



China's Global Influence: Perspectives and Recommendations



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Introduction

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¹ The views and recommendations expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, US Department of Defense, or US Government.

Over the last several years, thousands of books have been written on the rise and role of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Many of those were edited volumes, which sought to bring together scholars that could highlight their specific area of expertise or insight. This volume seeks to differentiate itself through leveraging one of the unique assets of the Department of Defense (DoD): the Regional Centers (RC).

The geographic focus of these five RCs span the world and serve to bring together security practitioners to share experiences, build networks, and share tools and ideas for improving cooperative security. The efficacy of their executive education model has long been appreciated within the department, in the halls of Congress, across the regions, and by policymakers spanning the executive branch.

One aspect of these Centers that is often overlooked, however, is the knowledge and insight of the faculty. The RCs are staffed by faculty drawn from seasoned experts on the regions, and from across the regions they cover. They specialize in the full array of challenges facing their regions and interact with security practitioners attending their courses on a routine basis. This mix of backgrounds and experiences provides the RCs with unique and valuable insights into the security challenges facing the United States (US) and its partners around the world.

With these strengths in mind, the directors of the RCs recently began an initiative to bring experts from the various RCs together to leverage their unique insights in understanding global security challenges. In January 2019 the first result of this collaboration was a workshop entitled "China's Global Reach," hosted by the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI APCSS) in Honolulu, Hawaii. However, the RCs wanted to do more than get together. They wanted to leverage their faculty to bring value to policymakers. The result is this volume.

THE WORKSHOP

In designing RC collaborative events, the focus was to tackle contemporary security challenges, leverage the varied perspectives of RC faculty, and provide not only insight, but useful policy recommendations to the US government. Consequently, for the first collaboration the RCs chose to examine activities of the PRC from the perspective of various regions to give context and clarity to PRC engagement throughout the world. To understand how these global activities impact the US, analysis was conducted within the context of the PRC's perspective of its own foreign policy, as well as strategic competition, as referenced in the 2017

National Security Strategy and 2018 *National Defense Strategy*. Additionally, experts in specific functional areas were brought in from the RCs and the broader policy community to look at regional and global engagement through the lens of specific foreign policy tools. The workshop leveraged the insights gained from this diverse expert input and small group discussions to formulate policy recommendations for pursuing state interests in the face of growing PRC assertiveness. These recommendations accepted that an interest-based approach would provide opportunities for both competitive and cooperative strategies and tactics.

Participants included academics and practitioners from the five RCs, USINDOPACOM, SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM, USINDOPACOM service components, the National Defense University, and the US Army War College. Other US Government participants came from the Department of State (DoS), Department of Treasury, and the Department of Energy. Five think tanks, including the Pacific Forum and the East-West Center, also sent participants.

GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE

The world has almost two hundred countries. There are seven continents. The DoS has six regional bureaus. The DoD has six Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC), which do not align with the DoS' regional bureaus. However, there are only five RCs. In constructing the workshop and finding chapter authors, the question of how to divide up the world was fraught with pitfalls.

The manner in which the book divides the world most assuredly has its detractors, but choices had to be made. Ultimately, we attempted to group geographic areas primarily by the manner in which the PRC engages with them. Certainly, there were different choices that could have been made. For example, it is clear from the chapters by Valbona Zeneli and Frank Mouritz that the PRC uses multiple engagement strategies within Europe, however, each strategy is influenced by the role of the European Union (EU) and its intersection with the PRC's engagement calculus. Consequently, non-Russian Europe has been treated as a single geographic entity, while Russia and Central Asia have been treated as another. Alternatively, the Indian subcontinent is split between two GCCs and, with the exception of Pakistan and Afghanistan, covered by two RCs. Meanwhile, the PRC interacts with the states of South Asia both uniquely and as part of its interaction with the broader Indo-Pacific region—though they decline to call it such. Therefore, the sub-region was given its own chapter, distinct from the rest of the regions covered

by both the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESAC) and the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI APCSS), even though some of the states are mentioned briefly in the Indo-Pacific chapter.

