

# THE FUTURE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND UNITED STATES ALLIANCE: FIX IT OR LOSE IT

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“If you want to go fast, go alone; but if you want to go far, go together”<sup>1</sup> is a proverb that well evinces the Republic of Korea and United States (ROK-U.S.) alliance whose origins trace back 75 years when U.S. forces landed in Incheon to end Japan’s 35-year annexation of the Korean Peninsula. Washington, however, remained circumspect of developing a strategic relationship with Seoul until the U.S. commitment to lead the international defense of South Korea against the North Korean attack of June 1950. It was, moreover, the shared experiences of the three year Korean War that cemented Washington’s relationship with Seoul and led to the October 1953 ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty.

Reciprocal strategic worth and interests have since preserved the ROK-U.S. alliance as the linchpin of Washington’s San Francisco System, which John Foster Dulles colloquially termed a “hub and spoke” bilateral military architecture.<sup>2</sup> Absent a Fulda Gap-like attack route whereby the Soviet Army might have collectively threatened Washington’s array of Asian partners and interests, coupled with Washington’s vastly disproportionate power imbalance among its allies, Washington chose in the early 1950s to negotiate a series of bilateral alliances that retained positional advantage over its allies,<sup>3</sup> including Seoul. In the intervening years, South Korea spectacularly rose from a war-ravaged, pauper state to the world’s 12th largest economy. This chapter considers the future of the ROK-U.S. alliance by assessing its present challenges and current worth as a linchpin ally.

## ALLIANCE CHALLENGES

The ROK-U.S. alliance is a strategic relationship that, while actively managed, has often strained heavily under the weight of its own challenges. Yesteryears' challenges included South Korea's threats to attack North Korea in the 1950s and late-1960s, coups d'état in 1961 and 1979, an illicit nuclear weapons program in the 1970s, and human rights abuses up through the 1990s. Other alliance challenges included the United States' troop reductions in the 1970s, 1990s, and most recently in 2004,<sup>4</sup> unilateral threats to militarily strike North Korea in 1994,<sup>5</sup> and the Yangju Training Accident (also termed the Highway 56 Accident) in 2002. These and other challenges have deeply divided the two allies. When challenges are ham-handedly tended, the alliance is senselessly stressed. It is therefore prudent to actively identify and deftly manage or resolve emerging alliance challenges. To that end, three pressing alliance challenges are presented here: (1) negotiating special measures agreement to share stationing costs of U.S. forces in Korea, (2) stationing U.S. single threat forces in Korea, and (3) transferring wartime operational control of ROK forces back to Korea.

### Special Measures Agreement

Seoul has directly supported the stationing of U.S. forces in Korea since the introduction of those forces in 1945 with no-cost land and facilities use. Since 1950, Seoul further contributed to defense cost-sharing of U.S. forces in Korea through manpower support of Korean soldiers or Korean Augmentations to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) as they are formally known. In 1966, Seoul and Washington amended Article IV of the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty with a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that codified in Article V for the U.S. to bear, without cost to the ROK, all expenditures incident to the maintenance of the U.S. armed forces in Korea, and for the ROK to furnish, without cost to the United States, all facilities and area.<sup>6</sup> Significant U.S. defense cuts at the end of the Cold War led Washington in 1991 to negotiate with Seoul an exception to Article V of the SOFA, necessitating a Special Measures Agreement (SMA) wherein Seoul would begin offsetting the non-personnel stationing costs of U.S. forces in Korea through a combination of cash remunerations and payments in-kind toward three categories: Korean labor, military facilities, and military support.<sup>7</sup> At the writing of this chapter, the 11th SMA was in contentious negotiation as the 10th SMA expired on December 31, 2019. With defense

cost-sharing agreements lasting 29 months on average and taking many months to negotiate, cost-sharing disagreements have been a perennial source of strain on the alliance. Cost-sharing disputes broadly converge on divergences of what constitutes fair-share contributions, how to measure direct and indirect support contributions, and perceptions of coercive concession-taking.

