings raises the highest level of concern in Southeast Asia. Ear’s chapter on Cambodia illustrates the continuing need for international support for initiatives that foster local empowerment in these areas. Northeast Asian alumni ranked their concerns on these issues significantly lower, especially with regard to weapons trafficking. The high level of concern of our Oceania alumni with regard to money laundering may come as a welcome surprise to those involved in countering the financing

Table 3 Transnational Crime

		Southeast Asia (%)	South Asia (%)	Northeast Asia (%)	Oceania (%)
Drug Trafficking	not important		3.3	8.7	
	of little importance		23.3	34.8	5.0
	fairly important	11.8	48.3	39.1	20.0
	very important	88.2	25.0	17.4	75.0
Human Trafficking	not important		3.1	12.5	5.0
	of little importance	2.6	23.4	33.3	10.0
	fairly important	50.0	43.8	33.3	45.0
	very important	47.4	29.7	20.8	40.0
Weapons Trafficking	not important		9.2	26.1	10.0
	of little importance	14.5	23.1	39.1	10.0
	fairly important	48.7	41.5	34.8	45.0
	very important	36.8	26.2		35.0
Money Laundering	not important	1.3	6.3	4.3	5.0
	of little importance	13.3	23.8	34.8	10.0
	fairly important	57.3	50.8	56.5	25.0
	very important	28.0	19.0	4.3	60.0
Cybercrime	not important	2.7	14.8	4.3	10.0
	of little importance	12.0	41.0	30.4	15.0
	fairly important	57.3	32.8	34.8	35.0
	very important	28.0	11.5	30.4	40.0
Piracy	not important	5.3	36.1	37.5	20.0
	of little importance	26.3	36.1	25.0	45.0
	fairly important	47.4	24.6	29.2	15.0
	very important	21.1	3.3	8.3	20.0
Illegal fishing	not important	5.3	30.2	47.8	5.0
	of little importance	17.1	31.7	34.8	5.0
	fairly important	43.4	30.2	8.7	15.0
	very important	34.2	7.9	8.7	75.0

of terrorism. As Finin points out in his chapter, the leadership in these countries has faced difficult tradeoffs between meeting the concerns of the international community and providing economic sustenance for their people. Oceania alumni also register very high levels of concern on the issue of illegal fishing, with substantial concern registered from our alumni in Southeast Asia as well. Campbell’s chapter on Indonesia discusses how environmental crimes like illegal fishing, illegal logging and illegal wildlife trade outrank concerns over terrorism.

The only Asia-Pacific subregion to identify piracy as at least fairly important is Southeast Asia, where concerns over the Malacca Straits have been prominent. Sato’s chapter on Singapore and Malaysia illustrates that even within Southeast Asia, concerns about piracy and other transnational challenges can vary widely. Table three also indicates that a majority of our alumni view cybercrime as at least fairly important, although South Asian alumni are yet to be completely convinced on this issue.

Table 4 Resource Scarcity

Table 4 displays the results with regard to resource scarcity issues (food, water and energy). Here South Asian alumni consistently demonstrate the strongest concerns, although alumni from Southeast Asia also place high importance on these issues. Energy scarcity is the one issue majorities in all of the subregions, including Northeast Asia, see as at least fairly important, although even here South Asians show the strongest concerns. Lal’s chapter on India highlights the manner in which South Asia’s lack of environmental resources is currently fueling tensions between states in this subregion.

Table 4 Resource Scarcity

		Southeast Asia (%)	South Asia (%)	Northeast Asia (%)	Oceania (%)
Food scarcity	not important	10.5		8.7	5.0
	of little importance	25.0	19.4	43.5	45.0
	fairly important	39.5	50.0	39.1	40.0
	very important	25.0	30.6	8.7	10.0
Water scarcity	not important	9.2	1.6	8.3	10.0
	of little importance	27.6	17.5	20.8	50.0
	fairly important	42.1	33.3	54.2	20.0
	very important	21.1	47.6	16.7	20.0
Energy scarcity	not important	2.6		4.3	5.0
	of little importance	18.4	6.5	13.0	15.0
	fairly important	38.2	30.6	52.2	45.0
	very important	40.8	62.9	30.4	35.0

V. Summary Thoughts on Crosscutting Themes

The chapters in this volume analyze security priorities at the individual country level and gauge each country's attempts at bilateral and multilateral security cooperation on transnational security challenges. Our intention is to provide policymakers and other government officials with a useful and convenient reference tool to draw upon to engage specific countries in the Asia-Pacific region. As shown in the survey results discussed above, security priorities across the various subregions can vary widely, making it hard to pinpoint crosscutting themes that fit the region as a whole.^{xxx}