The more one looks at the regions, the more one is tempted to sub-divide. For example, at DKI APCSS the Indo-Pacific is currently divided into five sub-regions (including the Americas), each of which could have warranted its own chapter. However, in a three-day workshop or a book of this size, one quickly reaches a point of diminishing returns regarding what can usefully be said about a number of topics in the time and space provided. Consequently, geographic regions were formed around states in which the PRC appears to pursue roughly similar ends in related ways, while avoiding the temptation to parse differences and draw ever smaller circles. The result is seven geographically-focused chapters that divide Africa, split four GCCs, and ignore the US and Canada. However, these chapters all draw from experts on the regions they study, and were informed by discussion and debate during the workshop. Moreover—and more importantly—the analysis in these chapters, when placed alongside each other, suggest that looking from the PRC perspective, there is a certain amount of logic to this approach. As with any system that sub-divides the world, this one is imperfect, but it serves the ends of the project in drawing out the relevant contexts for understanding the PRC’s global approach. However, some of the idiosyncrasies introduced by any such scheme are mitigated by the global approach taken in discussing tools of influence in Part III.

EDITORIAL DECISIONS—THE RECTIFICATION OF NAMES

One of the benefits of the workshop was the eclectic group of scholars it brought together. Not only did they hail from a variety of countries and regions, but they came from backgrounds not only in security policy, but in economics, technology, communications, finance, and energy. Moreover, some of these individuals were new to examining the PRC in their region of primary scholarly interest. Consequently, not all were equally steeped in the lexicon of PRC studies. The popularization and diffusion of the “China-watcher” community has also led to a wide variety of terms being used for similar concepts. Finally, recognizing the value of a name, the PRC leadership has itself attempted to change the manner in which it and its policies are referenced, much as it tries to shape the way others refer to artificial land features and maritime claims

(note how we avoided terms they might use here, the very use of which would imply permanence and territorial claims).

In compiling the work of these scholars, the editors have decided to take the advice of Confucius and begin our own “rectification of names.” Confucius surmised that simply by using a certain name for a thing or an act, one imbues meaning and, as individuals interact with this meaning, ultimately shape behavior. Similarly, the PRC has attempted to change the names of things and concepts to encourage other states to treat them in the manner desired. Therefore, on a few issues that were deemed important to countering the PRC’s global influence, the editors have encouraged the authors to buck what has quickly become common usage on certain concepts and use terms that more accurately describe the PRC and its initiatives.

Whose President?

First among these is the embrace, especially of the western media, of calling Xi Jinping “president.” The editors do not deny that this is one of the titles he holds, but it is both the least important and papers over the fact that the PRC is actually a party-state in which the decisions that matter are those made by the party. Thus, we have encouraged the authors to use his most important title, “General Secretary of the Communist Party” (shortened to General Secretary). This has largely been done, with the exception of a previously published piece.

Whose Road?

Second, and somewhat more contentiously, the editors have used the Chinese name of the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative, even in English translation. An attempt has been made by the PRC leadership to convince the West to use a new term: “Belt and Road Initiative.”² This name change appears to have been initiated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the wake of linkages being drawn in the West to “all roads leading to Beijing,” and the suggestion that there was only one acceptable road to follow. Doubtless, there were also concerns that their map quickly grew to at least five belts, two roads, and now digital infrastructure, making the title ungainly. However, the PRC has not changed

2 While there has unmistakably been a change in the translation used by the PRC in this regard, the source usually cited for the change leaves the final English translation less than definitive. See Huang Yusheng [黄语生], “‘一带一路’译法刍议 [My Observations on the Translation of ‘One Belt, One Road’]” 《中国社会科学报》 [*China Academy of Social Sciences Newspaper*] 13 August 2015, cited by the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, accessed 12 July 2019, http://www.cctb.net/bygz/zzyby/byyj/201511/t20151124_331667.htm.

the name in Chinese. To an internal audience the name remains “一带一路” (*yidaiyilu*) or “One Belt, One Road.” In fact, even the official English language version of the government website is the pinyin version of this phrase, preceded by “eng.”³ In short, the PRC’s preferred name is inconsistent with the Chinese-language term, but consistent with Beijing’s attempts to influence those outside its borders, which is a primary focus of this book. One of the actions the PRC consciously takes as a means of influence is to shape the words others use to suit their view of the world. Our view of the world is that OBOR is, in part, an attempt to convince the world that Beijing is the world leader setting the international trading regime—ignoring the fact that even their own trade would be impossible without the free, open, and rules-based trading regime built by the US and others. Part of pursuing US interests is maintaining the liberal international trading regime that benefits the US and everyone else. It would be ironic if a volume providing policy recommendations vis-à-vis PRC influence caved to the PRC’s view of the international system.