Fair-share contribution disputes emote from divergent viewpoints of how to parse the costs of defending against a North Korean threat. Toward that view, Washington circumscribes cost expenditures to those used in defending South Korea.<sup>8</sup> To that point, Washington's lead SMA negotiator asserted that "the most important factor to consider in these [SMA] talks is ... [that] the American taxpayer bears a very significant burden ... *to defend the Republic of Korea* [emphasis added]."<sup>9</sup> Seoul asserts that North Korean threats hazard beyond South Korea's borders, and that it is Washington's national interests vice its benevolence that underlies the stationing of U.S. forces in Korea, Japan and elsewhere, and therefore the U.S. defense of Seoul cannot be a singular determinant in parsing cost-sharing contributions.<sup>10</sup>

Beyond SMA contributions, Seoul more liberally weighs its alliance contributions to be inclusive of its several international security engagements, robust procurements of U.S. defense articles, and its top-tier defense spending of which it ranks ninth globally.<sup>11</sup> The alliance, however, is cast as a transactional arrangement when a ledger is used to measure its worth, which inevitably contributes to Washington's interrogative doubts to continue stationing its single threat forces in Korea to defend Seoul, as Seoul publicly muses the future worth of the ROK-U.S. alliance.<sup>12</sup>

### **Single Threat Forces**

Reminiscent of the Cold War when the United States forward deployed single threat forces in Germany against the Soviet Union and in South Korea against North Korea, U.S. forces in Korea have stood a 70-year vigil against the North Korean People's Army. The decreasing viability of U.S. forces forward-deployed against singularly postured threats seems to be running its course. On June 30, 2020, the Pentagon announced that the U.S. president had finalized his decision to reduce 9,500 troops from Germany.<sup>13</sup> In the week preceding this announcement, the U.S. national security advisor explained that "[t]he Cold War practice of garrisoning

large numbers of troops with their families on massive bases in places like Germany is now, in part, obsolete.”<sup>14</sup> Similarly, the president had earlier ordered the Pentagon to develop troop reduction plans for Korea,<sup>15</sup> and then in late 2019, it was reported that he was specifically considering the reduction of 4,000 troops from the Korean Peninsula.<sup>16</sup>

This alliance challenge leaves particular publics and politicians in both countries questioning the rationale to continue stationing U.S. forces in Korea.<sup>17</sup> Attesting to the prospect of contemplated U.S. troop reductions from Korea, the U.S. Congress legislated against using 2020 appropriated funds to reduce U.S. forces in Korea below the currently stationed strength of 28,500, unless the defense secretary certified to Congress that doing so would not significantly undermine U.S. allies in the region.<sup>18</sup> Considered reduction of U.S. forces from Korea has been a nonpartisan issue for the United States as both parties have at times advocated complete troop withdrawal, while implementing partial troop reductions. Washington’s perceptions of its flagging national interest to expend treasure and troop strength to defend South Korea has been and will continue to be its primary argument for directing U.S. troop reductions from the peninsula.<sup>19</sup> Consequently, unless Washington adopts core strategic interests for forward-stationing troops on the Korean peninsula that are more vital than the need for single threat forces to defend against a potential North Korean attack, then the ROK-U.S. alliance risks future relevancy.

Respectively incongruent toward the perpetual defense posturing of U.S. forces in Korea against a single threat has been successive ROK administrations that have rejected the characterization of North Korea as its enemy as was done in three biennial publications of the government’s Defense White Papers in 2006, 2008, and 2018.<sup>20</sup> Delisting Pyongyang as its enemy was taken concurrently with multiple inter-Korean joint statements to establish a permanent peace regime. The dichotomy of establishing a peace regime while jointly posturing “fight tonight” combatants is stark and has but two outcomes: perpetuation of mutual hostilities as the threat of force overshadows efforts toward peace, or the emergence of peace and the irrelevance of combat postured forces. In either scenario, the United States’ forward-deployed single threat forces in Korea face a future risk of relevance. In the former scenario, Seoul’s public and politicians may perceive U.S. forces in Korea as an obstacle to establishing peace with Pyongyang, and in the later scenario, U.S. forces in Korea may be left scrambling to justify its continued presence on the peninsula in the face of future irrelevance absent an actual North Korean threat.

