Teaching executive courses at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies is a wonderful way to live two worlds at the same time. The courses must be most relevant to policymakers and they must offer something that the policymakers routinely miss in their everyday work. This something is, as many of our course participants told me, a “10,000 miles above the ground” that permits one to see both the big patterns and the deep structures of the landscape. This dual requirement and the engagement with the course participants, who are security practitioners from around 40 countries in the Indo-Pacific region, place the teaching at DKI APCSS in the interface between the practitioner’s world and the analyst’s world.

This book is part of this interface. It provides both an overview of the strategic landscape and insights into the currents that shape this landscape; it addresses security aspects that are important to the practitioners; and it answers the “so what” question central to the practitioner’s job. To this end, one theme underlies every chapter of this book—the complexity of the real world. As the chapters of this book attest, this complexity manifests itself in various ways. One face of the complexity of the social world is embedded in the structure of a situation, which often remains invisible to the participants and defies linear thinking. The complexity of our world affects every action, choice, and decision we make by giving them multiple orders of effects, many of which may go beyond, even against, our purposes.
What drives an individual, an organization, a nation to fight?

“This age-old question warrants a high level of critical thinking due to the unintended consequences of decisions. For some, it comes down to believing there’s a threat to their nation’s interests or territorial integrity. For others, it may be deeper than just that … citizens may voluntarily support, even sacrifice, if the “cause” is deemed fundamental beyond material worth. I would offer this idea: a cause that resonates with values, identity, beliefs, and aspirations can be compelling enough for people to act. Nationalism played a defining role in both World War I and World War II. The Cold War is known both as an ideological and existential clash. In this prolonged contest, Americans were buoyed by the fundamental creed of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, defining elements of American identity, while the Soviet Union embraced an authoritarian approach where more emphasis was placed on control and order than to free thinking. Although some might find parallel themes in the current Strategic Competition discussion, it is worth mentioning that the complexity and the interconnectedness of our world and societies warrant a deeper understanding of consequences and opportunities. Unintended consequences may lead to instability, whereas cooperation and collaboration may reveal opportunities for countries to enjoy more prosperity in a secure and stable world.”

Pete Gumataotao, DKI APCSS Director

The book’s 21 chapters discuss a wide spectrum of topics:

- the rise of China;
- the strategic competition among the great powers;
- the nexus between security and science and technology;
- the quest of individuals, groups, and nations for resources, rights, power, and places in the international arena;
- the question of war and peace;
- the architecture of regional security;
- issues of governance in response to the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century.

Although DKI APCSS is a U.S. organization, several of our authors are non-U.S. nationals and, more importantly, this book deliberately avoids U.S.-centrism. The authors have been encouraged to take a broad regional or global perspective that would allow them to make their discussion relevant to as many security practitioners and analysts in the contemporary world as possible. For example, the discussion of China’s rise and great
power competition in this book is not a response to some uniquely American concerns, but it addresses a common interest shared by an increasing number of people in the region and the world. In this context, it is worth quoting at length some thoughts by Director Pete Gumataotao of DKI APCSS:

I wanted to insert an important viewpoint in this discussion on Strategic Competition that is raised not just by the United States but by many of our Allies and Partners in the region, namely, a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. This concept has been highlighted by countries such as Japan and India years before the United States formally put it in the strategic discourse. For decades, countries in the region have made the fundamental connection that economic security is national security. Simply stated, many countries in the region have benefitted economically from stability in the region: open access to international waters, airways, cyber and space domains; open and transparent investment and financial transactions. I would offer that the prosperity we enjoy today goes beyond monetary value. It is grounded by fundamental principles of respecting individual rights and liberties and, at the national level, freedom from coercion by other countries and adherence to the international standards where all benefit regardless of size or ambitions. I do believe the sky is the limit if we work collaboratively to continue to promote this time-tested concept of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.

A major part of security studies involves the phenomenon of violence. True to its comprehensive character, this book discusses not only war and terrorist attacks, but it also dedicates more than one chapter on structural violence, cultural violence, and sectarian violence, as well as different shades of coercion. These chapters do not end at the analysis of violence and coercion; rather, the analysis serves as the foundation for a solution of the issue, which the chapters will offer.