Whose Freedom?

The term “state-capitalism” has become a common way to describe the CCP’s apparent embrace of market-based mechanisms. However, it is a contradiction in terms. Capitalism is a political-economic system in which individual owners of capital determine how it is spent and invested. It is a system that fundamentally requires political freedom—the liberty to do what one sees fit with one’s life and property. The state is an instrument of force. While there is a legitimate use for force in protecting individual rights, in the economic realm it usurps individual liberty. By suggesting an economic system that relies on individual freedom can be managed by an agent of force, “state-capitalism” undermines the meaning of its component parts. It represents what philosopher Ayn Rand described as an *anti-concept*.⁴

“State-capitalism” ignores the fundamental characteristics of both the state (which intervenes in the economy by force) and capitalism (which stipulates that economic decisions are made by the individuals). The difficulty in defining such an anti-concept is made clear by the *Oxford English Dictionary*, which defines it as a “political (esp. socialist) system in which the State exerts exclusive control over a substantial proportion

3 See <https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn>, accessed 3 July 2019.

4 Ayn Rand, “‘Extremism,’ or the Art of Smearing,” in *Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal* (New York, NY: SIGNET, 1967), 176.

of the means of production and the capital created by this.”⁵ In fact, it defines almost any system *except* capitalism. Consequently, the term is not only inaccurate, it shrouds the meaning of what is actually being discussed and weakens our understanding of political economy.

The term also lends the PRC an air of respectability it does not deserve—implying the protection of economic rights. However, when the whims of the Party change, the food cart is whisked away, the house torn down, or the farm confiscated. Pretending they recognize economic rights aids and abets the PRC’s attempts to present itself as a respectable, rule-based, and rights-respecting economy—an image they leverage in presenting themselves as the guarantor of global order and prosperity.

RENDERING THE CHINESE LANGUAGE

In general, this volume conforms to the custom of rendering most Chinese words in pinyin, but maintaining traditional romanizations for words in the common lexicon. The most obvious case of this is the author of *Art of War*, traditionally rendered as Sun Tzu, though in pinyin as SunZi. Where used, characters are generally rendered using the simplified form used in the PRC, as that is the primary topic of this work and the characters used in most Chinese language sources cited.

STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

In cataloguing the value RCs can bring to ongoing policy discussions, this book was designed, in part, to showcase the role the RCs can play in bringing broad-based, regionally relevant analysis to the policy-maker. Consequently, authors were chosen with a bias towards including as many RC authors as possible. In a few cases, faculty were unavailable due to the large number of competing commitments, or particular specialties are not currently covered within the faculty. When this was the case, specialists were chosen based on specific recommendations of an RC, often with specialists with whom they had worked in the past. The result is a book centered on RC professors, but balanced by a few exemplary specialists from outside the RC system. This builds on the efforts of the RCs to maintain a quality pool of talent in house and within budgetary constraints, while reaching out to the broader academic community to ensure constant renewal and exchange. It also represents the focus on including a broad array of security practitioners and experts,

5 *Oxford English Dictionary*, accessed 8 July 2019, <https://www-oed-com.eres.library.manoa.hawaii.edu/view/Entry/370383?rskey=en4YpO&result=1#eid>.

as reflected in the courses run by the RCs, as well as the many non-RC participants at the workshop that supported the book.

The book is divided into four principle parts. While the book is designed to be read in its entirety and sequentially through these four sections, it is also intended to serve as a ready reference to policymakers and those who work in policy sections of governments and international organizations that focus on a single region, or a single foreign policy tool, as defined below. With this dual-purpose in mind, chapters were written concisely to impart information, provide sources to enable further exploration, and conclude with policy recommendations pertaining to the focus of the chapter.

Strategic Context

The first part sets the strategic context for the book, and the focus is twofold. In the first chapter, Scott D. McDonald explores strategic competition. This term has received a lot of attention following the release of the 2017 *National Security Strategy*, and the editors thought it important to examine what strategic competition actually is, both from a US and PRC perspective, as well as what this analysis means for the likelihood of conflict and the possibility for cooperation between these two powers.