## Wartime OPCON Transfer

Since the opening days of the Korean War, the United States has maintained uninterrupted wartime operational control (OPCON) of delegated ROK military forces. This military construct, which facilitated unity of combined command for seven decades, was contentiously viewed as infringement on Korea's autonomous defense and sovereignty by the South Korean administrations of Presidents Park Chung-hee in the early 1970s, Roh Tae-woo in the early 1990s, Roh Moo-hyun in the early 2000s, and Moon Jae-in since his 2017 inauguration. Seoul and Washington have negotiated, in stages, the transfer of operational control of ROK forces from the United States back to South Korea. Peacetime OPCON – train, maintain, and equip authority– of ROK forces by the U.S. commander was relinquished in 1994;<sup>21</sup> and in 2006, it was originally “agreed to expeditiously complete the transition of [wartime] OPCON to the ROK ... not later than March 15, 2012.”<sup>22</sup> However, North Korean security threats in the intervening years led to shared decisions to delay OPCON transfer. The first decision came in 2010 to delay OPCON transfer until December 2015;<sup>23</sup> this was followed by a second delay decision in 2014 to forego a specified transfer date in favor of a conditions-based approach to the transition of wartime OPCON.<sup>24</sup> With South Korean President Moon Jae-in's 2017 election, Seoul progressives once again asserted national urgency to regain wartime OPCON of their military forces; an objective that Moon wants fulfilled before ending his five year-termed presidency in May 2022.<sup>25</sup>

Complicating the wartime OPCON transfer agreement, is the 2014 decision by the ROK defense minister and U.S. defense secretary to “transition wartime operational control (OPCON) from the U.S. forces-led Combined Forces Command (CFC) to a new ROK forces-led combined defense command.”<sup>26</sup> The implication of that commitment is that operational control of U.S. forces and capabilities in the Korean theater of operation will no longer be exercised by a U.S. commander, but by a ROK commander; a decision that Washington seems to have never fully embraced and increasingly appears to be shying from. Favorable OPCON transfer conditions will be measured by two factors: South Korea's capability to lead the ROK-U.S. CFC, and the North Korean threat against the ROK-U.S. alliance. The Moon administration sought to actively affect both these conditions with enactment of the Defense Reform Plan 2.0 in July 2018,<sup>27</sup> and an inter-Korean cooperative threat reduction plan, colloquially termed the Comprehensive Military Agreement of September 2018.<sup>28</sup> Fol-

lowing an agreed three-tiered OPCON transfer certification process, the United States certified South Korea's initial operational capability (IOC) in August 2019, agreed to evaluate its full operational capability (FOC) in August 2020, and then full mission capability (FMC) in 2021.<sup>29</sup> Adherence to this timeline would conceivably result in wartime OPCON transfer before the end of Moon's presidency in May 2022. The timeline, however, now seems to be in question as COVID-19 mitigation measures prevented ROK-U.S. CFC from conducting their combined springtime exercise in March and may alter their August 2020 exercise as well.<sup>30</sup>

Wartime OPCON transfer is a polarizing issue in South Korea with a 50-50 split, according to a January 2019 survey that identified 39.6% support for the transfer as planned, 31.5% support to delay the transfer period, 10.5% support to eliminate the transfer plan, and 18.3% who were uncertain.<sup>31</sup> Seoul and Washington both know that if wartime OPCON transfer is not implemented in Moon's administration that absent a consecutive progressive incumbent in 2022, OPCON transfer will be delayed by a conservative Seoul administration. President Moon's left-leaning party, however, won a historic landslide victory in April's midterm parliamentary elections,<sup>32</sup> which emboldened Moon's progressive mandate and improved the probability of his party retaining power in the 2022 elections. The U.S. relinquishment of wartime operational control of ROK military forces is inevitable and imminent if a progressive president succeeds President Moon Jae-in. Washington needs to either be reconciled that a ROK commander will exercise operational control of U.S. forces allocated to the ROK-U.S. CFC, or decide on alternative actions.