Taking the evolutionary perspective, each chapter of the book situates the topic of its study in the grand scale of time in order to mine lessons from the past and draw implications for the future. These hindsight and insights, then, enable the authors to look far into the future and make policy recommendations for the security practitioners of today. The book’s substantive chapters are organized into three parts: Part I discusses the contours of the big picture, Part II examines the changing faces of regional security, and Part III exhibits the local dynamics of regional security.
Part I starts with a discussion, in Chapter 1 by Scott McDonald, about how to decipher the actions and decisions of China, the weightiest and highly enigmatic actor in Asia. The author argues that ideas will drive the Indo-Pacific and shows specifically why Chinese philosophy can help us make sense of China’s strategic behavior. Philosophy, as the author notes, is often marked by cultural norms and provides the context within which policy options are deemed ethical and efficacious by policymakers. Chapter 2 by Alexander Vuving turns to great power competition, a phenomenon that profoundly shapes the strategic environment at the international level. Benefiting from the hindsight of millennia of great power history, the chapter identifies the major structures and dynamics that give each case of great power competition a distinctive form. Accordingly, the strategic structure of the U.S.-China rivalry in the 21st century is markedly different from that of the hegemonic contest between Athens and Sparta in the 5th century BC and the Thucydides Trap that made war inevitable between Athens and Sparta does not exist in the U.S.-China strategic competition. The contest’s strategic and configurative structures render some outcomes more likely than others and some strategies more viable than others. The chapter also suggests the strategic imperatives that the contestants must heed if they want to win.

Intertwined with, but distinct from, the Sino-U.S. strategic competition, the Fourth Industrial Revolution is another paramount development that defines the first half of the 21st century. In Chapter 3, Virginia Watson examines the impact of this paradigm-shifting revolution on society, governance, and geopolitics. The chapter outlines the challenges and opportunities in governing the emerging technologies as well as the “big tech” companies that are driving this revolution. While Chapter 2 argues that conflicts in the “gray zone” between peace and war will abound given the strategic structure of the current great power competition, Chapter 3 adds the digitization of geopolitics and war as a key driver of gray zone conflicts. Both chapters highlight the role of “big tech” companies as a major disruptive force that is changing the international system based on their position as the gatekeepers of the virtual world. In Chapter 4, Inez Miyamoto focuses on an important nexus between technology and security. For millennia, surveillance has been a central technique of government and security. Now enhanced tremendously by artificial intelligence, surveillance technologies are posing enormous challenges to the political culture of democratic states because, as the author argues, they conflict with the agreement between democratic governments and their citizens for privacy and civil liberty protections. Based on case studies and a dis-
cussion of the roles of the private sector and the state, the author suggests several recommendations that states should take to resolve these new challenges. Chapter 5 by James Minnich concludes Part I by discussing a security aspect that affects the entire humanity but has largely evaded traditional security studies. The chapter examines global manifestations of societal violence against women in peace as well as in conflict and makes a strong case for gendered security. It also provides a detailed “gendered security analysis tool” for assessing comprehensively the multidimensional operational environment.

Zooming in the Indo-Pacific, the 10 chapters of Part II shed light on major security dynamics that are shaping the face of the region. Tracing the evolution of political violence, particularly terrorism in South Asia and terrorism and insurgency in Southeast Asia, Chapters 6 and 7 by Shyam Tekwani and Sam Mullins, respectively, provide an historical overview of these issues and identify their political and social wellsprings, along with current and emerging threats that may shape the nature of terrorism in the decades to come. Both chapters draw several lessons learned from history to help minimize future violence. Political and societal violence also results from exclusionary politics and religious nationalism. Chapter 8 by Saira Yamin argues that government restrictions on religious freedoms combined with rising religious nationalism are increasing insecurity and instability in the region. Through case studies of the efforts of “Sinicization” and mass detention camps in Xinjiang against Uyghurs and other Muslims and religious nationalism against Muslims in India and Myanmar, the author detects a regional contagion effect of exclusionary state policies that is reinforced by China’s norm-recasting power. For a solution to this challenge, the author offers the example of the Mongol empire with its model of inclusive governance, a secular policy that champions religious coexistence and multiculturalism.