Before attempting to understand where and how they are attempting to project regional and global influence it is important to understand the context of the PRC's overall foreign policy. Liza Tobin's examination of "Xi's Vision for Transforming Global Governance" accomplishes this with a detailed examination of the CCP's quest to reshape global governance in line with the PRC's own governance model. To accomplish this, Tobin uses Xi's own rubric, outlining the five dimensions in which the "Community of Common Destiny" establishes his model of global governance—politics, security, development, culture, and environment. From this analysis she concludes western observers look too narrowly at the PRC in their attempt to understand its global aspirations and recommends more resources be placed against analyzing and understanding high-level PRC authoritative media. Without this understanding, the US risks continuing to inadvertently support PRC talking points and miss new concepts and opportunities to influence them before they become cemented in PRC lexicon and strategy. Tobin closes by identifying that the US ought to both drop its fear of offending the PRC to encourage an open debate about global governance models,

while simultaneously promoting the free and open order and inviting Beijing to join.

Regional Context

Part II leverages the unique capabilities of the RCs to provide regional perspectives on PRC influence. Beginning in this section, each subsequent chapter not only describes the role and influence of the PRC, but offers specific policy recommendations. As DoD institutions, the role of the RCs is to do more than describe the world and help interpret it, but to leverage their expertise to offer tools and solutions to decision-makers.

These chapters begin in the Indo-Pacific and roughly work their way westward around the globe. Dr. Sungmin Cho of DKI APCSS begins by looking at the PRC's home region and Beijing's efforts to secure its interests by becoming a regional hegemon. His analysis examines the US response to PRC activities in regional maritime security, the geopolitics of the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan, and economic statecraft. Dr. Cho identifies two primary reasons US policy to date has been largely ineffective. First, he argues the US does not recognize the true nature of the PRC or believe it will become a regional peer that must be integrated into the rules-based order, not excluded from it. Second, he sees very little in terms of effective action on the part of the US to check PRC expansion. To strengthen US policy Dr. Cho argues the US must first recognize the inevitability of a regionally powerful PRC, then develop policy options to convince it to leverage that power in accordance with international norms. In order to implement these actions, he encourages US policymakers to adopt a "Tit-for-tat" implementation strategy that will reign in the PRC's non-cooperative behavior through tailored coercive policy options that use the principle of reciprocity to demonstrate the futility of defection and ultimately nudge the PRC into cooperating with the US and other states in the region.

Moving to the seam region of South Asia, John H. Gill of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESAS) notes increasing PRC interest and engagement. Naturally, the PRC's role in the region is focused on its "junior ally" Pakistan, and perennial competitor India, however, the rest of South Asia has also been subject to increasing attention. Gill identifies an Indian hedging strategy that reaches beyond the region for friends and influence, but attempts to avoid antagonizing its northern neighbor. Overall, he paints a picture of South Asian nations using the PRC's interest in expanding regional influence for their

own domestic political purposes, while trying to balance the PRC with broader engagement. Thus, Gill concludes there is ample opportunity for the US to engage with the region through supporting alternative investment schemes and paying attention to the needs of the “smaller” states while generally keeping the course with strong engagement with India and Pakistan.

Traveling north from the subcontinent, Dr. Graeme Herd of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC), presents an interesting view of the carefully calibrated relationship between Russia and the PRC, as well as its implications for other Eurasian states. He identifies three goals Beijing is pursuing in Eurasia: strengthening its strategic partnership with Russia, upholding a Sino-Russian political consensus, and increasing connectivity with Central Asia. However, Dr. Herd calls attention to the precariousness of the Sino-Russian relationship, built as it is on shared cognitive dissonance and upholding solidarity in the face of perceived threats, rather than fundamental interests in common. In fact, engagement with Central Asia comes across as a tool the two large states use to jockey for leverage, rather than targets of investment or engagement for their own sake. In Turkmenistan one gets the ominous sense engagement focused on large geopolitical calculus is causing the PRC to be pulled deeper into the state than it intended. Meanwhile, former Soviet republics in western Eurasia are actively playing Russia and the PRC off one another to maintain their own autonomy, potentially increasing competition between the powers. In this context, Dr. Herd’s recommendations to better understand the PRC and its relation to Eurasia while actively promoting an alternative to the “Beijing consensus” on international development seem measured. However, fearing a deterioration in western relations with Russia, he discusses how such an event could be leveraged to build cooperation with the PRC. In sum, the Russia-PRC “partnership” poses challenges for both parties, as well as the states that sit between them.