## ALLIANCE WORTH

The ROK-U.S. alliance, valued as a Cold War bulwark against the spread of communism in Asia for 40 years and thereafter as a shield against Pyongyang's threat of nuclear weapons and missiles, has been progressively questioned as to its future purposes. As Washington felt increasingly pressured to rationalize the worth of the ROK-U.S. alliance in terms of yearly fiscal budgets and calculated casualty rates in the defense of its economically vibrant ally in Seoul, the U.S. defense secretary and ROK defense minister established in 2002 the Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance (FOTA), a senior defense-level working group, to address near-term alliance adjustments and a longer-term alliance vision.<sup>33</sup> Four years later, the

group issued a report that suggested a future in which the alliance would contribute to peace and security near and far.<sup>34</sup>

In 2009, Presidents Barack Obama and Lee Myung-bak issued a *Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea* affirming that the two countries were “building an Alliance to ensure a peaceful, secure and prosperous future for the Korean Peninsula, the Asia-Pacific region, and the world.”<sup>35</sup> Perhaps with renewed uncertainty of the defining worth of the ROK-U.S. alliance, the U.S. defense secretary and ROK defense minister directed in 2018 yet another joint study; that one was titled *The Future Defense Vision of the ROK-U.S. Alliance*. The study results were presented a year later and highlighted “that future alliance cooperation should continuously expand and deepen.”<sup>36</sup>

In a rare exhibit of public candor, Dr. Paik Hak-soon, policy advisor to the ROK Ministry of Unification, profoundly questioned the present value of the ROK-U.S. alliance while speaking at a CSIS-hosted online event in June 2020 with other past and present executive government officials from Washington and Seoul.<sup>37</sup> With equal forthrightness, former U.S. Ambassador to Seoul Kathleen Stephens then cautioned against rosy assumptions that the ROK-U.S. alliance’s future could weather its current challenges or the evolution of great power relations.<sup>38</sup> In view of two decades’ joint search for the rationale of a future ROK-U.S. alliance, paired with mounting cautionary signals from senior alliance experts, it seems incumbent on alliance managers and leaders to urgently articulate the alliance’s distinct worth now and into the future. To that end, three elements of the alliance’s worth are presented here: (1) evolving the security partnership into a comprehensive strategic alliance, (2) establishing strategic flexibility of forward-stationed U.S. forces in Korea, and (3) forming a networked security architecture.

### **Comprehensive Strategic Alliance**

Forged in battle and resolute for seven decades, the ROK-U.S. alliance firmly stands against the North Korean threat, but what will the alliance stand for as the North Korean threat wanes or is abated? Alliances fear entanglement in conflicts not of their choosing, and abandonment in times of need. Prospect of alliance irrelevance, therefore, could dissuade an ally from advancing threat reduction measures to forestall abandonment. As long as the ROK-U.S. alliance is singularly focused on “fight tonight” security readiness, there is lessened impetus for alliance partners to advance

threat reduction measures with North Korea, which in turn could strain the rationale for the continued existence of the alliance. Such was the case for NATO when the Soviet Union collapsed. Similarly deleterious to an alliance is the notion that it is a burden, which is conveyed often in language such as burden-sharing, free-riding, and one-way commitment.<sup>39</sup>

Seoul and Washington have consistently voiced need to expand the ROK-U.S. alliance. As stated earlier in this chapter, Presidents Barak Obama and Lee Myung-bak committed in 2009 to build “a comprehensive strategic alliance of bilateral, regional and global scope”;<sup>40</sup> and more recently, Presidents Donald Trump and Moon Jae-in met in 2017 near the inauguration of both of their administrations “to advance the comprehensive strategic Alliance between the United States and the ROK.”<sup>41</sup> Reimagining the ROK-U.S. alliance as comprehensive and strategic is to envision its purpose as more far-reaching than just the defense of South Korea and its worth to be inherently more than defense alone. Certainly more than defense against traditional geographic threats, which are less likely from Pyongyang, Beijing or Moscow than their nonmilitary threats through diplomatic coercion, economic sanction, disinformation, and cyberattack.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, in an era when Washington views China as a revisionist power laboring to displace the United States from the Indo-Pacific through coercion of other nations,<sup>43</sup> the need to reform the alliance seems doubly pressing. Comprehensive strategic alliance reform should consider internal reflection and joint inquiry into interests and values that are singular and shared to warrant expenditures that produce aggregate benefits to each ally.<sup>44</sup> A ROK-U.S. comprehensive security alliance might collectively advance health security, gendered security, cyber security, space security, maritime security, and networked security with other powers to sustain the rules-based regional order.<sup>45</sup>