Turning to regional architecture, Chapter 9 by John Hemmings traces the evolution of the U.S. alliance system in the Indo-Pacific, the most enduring feature of the regional security architecture, and highlights the growing minilateralism both within the alliance system and with non-allies as exemplified by several trilateral mechanisms and the “Quad.” The author argues that this alliance system will continue to exist in the coming decades but its original “hub and spokes” structure will be transformed to meet the challenges of a new era and the needs of its members. As evident in most chapters of this book, the new era is characterized by the rise of China and the responses of others to China’s growing power. Chapter 10
by Anu Anwar examines One Belt One Road (OBOR), China’s epoch-shaping effort to expand its influence, in the context of South Asia. As the author notes, OBOR is an essential component of China’s grand strategy, with the potential to reshape South Asia’s security architecture and alter the balance of power in the entire Indian Ocean region in Beijing’s favor. Highlighting the significance of OBOR for South Asia and of South Asia for OBOR as well as China’s unique approach to South Asia, the chapter delineates the security risks posed by OBOR in each of its subregional frameworks and the way forward for South Asia to mitigate these risks. The fulcrum of OBOR is infrastructure investment but it is not living up to expectations. The United States and its like-minded partners have introduced the Blue Dot Network to promote transparent, sustainable, and quality infrastructure investment, an initiative seen as a counter to OBOR. In Chapter 11, Jerre Hansbrough proposes to further develop the Blue Dot Network into the Blue Dot Marketplace as a platform to bring together numerous construction and financial vendors to increase the quality and quantity of global infrastructure investment. Undergirded by an inclusive governing architecture detailed by the author, the Blue Dot Marketplace could serve as a way to cooperate amid the strategic competition.

A look at the map reveals that the Indo-Pacific region is dominated by the maritime domain—the Indian and the Pacific Oceans. Not only does it cover most of the region’s area, but it also supplies most of the hydrocarbons and much of the protein consumed by the region. The best way to trade between China and India, the world’s two most populous countries, is to ship goods through the sea lines of communication that hug the southern and eastern coast of the Asian continent, not by crossing the Himalayas, which form the land border between the two. The main conduit of regional trade, the East and South Asia seas are also the central arena of strategic competition. Chapter 12 by Mizuho Kajiwara brings us to the undersea domain, where the strategic competition is crucial to the global balance of military power. Surveying the history of underwater competition between major powers, the chapter draws numerous lessons on this “cat and mouse” game and the game-changers. It also discusses the recent developments in the Indo-Pacific and suggests specific measures that Japan, a key player in the region, should take to meet the challenges in this domain. Based on these hindsight and insights, the author predicts that new detecting or tracking systems for unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) could be a game-changing technology and help establish supremacy in the undersea domain. Chapter 13 by Ben Crowell and Wade Turvold discusses a major issue in the maritime domain—illegal, unreported,
and unregulated (IUU) fishing—and its impacts on maritime security. The chapter’s global survey of the activity shows that IUU fishing is involved in a wide range of threats including environmental destruction, human slavery and trafficking, smuggling of drugs and weapons, piracy, armed robbery, and the “gray zone” tactic of some nation-states, most notably China. With hindsight and insights gleaned from this survey, the authors make several recommendations for addressing these threats.

In the industrial age, the strengths of the major powers and the security of the international communities hang heavily on the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) capacities and nuclear weapons arsenals of those powers. Surveying the way China is boosting its STEM capacity, Chapter 14 by Ethan Allen argues that Beijing’s state-driven approach to STEM innovation is itself a security concern because it encourages the acquisition of STEM capacities via illegal methods, the violation of widely accepted norms and ethical standards, and the destruction of the environment. Contrasting this state-driven approach with the scientist-driven model, the chapter draws several implications for STEM governance and the relationship between STEM and security. Concluding Part II, Chapter 15 by Bill Wieninger notes that six of the nine global nuclear powers contest in the Indo-Pacific region and the world’s three new nuclear-armed states since 1995 all come from the region. It argues that the danger of a nuclear holocaust is larger today than it was 25 years ago because these nuclear powers pursue their self-interest without considerations for the others’ security needs. Stuck in this security dilemma, the security of these nuclear powers—and with them that of the whole world—will not improve however much they spend on their own defense. While making predictions on the state of nuclear weapons, the chapter also offers some insights on new risks stemming from new technologies and new doctrines as well as how to mitigate the risks of Armageddon.