To the southwest, the states of the Middle East and their culturally similar cousins in North Africa seem primed for PRC cooperation, compared to the tense partnership with Russia. Dr. Gawdat Bahgat of NESAC paints a picture of a benign PRC whose economic support to the region is welcomed locally, and not counterproductive to US interests. He sees room for growth of PRC engagement and cooperation, with long-standing US military relationships and enduring soft power ensuring its continued preeminence for years to come.

From a continental perspective, Africa is a more promising target of US-PRC cooperation, according to Ambassador Phillip Carter III, Dr. Raymond Gilpin, and Paul Nantuly of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. They begin with an overview of the underappreciated history of relations between Africa and various Chinese regimes, demonstrating that engagement, if having grown more recently, is not new. Their analysis of PRC investment and engagement in Africa reveals a generally benign investor, which sees value in investing in Africa and is increasingly doing so in ways that are mutually beneficial. For example, the authors point out that there are many signs the PRC is learning to employ more locals and ensure investments are economically viable. Consequently, the relationship is highly valued by local governments as an alternative to western aid that has historical baggage and requirements to meet international norms on lending and accountability. The Achilles heel in this relationship lies in private firms and civil society organizations that view non-transparent PRC negotiation methods with government as detrimental to their interests. However, overall the authors argue the African continent is an area where US and PRC interests are not necessarily at odds and cooperation can be leveraged. Broad goals of increasing infrastructure development and assisting Africa to overcome its challenges and become a vibrant contributor to the international economy are shared by the US and PRC. It is the methods that must be worked out. For this reason, they recommend policy options that will build cooperation between the US and PRC, while improving their ability to jointly provide better support and investment in Africa.

Moving to Europe, Dr. Valbona Zeneli of GCMC provides a fascinating description of three Europes that the PRC engages differently for different objectives. Sub-dividing the Continent in terms of both the level of economic development and relative wealth, she has identified three overlapping zones as seen through the PRC's eyes. In Western Europe the PRC acts as an investor in an attempt to leverage advanced research and development networks. In Southern Europe, the goal is to use investment in economically strapped states to acquire strategic infrastructure. But in Eastern Europe, and specifically the 16+1 countries (recently renamed 17+1 with the addition of Greece), the PRC is using development assistance to weaken EU solidarity and create conditions to dominate Eurasia. To prevent the "Balkanization" of Europe, Dr. Zeneli recommends closer cooperation between the US and EU founded on evidence-based research that will prevent the PRC from creating trans-Atlantic divisions and enable joint efforts to demonstrate the value of

the western international system to those states lured by immediate gains from PRC investment.

Crossing the Atlantic to Latin America, Dr. R. Evan Ellis of the Army War College Strategic Studies Institute and previously of the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies describes the primary PRC ends as resources, agriculture products, and markets. However, in their approach to secure these interests, they are attempting to restructure commercial interactions and finance in ways that are deleterious to the region, and ultimately the US. In addition to entering sectors across the regional economy, Dr. Ellis argues the PRC is engaging multilaterally, transnationally, and militarily (specifically with those that antagonize the US), as well as consciously targeting states to shift recognition from Taiwan. Envisioning a broad-based attempt to undermine US interests in the region, he provides recommendations that span from building respect for the liberal international training system, increasing transregional engagement, increasing alternative infrastructure investment schemes, and expanding cross-combatant command coordination to better understand how the PRC could use Latin America to support a war with the US.

Tools of Influence

The third part of the volume shifts to a global exploration of tools of influence the PRC is employing in pursuit of its interests. These complement the regional chapters and help to integrate them by demonstrating how tools used in various regions contribute to broader strategic ways, or methods, of a global strategy. During the workshop it quickly became clear that an important part of PRC activities in every region revolved around the manner in which their actions communicated a narrative. In many ways, this seemed to be the core of the strategic approach, consequently, the functional part begins with strategic messaging.