### **Strategic Flexibility**

Respecting the U.S. need for strategic flexibility, Seoul assented in 2006 for the United States to globally employ its forces from Korea with the caveat that Washington respect Seoul’s position to not be involved in a regional conflict against its will.<sup>46</sup> The United States has yet to meaningfully exercise strategic flexibility of its forces from Korea. Notwithstanding, this dormant foreign minister-level agreement could form the basis to transform U.S. forces in Korea from a single threat operational force to a forward stationed strategic force. A concurrent decoupling of U.S. war-

time operational control over ROK forces with the available employment of U.S. forces from Korea could significantly increase U.S. strategic reach throughout the Indo-Pacific, and beyond. To that end, the present composition of U.S. forces in Korea should be reexamined to better account for desirable capability and deployability. An increased use of agile rotational forces in Korea was highlighted by the U.S. defense secretary in late June 2020 as a particular approach toward fostering U.S. “greater strategic flexibility in terms of responding to challenges around the globe.”<sup>47</sup>

### **Networked Security Architecture**

Washington’s networked security objectives lie in encouraging, and as necessary, supporting allies like Seoul to advance within the region comprehensive efforts that promote the gamut of security dimensions in political stability, governance, economics, health, social progress, gendered security, environmental protection, peacekeeping, and defense. A networked security architecture should seek to cooperatively cross-level regional security accountability among allies and partners. Its effectiveness will be found in purposeful cooperation.

Ambassadors and senior representatives of the 21 member states of the United Nations Command and Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission gather together often where they are posted in South Korea to discuss security matters. Each of these 21 countries is linked by its participation in the Korean War, support to the Korean Armistice Agreement, and its security interests in Asia. This networked security architecture is unique as it convenes security leaders from all six continents and beyond and includes countries from the Americas (Canada, Colombia, United States), Africa (South Africa), Asia (Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey), Europe (Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom), and the Pacific (Australia, New Zealand). This networked security architecture is very active in administering armistice supervision on the Korean Peninsula and to a lesser degree military operations. However, this body’s broader potential to collectively advance a more comprehensive security in the Indo-Pacific is unrealized. Amplifying this collective’s security focus on the Korean Peninsula and beyond might necessitate soliciting an enlarged sense of purpose for this special group of 21 countries.

Illustrative of regionally networked security is the Japanese-hosted Enforcement Coordination Cell in Yokosuka where eight states partner

to enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions against North Korea's illegal ship-to-ship transfers of sanctioned cargo.<sup>48</sup> Similarly illustrative is the Proliferation Security Initiative, a political commitment of 21 states who form an Operational Experts Group that loosely lead a large body of endorsing states who have pledged to interdict the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction.<sup>49</sup>

## CONCLUSION

*Katchi keapshida* – “we go together” is the motto of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command specifically and the ROK-U.S. Alliance generally. As the guiding dictum over a 70-year relationship, observers might be comfortably lulled into thinking that the ROK-U.S. alliance will last forever. The alliance's future, however, is increasingly uncertain, which requires alliance leaders and managers to actively tend to its present challenges and pursue its intrinsic worth. There are manifold problems along a continuum of the alliance's strategic and tactical challenges. This chapter examined three perennial matters – special measures agreement, single threat forces, and wartime OPCON transfer – that have again risen to occupy attention at the highest levels in both capitals. Negotiating a special measures agreement to share stationing costs of U.S. forces in Korea needs an immediate resolution to depressurize bilateral grievances over the sensitivities of this issue. While present cost-sharing concessions will likely be forthcoming, the challenges of this issue will yet linger and likely re-fester to the degree that the alliance's worth is measured on an accounting ledger.