Despite the difficulty in categorizing all of the Asia-Pacific under a single framework, several themes that emerge from these analyses are noteworthy. Northeast Asia, as stated above, is an outlier among the other subregions where internal and transnational security issues receive paramount importance. Nevertheless, in Russia, Japan and South Korea, where traditional interstate security issues predominate, each country has adopted policies that allow it to play an international role in helping to resolve transnational security challenges. Furthermore, the bilateral relationships between these economically powerful countries and the United States influence their willingness to confront cross-border challenges. More broadly, we see that US security priorities can differ significantly with those of many Asia-Pacific countries (see especially chapters covering Oceania, Indonesia and Malaysia), and that the willingness of the United States to engage these concerns will impact the response on US concerns.

The research for this book was conducted during a period of deep financial crisis. Many of the chapters depict the additional burden that economic turmoil has placed upon already beleaguered states to provide basic services to their people, no less carry out the tasks of securing porous borders and initiating governmental reforms necessary to bringing whole-of-government approaches to complex security challenges. Several states covered in this volume, including Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam, have prioritized domestic or regime stability to such an extent that transnational challenges are not receiving sufficient attention. US policymakers are urged to find ways to work with these governments to prevent negative outcomes that would threaten long-term stability in the region.

ⁱSee Paul Stares, "Introduction," in Paul Stares ed., *The New Security Agenda: A Global Survey* (Tokyo and New York: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1998):12.

ⁱⁱSee Moisés Naim, *Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats Are Hijacking the Global Economy* (New York: Doubleday, 2005).

ⁱⁱⁱSee, for example, Thomas Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict," *International Security* vol. 16, no. 2, 1991.

^{iv}Jessica Matthews, "Redefining Security," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 68, no. 2, 1989: 162–177.

^vRobert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *The Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 273, no. 2, 1994: 44–76.

^{vi}Stares, "Introduction," p. 15.

^{vii}Amitav Acharya, "Human Security: East Versus West", *International Journal*, Vol. LVI, No. 3 (Summer 2001): 442-460.

^{viii}Alan Dupont, *East Asia Imperilled: Transnational Challenges to Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 243.

^{ix}*Ibid.*, pp. 3–11.

^xStephen Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* vol. 35, no. 2, 1991: 211–39.

^{xi}John Mearshimer, "Disorder Restored," in Graham Ellison and Gregory T. Treverton, eds., *Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order*, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992).

^{xii}See Kurt Campbell, Nirav Patel, and Vikram Singh, "The Power of Balance in iAsia," Center for a New American Century, 11 June 2008: 60. Available online at: www.cnas.org/files/documents/.../CampbellPatelSingh_iAsia_June08.pdf.

^{xiii}Ann M. Florini and P. J. Simmons, "North America," in Paul Stares, ed., *The New Security Agenda: A Global Survey* (Tokyo and New York: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1998):62.

^{xiv}*Ibid.*, p. 61.

^{xv}*Ibid.*, p. 63.

^{xvi}See the Bush Administration's National Security Strategy of 2002, available online at: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/>.

^{xvii}See Shirley Kan, "US-China Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: Issues for US Policy," *CRS Report for Congress*, May 12, 2005. Available online at: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21995.pdf.

^{xviii}This issue was raised on numerous occasions during author interviews with Japanese security analysts.

^{xix}Catherine Dalpino, “Group Think: The Challenge of US-ASEAN Relations,” in *America’s Role in Asia: Asian and American Views* (San Francisco: The Asia Foundation, 2008): 231.

^{xx}Alice Ba, “Systemic Neglect: A Reconsideration of US Southeast Asia Policy.” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* (December 2009): 376.

^{xxi}*Ibid.*, p. 379.

^{xxii}*Ibid.*, p. 378.

^{xxiii}Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks on Regional Architecture in Asia: Principles and Priorities,” East-West Center, Honolulu, January 12, 2010.

^{xxvi}Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates’s remarks for the 8th IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-la Dialogue), 30 May 2009.

^{xxv}*Ibid.*

^{xxvi}Kurt Campbell, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “Principles of US Engagement in the Asia-Pacific,” testimony before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington DC, 21 January 2010.

^{xxvii}Ivan Boekelheide, “Engaging ASEAN: US Policy in Southeast Asia,” Stimson Publications available online at: <http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=%20908>.

^{xxviii}Kurt Campbell, “Principles of US Engagement in the Asia-Pacific.”

^{xxix}For details on survey methodology please contact David Fouse at foused@apcss.org.

^{xxx}Barry Buzan first documented this disparity among what he termed the “security complexes” of the region in his seminal work *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1983).