Dr. Alexander L. Vuving of DKI APCSS, begins the chapter with an in-depth discussion of strategic messaging comparing and contrasting aspects of this often cited, but rarely understood tool. In describing its use, Dr. Vuving focuses on PRC efforts to influence the US, but the methods discussed are used around the world. He identifies three routes through which the PRC is influencing the US: acting and speaking in ways to directly influence thought, employing the “borrowed boat” to let others speak for them, and leveraging free societies to purchase Chinese language media. These means are used to enhance the PRC’s positive reputation, counter negative opinion about it, spread negative

views about opponents, and cultivate norms that favor the PRC in relations with other countries. In order to combat PRC strategic messaging efforts, Dr. Vuving proposes a thorough upgrading of US strategic messaging capability and defense.

Central to concerns about growing PRC influence is the willingness of the regime to use economics coercively. Frank Mouritz of GCMC identifies three different methods the PRC is using economic tools to pursue its ends, varying based on a state's level of economic development. In developing countries, political influence is the goal and is purchased with development finance. The PRC acts more subtly in emerging markets, leveraging state-owned enterprises and other vehicles to bargain shop. However, in advanced economies, private investors and state-backed funds invest in western companies, hoping for economic gains, while reducing overall skepticism of PRC objectives. In response to these challenges, Mouritz recommends the West should only challenge the PRC where strategic-level interests are involved recognizing that—especially in developing countries—some investments will win, some will lose, and many do not matter to the larger strategic context. In emerging markets, he advocates encouraging the private sector to invest, while also taking actions to counter PRC state intervention—which is preventing a level playing field—while ensuring individuals and civil society organizations are fully informed about the nature and terms of PRC investment. However, in advanced economies, Mouritz identifies a need for better screening of investors from the PRC to prevent takeover of strategic industries and encourages the West to start standing up to the PRC and, rather than worry about offending, remember the PRC's export-oriented economy needs markets as much as westerners want the products produced there.

A great deal of international concern has also been focused on the PRC's non-compliance and attempts to change international law. Jonathan G. Odom frames this discussion in terms of PRC attempts to shape the normative aspects of the rules-based international system, while simultaneously attempting to use the instrumental aspects of that same system to its benefit. He proposes “legal gamesmanship” as a concept for understanding how the PRC uses law as a tool of influence, rather than as a weapon. Within this construct he highlights seven tactics currently being used to reshape norms of law: making ambiguous allegations, ignoring the meaning of treaty provisions, quoting treaties out of context, ignoring negotiating history of treaty provisions, alleging violations by other states when committing the same types of actions,

avoiding third-party forums, and insisting on resolving disputes through negotiations where legally inappropriate. Additionally, Odom identifies five tactics the PRC uses to leverage the instrumental aspect of the current international legal order: selectively adopting actions by previous governments of China, enacting law codifying national policy, invoking national laws as a legal authority restricting other states, combining territorial claims and artificial maritime claims to assert control of geographic space, and carrying out incremental action by deniable agents. To counter this wide range of tactics, Odom recommends opposing PRC appointments to international courts and tribunals they refuse to submit to, as well as continuing transits that challenge illegal claims. Perhaps more importantly, he makes several recommendations that can be broadly categorized under the heading of messaging—specifically messaging the PRC and the world that the international community is aware of their gamesmanship and calling attention to blatant attempts to undermine the global legal framework.

Dr. Phillip C. Saunders and Jiunwei Shy of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University examine how the CCP is using of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to expand influence globally. While this is certainly a common means states employ to shape their security environment, it is relatively new for the PRC. Consequently, where and how they chose to use military diplomacy has the potential to shed light on broader objectives of the PRC's use of influence. The authors divide PRC military diplomacy into strategic—which support PRC diplomacy writ large and shape the environment—and operational—which focus on collecting intelligence, improving the PLA, and benchmarking the PLA against foreign militaries. Their analysis shows senior leader engagements compose the majority of military diplomacy efforts, but exercises have expanded rapidly under Xi Jinping. Regardless of the form of engagement, the authors conclude that the majority of these engagements either do not contribute significantly to shaping or help to bring the PRC into the international system. However, they do caution against granting the PLA access to training or exercises with the US or allies that improve their warfighting capabilities or build relationships that provide access to strategic sea and airports.