The continuous stationing of U.S. single threat forces in Korea proved itself as a problematic policy time and again when confronted by competing U.S. interests and diminishing defense budgets. As a result, four U.S. administrations withdrew 34,500 U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula between 1971 and 2008. At the writing of this chapter, Washington again debates its rationale for permanently stationing single threat forces on the Korean Peninsula. A clear line of examination is drawn between the cost to station single threat forces in Korea, and the level of Seoul's cost-sharing contributions to offset Washington's defense burden.<sup>50</sup> Resolution of this current challenge will likely manifest in two ways; either Seoul will increase its cost-sharing contributions, or Washington will reduce its troop strength. Both of those resolution methods were employed in yesteryears' crises of defense interests. However, absent an alliance rationale to station

U.S. forces in Korea for reasons other than to “defend” Seoul, this alliance challenge will perennially persist until the last U.S. soldier departs the Korean Peninsula.

The ROK-U.S. CFC has long been heralded as the world’s most combat capable combined force. The cost of this distinction, however, has been Seoul’s willing relinquishment of wartime OPCON to an uninterrupted line of U.S. four-star commanders since 1950. No other sovereign state with a standing military has tendered it autonomous defense to another country, and Seoul now wrestles to reclaim autonomous defense while preserving the ROK-U.S. defense alliance. For 18 years, the challenge of wartime OPCON transfer rose to presidential levels as an alliance challenge for each former ROK and U.S. administration. The ROK military is a highly capable force with extremely competent commanders and institutional experience from the last four major wars in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The competency of ROK commanders to resume wartime operational control of its forces is not the issue at hand. Rather, the problem is that Washington is not committed to the prospect of ROK commanders assuming operational control over U.S. forces in wartime. A standing wartime OPCON relationship over an ally’s military force is not essential to the deployment of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula, but it is the essence of maintaining a future ROK-U.S. CFC. Consequently, Washington and Seoul should reconcile to that reality and collectively create a new future that each can support.

The value of the ROK-U.S. alliance is measurable by seven decades of peace and prosperity in South Korea and throughout the region. Alliance challenges are a harbinger that the future of the ROK-U.S. alliance is not in preserving its past but in promoting its potential. Unequivocally, this author believes that the ROK-U.S. relationship is singular and its future boundless if tethered to explicit worth that is collectively heralded in Seoul and Washington. This chapter identified three alliance diversifications—comprehensive strategic alliance, strategic flexibility, and networked security—that could revitalize the ROK-U.S. alliance to be adaptive to its transforming region. As Seoul increasingly labors to normalize relations with Pyongyang, a North Korean threat-based alliance will eventually meet a test of relevancy. It is in this context worth remembering the colloquial tones of Marshall Goldsmith, “what got you here won’t get you there.”<sup>51</sup> A ROK-U.S. comprehensive security alliance envisions broad alliance collaboration in manifold areas of health security, gendered security, cyber security, space security, maritime security, and networked security.

The exercise of strategic flexibility will diversify the aim and configuration of single threat-based U.S. forces deployed to the Korea Peninsula. As this strategy unencumbers U.S. forces in Korea to respond to expanded security roles, the alliance should create opportunities to partner in off-peninsula activities that underscore alliance extra-peninsular security obligations toward upholding a free and open Indo-Pacific. The dyadic nature of the ROK-U.S. alliance should discard any remaining patron-client vestiges and promote a dynamism that produces organic momentum toward independently led efforts of greater regional security. The synergy produced from such a bilateral alliance will expand its charter from doing together to doing with others. This is the essence of a networked security architecture where Seoul and Washington labor independently with others to uphold a rules based regional order. The ROK-U.S. relationship runs deep and long; and while challenges to the alliance future are significant, the collective liability is diminutive to a shared worth that needs garnered now. A study of the Korean language invariably leads one to learn its proverbs (*sokdam*). *So ilko oeyanggan gochinda* translates to “lose the cow then fix the barn.” In context, this Korean proverb is an admonition to fix these alliance challenges and set its future worth before the alliance is lost.

## Notes

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