Part III runs a tour of the region through some important locations to capture the local dynamics of regional security. It dwells on Russia, China, and India, the three major nuclear-armed powers on the Asian continent, and South Korea, Myanmar, and Taiwan, which represent different kinds of gateways linking the land and maritime domains of the region. Chapter 16 by Wade Turvold argues that Russia’s interests and historical experience in the Indo-Pacific are significantly different from its interests and experience in Europe, thus, Moscow can behave very differently in the two theaters. The chapter catalogues the overlaps of long-term interests between Russia and many other states in the Indo-Pacific region,
including the United States and its allies, and makes recommendations for grasping these opportunities for cooperation. Chapter 17 by James Min-nich examines the military alliance between South Korea and America, the only mutual defense pact currently existing between a country on the continent side of the Indo-Pacific and an offshore power. Surveying the major challenges and key values of the alliance, the author suggests that a strong rationale for the alliance in the future can be established if it evolves from a security partnership into a comprehensive strategic alliance with strategic flexibility of forward-stationed U.S. forces in Korea and embedded in a networked security architecture that involves many other allies and partners.

Looking inside China and looking back decades of its “reform and opening” era, Chapter 18 by Sungmin Cho suggests that a cycle of relaxing and tightening (fang-shou) can help us decipher the future of Chinese politics. This cycle results from the wax and wane of major factions within the Chinese Communist Party as they respond differently to domestic and international challenges. If this mechanism continues, the author argues, we should expect a period of liberalization—but not necessarily democratization—of Chinese politics in the decades ahead. Chapter 19 by Srini Sitaraman focuses on the military conflict between the two most populous countries in the world—China and India. Placing this conflict in the historical context of the Sino-Indian territorial disputes, the regional context of their relations with Tibet and Pakistan, their external and internal balancing efforts, and other international and domestic factors, the chapter examines the prospects and implications of three scenarios—status quo, grand bargain, and hot war—in the short, medium, and long terms.

Strategic primacy in Asia hinges on access to both the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. China’s dream of “restoring” its top position at the apex of the hierarchy of nations in Asia is thus contingent to a considerable extent on Beijing’s influence in countries like Pakistan, Myanmar, Indonesia, and, if the Kra Canal is built, also Thailand, which control the gateways to the Indian Ocean from China and the South China Sea. With Pakistan firmly entrenched as a Chinese ally, Indonesia vigilantly guarding its independence, and the Kra Canal not built, Myanmar is the softest of the major spots of the strategic competition in Asia. Has Myanmar become China’s back door to the Indian Ocean? Chapter 20 by Miemie Byrd poses this question after examining the history of U.S.-Myanmar relations and recent vital gains China has reaped in Myanmar when the United States imposed sanctions on Myanmar’s top military leaders against their human
rights abuses. The author argues that a strategy of engagement with Myanmar can meet U.S. objectives regarding both its strategic competition with China and its promotion of human rights, a long-term process that the American engagement with South Korea can attest. Concluding Part III and the book, Chapter 21 by Michael Burgoyne turns the spotlight to Taiwan, which is situated at the double gateway between the East China Sea and the South China Sea and between China and the open oceans. Taiwan lost the China seat in the United Nations to Beijing in 1971 and since then has been fighting a continuous struggle for international space in international organizations and relations with individual states. This fight is not only an existential struggle for Taiwan, but it is also a major way for China to enlarge and deepen its worldwide influence. After briefly surveying this struggle, the chapter argues that fateful decisions by Beijing and Taipei related to the 2020 presidential election in Taiwan, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the governance of Hong Kong have the potential to reverse the long-term trend in this fight between Taiwan and China.

Even with 21 chapters, this book still does not exhaust the list of security issues in the Indo-Pacific region. Several important topics and places such as natural and man-made disasters, the water-food-security nexus, the impact of demography on security, the space domain, Oceania, the Arctic, Antarctica, the Mekong subregion, to name just a few, are left for our future publications to address at length. This book does, however, provide a tour d’horizon of the most consequential issues that are defining the global and regional security landscape. With hindsight, insight, and foresight in each of its chapters, the book offers a perspective to see this landscape in its dynamic making and re-making.