Part III closes with Elsa B. Kania's exploration of the PRC's use of technology to expand its influence. While catching up with the West has been a recurrent theme since the CCP's consolidation of power, she notes that under Xi Jinping innovation-driven development that leverages disruptive technologies has been prioritized. Not only is this effort

intended to secure the PRC's place as the leading superpower, but to exert influence in the nature and organization of international technology and commerce. Kania notes that the PRC views a strategic opportunity in areas such as artificial intelligence (AI) and fifth generation (5G) communications technology, where for once it is starting from the same level as the West. Consequently, they are vigorously attempting not only to build the backbone of these systems, but to set the standards by which these technologies will be governed. Kania concludes by recommending the US increase scientific cooperation with its allies on standards and preventing further technology transfer. Meanwhile, she advocates establishing systematic initiatives to develop and promote technical standards and normative frameworks consistent with US values.

Synthesis

Finally, the editors attempt to pull together lessons from the workshop and finished chapters to synthesize the contributions of the authors and the insights of all workshop participants into overarching themes and key policy recommendations. Representing a collection of DoD institutions, the Directors of the RCs sought to add value by providing easily digestible policy recommendations that can be useful to policymakers. While a full reading of the book is encouraged to more fully understand the PRC's campaign, this final synthesis provides both a summation and a quick view into how the US might better compete. For one thing is certain: the PRC is already competing, and has been for a long time.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

As the first RC collaboration, this volume could not have been produced without the dedication and hard work of many intelligent, insightful, and understanding people. Most importantly, the Directors of the RCs identified the value in bringing their faculty together to better understand the regional impacts on global problems and took the initiative to make it happen. However, workshops require a lot more than commander's intent. The three-day event in January 2019 involved thousands of man-hours by over a hundred individuals.

First and foremost, though the Directors of the RCs ultimately committed their Centers to participate in the workshop and this resulting volume, the Deans of all five RCs were instrumental in making this a true RC collaboration. We could not have asked for a more supportive, collaborative group guiding our efforts.

At the outset of this project we received solid recommendations and great insight from Dr. Roger Kangas, Dr. Mohan Malik, Dr. Justin Nankivell, Dr. Jeff Reeves, Dr. Phil Saunders, Chad Sbragia, Dr. Joseph Siegle, Dan Tobin, and Dr. Scott Tollefson. We appreciate the time and effort they dedicated out of their busy schedules.

Thank you to our chapter authors, who gamely agreed to a quick publication timeline to support policymakers with timely information and recommendations as they grapple with a rapidly changing US-China relationship. We appreciate their depth of thought and thoroughness, as well as their willingness to challenge and be challenged with their arguments. It was an absolute pleasure working with them.

Any attempt to name every individual at DKI APCSS who contributed would likely miss someone and fail, especially since just about everyone contributed to the success of the workshop in some way. However, we would like to single out workshop co-lead Dr. Mohan Malik, who helped develop the flow of the event and was instrumental to its success. A few other individuals particularly worthy of note were the three faculty members who facilitated break-out groups during the workshop. In these sessions, they facilitated our eclectic group to assist chapter authors in understanding the broader context, and developing possible policy recommendations. In this regard, Dr. Al Oehlers, Prof. Dave Shanahan, and Dr. Saira Yamin were all instrumental in taking our concept for a workshop and turning it into reality. Each of our faculty partnered with one of our military fellows who assisted in facilitating and capturing outcomes: Maj Charles Berry, USAF; MAJ Qiana Harder, D.B.A., USA; and MAJ Mikel Resnick, USA. The notes and insights provided by our military fellows were instrumental to this finished volume. From a logistics perspective, Darren Adams of the Center's Regional Engagements Office brought the entire event together, and made it look effortless. Finally, thank you to all of our workshop participants who took time out of their busy schedules to join us for three days. They asked thought-provoking questions and offered insightful comments that informed our authors and made their chapters better.

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a collection of chapters into the finished version you are reading. It looks as good as it does due to her skill and tenacity.

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A great many people contributed to this volume, but any errors in formatting, organization, or translating the workshop results into a synthesis chapter are fully ours.

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